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NON-PRO POSITIONAL ANALYSES OF BELIEF

Richard

H.

Feldman, B.A. Cornell University
M.A., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Prof, Herbert Heidelberger

In this

dissertation

I

will evaluate three principal

kinds of non-propositional analyses of belief.
is

The first kind

the sentential analysis, according to which belief sentences

may be interpreted as relating people to sentences.

A view of

this sort has been defended by Rudolf Carnap in Meaning and
:

jNecess ity

.

The second kind of non-propositional analysis of belief
to be discussed is the inscriptions!

(or utterance) analysis,

according to which belief sentences may be interpretated as
relating people to inscriptions or utterances.
this sort that

I

The views of

will criticize have been presented by Israel

Scbeffler in The Anato my of Inqu iry and by Donald Davidson
in "On Saying That".

The third kind of non-propositional analysis is the

non-relational analysis, according to which belief sentences are
iv

not relational at all.

defended by W.

V.

0.

I

will discuss the versions of this
view

Quine in Word and Obje ct

,

A.

N.

Prior in

Objec ts of T hought, and Jaakko Hintikka
in "Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes".

v

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PROPOSITIONS

I.

CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER Ill

CARNAP

OBJECTIONS TO CARNAP’S THEORY

CHAPTER V.

SCHEFFLER

CHAPTER VI.
.

39

68
91

118

DAVIDSON

CHAPTER VII I.
CHAPTER IX.

21

CARNAP AND CHURCH

.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER VII

1

QUINE AND PRIOR

171

HiNTIKKA

195

CONCLUSION

217

VI

Chapter

I

PROPOSITIONS

In

G.

E.

Chapters

3

and 14 of Some Main Problems of Philosophy'

1

Moore discusses propositions. 2

In

Chapter

3

he says that

there "certainly are in the universe such things as propositions"^
and he goes on to describe some of their more important charac-

teristics.

In

Chapter 14 he comes to

a

different conclusion,

namely, "that there simply are no such things as propositions."^

Many philosophers have been more sympathetic with Moore's
later view, that there are no propositions, than with his earlier
view, that there are.

In

large part the reason for the stronger

appeal of the negative view is that neither Moore's nor anyone

else's account of propositions leaves the reader certain that
there are such things.

Moore's discussion of propositions may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Propositions are not "any of those collections of words,

which are one of the things that are commonly called propositions."^
The word 'proposition' is sometimes used to mean 'sentence,

1

and

Moore is here pointing out that he is not using the word in that
way.
(2) Propositions, Moore says, are "the sort of thing which

these collections of words express" or "what these words mean."^

1

i

he collections of words to which Moore
refers are sentences, so

propositions are the meanings of sentences, and sentences
are
said to express propositions.

Elsewhere Moore points out that not all sentences
express

propositions.

For example,

does not express one.

In

a

sentence such as 'Close the door'

general, it is only declarative

sentences that express propositions.^
(3) When one sees or hears a sentence, and understands it,

one "apprehends" the proposition expressed.

A proposition, then,

is "the sort of thing which is apprehended" when one understands
a

sentence. 8
(4) One may simply apprehend a proposition without making any

judgment about it, or one may adopt any of
toward it.

a

number of attitudes

Moore mentions only the possibilities of believing

it and disbelieving it,^ but there are several others that may
be added to his list.

assert it, etc.
with respect to

All
a

One may doubt a proposition, know it,
of these positions one may take or have

proposition are called "propositional attitudes."

(5) Propositions "are a sort of thing which can properly be

said to be true or false,"^ although Moore admits that other

things may also be said to be true or false, for example, beliefs
(acts of believing) and sentences.

Moore has suggested elsewhere that propositions are the
"primary" truth bearers.

This means that the sense of 'true*

8

3

in which things other than propositions are
true may be defined
in terms of the sense in which propositions are
true, but the

propositional sense cannot be defined in terms of the other
senses.

Thus,

belief is true provided it is

a

belief in

a

true proposition; a sentence is true provided it expresses

a

a

true proposition.^
(6)

In Chapter 14 of Some Main Problems of Phi losophy

Moore adds another item to this list of characteristics of
proposi tions.

It is that we can always form a name of a proposition

by prefixing a sentence expressing that proposition with the

word 'that'.

“

Thus, for example, the proposition that lions

exist is named by the expression 'that lions exist
expression consisting of 'that' followed by
called

a

a

1

.

Any

sentence may be

"that-clause".

Item (2) in this list of characteristics of propositions
is a source of some difficulty.

persuasively that

a

Richard Cartwright has argued

sentence such as 'It is raining' is used

to express different things on different occasions, but its

meaning remains constant.^ 4

Thus, what

a

sentence means and

what it expresses diverge, at least in some cases.
reserve 'proposition' for what is expressed by

a

Let us

sentence.

We may leave open the question whether what is meant by a

sentence and what is expressed by it ever coincide.
I

can see no further inconsistencies in Moore's account

4

of propositions, but there is one respect in
which it should be

supplemented.

It is generally said of propositions that
they

are abstract entities whose existence is necessary

5

They are,

therefore, not physical objects located at seme particular
place
or time.
If Moore was right when he said that there are propositions,

then a number of facts concerning belief and belief sentences

seem subject to simple explanations.

discussion

of

I

will turn now to a

how prepositions can aid in these explanations.

The supposition that that-clauses are names of propositions

seems to allow us to give an unproblematic account of the

semantics of belief sentences.
semen rics for

a

In a typical

extensionsal

language, we show how the truth value of every

sentence in the language is determined by the extensions of
the expressions making up the sentence.

The extension of a

name is an object and the extension of an n-place predicate is
a

set of ordered n-tuples of objects.

On the supposition that

that-clauses are simple names, belief sentences may easily be

incorporated in

a

language for which an extensional semantics

may be given.
By saying that that-clauses are simple names,

I

intend to

contrast them with complex names, which are names having
meaningful parts and whose meaning (or extension) is somehow

determined by the meaning (or extension) of these parts.

For

5

example, one might say that 'the father of
Nixon' is

a

complex

name, whose extension is determined by the
extensions of its

meaningful parts, 'the father
Suppose

F

of

and 'Nixon'.

is a function that assigns to each simple

English expression its extension.

It will

thus assign to each

simple name some object and to each n-place predicate
some

ordered n-tuple of objects.
G.

E.

F( 'Moore'), then, will

be the man,

Moore, F('that lions exist') will be the proposition

that lions exist, and

F(

'

bel ieves

'

)

will be a set of ordered

pairs of people and propositions such that the first member of

each pair, the person, believes the second member, the
proposition.
We are now in a position to specify the truth conditions

for

1.

a

typical belief sentence, e.g.,

Moore believes that lions exist.

The truth conditions will be stated by this principle:

'Moore believes that lions exist' is true iff <^F('Moore'),
F('that lions exist')/* e F( believes ')
'

(2)

is

simply an instance of

a

more general formula

covering all belief sentences:

3.

For any names a and ^that 03 r a believes that
iff <^F (a) , F( r that 0^ )/> e F( bel ieves' )
'

0^

is true

6

itself is simply an instance of

(3)

still more general

a

formula that provides the truth conditions for
all atomic
sentences.

Ignoring

a

problem about word order in English, we

may state this general formula this way:

4.

For any names a ,...,a and any n-place predicate P,
is true iff <F(a )...FTa
e F(P).
1

r

P(cq...a
V
1

V

n'

n )>

On this account of belief sentences, then, no special rules
need
be added to the truth definition to cover them.

Let us call the theory just sketched the "naive

propositional view", or simply "(NPV)".
advantages.

arid

has a number of

First, it seems clear that speakers of diverse

languages may believe the same thing.
Nixon

(NPV)

If, for example, both

Brezhnev believe that detente is good, then they

believe the same thing.

with this fact.

Nothing about (NPV) is inconsistent

Although the two men would use different

sentences to express their common belief, we may say that there
is one proposition, namely, that detente is good, and that both

Nixon and Brezhnev believe it.
Second, since propositions are abstract entities they are

not dependent for their existence upon languages or language
users.

Therefore, even if no one expresses

may exist and be believed.
beliefs are never expressed.

a

proposition, it still

This accords with the fact that some
Thus the sentence 'Jones believes

7

something that never has been and never
will be expressed
true.

1

may be

(NPV) accounts for this, since
nothing prevents F( 'believes*

from including an ordered pair consisting
of Jones and some

proposition that never has been and never will
be expressed.
A third advantage of (NPV) is that it
explains the

invalidity of certain inferences.

5.

For example,

Plato believed that nine is greater than seven,

may be true despite the falsity of

6.

Plato believed that the number of planets is greater than
seven.

The fact that nine is the number of planets does net prevent
(5)
and (6) from differing in truth value.

(NPV) provides a simple

explanation of this: the that-clauses in (5) and (6) name
different propositions.
other..

Plato believed one of them, but not the

Hence, (5) and (6) have different truth values.

Although (NPV) has all these advantages, it is subject to
some important criticisms.

By treating that-clauses as simple

names, it seems to ignore some extremely important facts about
language.

Since any sentence can be preceded by 'that', and there
are an infinite number of sentences, it follows that there are
an infinite number of that-clauses.

If each that-clause is a

8

simple name, there are an infinite number of simple names.
The view that English has an infinite number of simple

names is an implausible one 15
.

If it is true,

it follows that

no one could ever be capable of understanding all the atomic

sentences of English, since no one could ever learn the entire

primitive vocabulary.

It seems clear,

however, that the number

of simple expressions is finite, and that it is possible for

someone to master all of them, as well as all the rules for

combining expressions, and thus be in
all

a

position to understand

the atomic sentences.

Independent of these general considerations are some more

specific considerations about that-clauses that suggest that they
are not simple names.
a

It seems clear that anyone who understands

sentence is thereby able to understand

out of it.
'exist'

a

that-clause constructed

For example, anyone who understands 'lions' and

and thus understands 'Lions exist'

understand 'that lions exist'.

is thereby able to

No additional information is

required to understand the that-clause, except possibly about
the function of 'that'.
If that-clauses were simple names,

'lions'

however, understanding

and 'exist' would be of no more aid in understanding

'that lions exist' than understanding the words 'nix' and 'on'
is in understanding

'Nixon'.

This suggests that that-clauses

are not simple names, but complex ones, whose meaning, or

9

denotation, somehow is determined by the
meaning or denotation
of its parts.

One additional problem with (NPV) is
that it fails to

account for points (2) and (6) in Moore's
list of attributes of
propositions.

Point (2) was that sentences express
propositions

and (6) was that

a

that-clause names the proposition the sentence

in it ordinarily expresses.

But (NPV) says nothing about

sentences expressing propositions.

It attributes truth values

to sentences, but in no way relates sentences
to propositions.

(Except in the roundabout way that sentences may contain
names
of propositions, and thus can be related to them in
this way.)

There are, then, two problems with (NPV).

One is that

it treats that-clauses as simple names, but this seems

implausible on general theoretical grounds, as well as being
a

factually incorrect treatment of that-clauses.

The second

problem is that it does not do justice to an intuition about

that-clauses and propositions, namely, that any that-clause
names the proposition ordinarily expressed by the sentence

contained in it.

Gottlob Frege developed the basic ideas for

a

propositional theory that is superior to (NPV) with respect to
the points just mentioned. 17

Frege's ideas were further

developed by other philosophers, primarily Alonzo Church.
Frege's central idea is to assign to each meaningful expression

10

two semantic values instead of just one.

In

addition to its

extensions each name, predicate, and sentence has
intension as well.
value.)

a

sense or

(The extension of a sentence is its truth

Tne introduction of senses provides the basis
for

a

better

theory than (NPV).
What follows is a highly simplified account of the Frege-

Church propositional view (PV).

ass'gned

a

Every primitive expression is

sense as well as a reference.

The reference of every

primitive expression is exactly the same as its extension on (NPV)J 9

That-clauses
expressions.

,

however, are not counted among the primitive

The sense of an expression is its meaning, or

perhaps what it expresses.

For a name, the sense is an individual

concept, e.g., the sense of 'Moore' is the individual concept of
Moore.

For a predicate the sense is

of 'is wise'

turns

out.

In

is the property wisdom.

a

property, e.g., the sense
For a sentence the sense

to be the proposition it expresses.

order to keep this exposition as simple as possible,

let us consider a language having only two names,

'Russell', two predicates,

word 'that'.

7.

'is wise'

'Moore' and

and 'believes', and the

Consider first the sentence:

Moore is wise.

Its truth conditions are exactly as would be expected.
is novel

about (PV) is the introduction of senses.

What

On Church's

11

reconstructions of Frege's theory, the sense of

wise', i.e.,

'is

the property wisdom, is a function that
maps individual concepts

onto propositions.

For example, it maps the concept of Moore

onto the proposition that Moore is wise, the
concept of Russell
onto the proposition that Russell is wise.

As a result, the

sense of (7) is the proposition that Moore is wise.
In

addition to proposing a second semantic value for

expressions, Frege had another important insight.

It was that

in certain contexts, called "oblique contexts", words
refer to

something other than their usual referent.

In

particular,

in contexts following the verbs expressing propositional

attitudes, words refer to what they usually express.

Consider the sentence:

8.

Russell believes that Moore is wise.

Frege's proposal is that in (8) 'Moore' and 'is wise' refer to

what they usually express, and as

a

result 'Moore is wise'

refers to, instead of expressing, the proposition that Moore
is wise.

We can assume that 'that Moore is wise' refers to

this proposition as well, although this does not make clear

what the import of 'that' is.

Perhaps it is just to warn us

that what follows refers to its usual sense.
is unproblematic.

refers to

a

The rest of (8)

'Russell' refers to Russell, and

set of ordered pairs.

(8)

'believes'

is true if and only if

12

ths set assigned to 'believes'

includes the pair consisting of

Russell and the proposition that Moore
is wise.

Earlier

I

cited two problems with (NPV).

incorrectly treated that-clauses as simple names.

One was that it
(PV) remedies

this by making them complex names whose
reference depends upon
the reference of their parts.

The second problem with (NPV) was that it did not
make
1

hat-clauses refer to the proposition ordinarily expressed
by

the sentences they contain.

But (PV) has corrected this defect

as well, making it a much better theory.
It must be admitted, however, that difficult problems

arise in working out the details of the theory.

Various

technical problems arise when quantifiers, descriptions, and

other expressions are introduced.
faced is

a

Another problem that must be

determination of the sense of expressions occurring

in oblique contexts.

Although these problems have not been

completely resolved, Church has been able to develop some
rather promising formulations of (PV).
then,

At the very least,

(PV) seems to be a viable and attractive theory.

Many philosophers object to (PV) on more general grounds
than that it has not been worked out in all its detail.

Their

objection is that it requires us to suppose that there are
individual concepts, propositions, and other abstract objects,
and these philosophers doubt that there are any such things.

V
fc

.<*

13

Moore himself came tc reject propositions.

He rejects a

theory something like (PV) on the grounds that

...if you consider what happens when a man entertains
false belief, it doesn't seem as if his belief
consisted merely in his having a relation to some
object which certainly is.
It seems rather as if the
thing he was believing, the object of his belief, were
just the fact which certainly is not - which certainly
is notTbecause his belief is false.
This, of course,
creates a difficulty, because if the object certainly
is not - if there is no such thing, it is impossible
for him or for anything else to have any kind of
relation to it.
2Q
a

Moore goes on to say that his own view

...may be expressed by saying that there simply are
no such things as propositions
That belief does
no£ consist, as the former theory held, in a relation
between the believer, on the one hand, and another
thing wh ch may be called the proposition believed
.

;

.

Bertrand Russell shared Moore's misgivings about
propositions.

He wro te

Time was when I thought there were propositions but
it does not seem to me very plausible to say that
in addition to facts there are also these curious
shadowy things going about such as 'That to-day is
Wednesday' when in fact it is Tuesday.
I cannot
believe they go about the real world.
It is more
than one can manage to believe, and I do think no
person with a vivid sense of reality can imagine it. 22
,

A number of other writers have shared Russell's and

Moore's skepticism about propositions.

Part of Russell's

skepticism seems to be founded on his feeling that propositions

14

are "curious” entities, perhaps ones whose
nature he does not

fully understand.

But such

doubting their existence.

a

feeling need not be

a

sound basis for

It would be like doubting the existence

of electrons on the basis of an incomplete
understanding of them.
In general,
a

if there is theoretical evidence for the existence
of

certain kind of entity, it seems wrong for one to doubt
its

existence simply because he does not fully understand its nature.
Not all the objectors to propositions base their objections

simply on bewilderment over what propositions are or simply on
the feeling that there are no such things.

Some have objected that

no clear criterion for individuating propositions has been provided

by their proponents.

That is, we seem to lack an effective method

for determining whether a proposition
in fact the same proposition.

p

and a proposition q are

2T

Nevertheless, proponents of propositions, especially Church,
are willing to defend them on the grounds that there is no

acceptable, or even promising, alternative to theories like (PV ). 24
The situation, as Church sees it, is that we must accept propositions
unless some viable alternative is produced.

Numerous alternatives to (PV) have been proposed and some
have been widely discussed in the literature.

I

think, however,

that many of these theories have neither been clearly refuted
nor shown to be acceptable, and that there

further evaluation of them.

is

a

need for

Should one of them prove acceptable,

it would provide the basis for a fairly powerful objection to
(PV), namely, that (PV) is committed to the existence of more

15

entities than are required for an adequate
account of belief.
In

the chapters that follow

I

will discuss several of the more

interesting alternatives to (PV).
There are some methodological difficulties
that will be
found in the discussion that follows.

In propounding the

theories to be considered, some philosophers
seem to be concerned
with showing that beliefs may be expressed
in artificial
languages in which no reference is made to propositions.
deal directly with English belief sentences.

Others

Of those who

oeal directly with English, some try to escape
commitment to

propositions by showing that none of the expressions
sentences are names of propositions.

jn

belief

Others attempt to

establish this conclusion by paraphrasing belief sentences into
other sentences that, they claim, contain no references to

f

proposi tions.
In all

these cases there are some methodological

considerations that bear upon the adequacy of the proposal.

For

example, w hen belief sentences are paraphrased into other
sentences, an evaluation of the proposal requires
the conditions of adequacy for paraphrases.

a

decision on

Some philosophers

require synonymy, some logical equivalence, and seme have even

weaker requirements.
For the most part

I

will try to avoid arguing against a

proposal on methodological grounds alone.

For example, against

16

a

philosopher who holds a weak view of
paraphrasing,

will not

I

argue that the stronger view is correct,
and that his account of

belief sentences is incorrect, even though
it satisfies his own
standards.

Instead,

I

will attempt to evaluate proposals on
the

standards cf their proponents.
Sometimes, however, the philosopher's standards
are not

made clear, and in such cases
at all times,

I

I

will

have to impose my own.

But

will try to be clear about exactly what

methodological assumptions and standards are in use.
Finally, in some cases the theories to be discussed
are

not developed by their proponents in sufficient detail to
make
any evaluative judgments about them.

In such

cases

I

will

try

to develop the theory in a way that accords with the general aims

of the defender of the theory.

I

will try to make clear what

features of any theory were part of the original theory and what
additions

I

have made.

17
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PART

I

SENTENTIAL THEORIES

For those wishing to avoid
commitment to propositions,

a

natural alternative to (PV) is to
construe the objects of belief
as sentences.

Sentences are thought to be more concrete
entities

than propositions, and therefore
sentential theories are favored

over (PV) on ontological grounds.

Rudolf Carnap has proposed two

sentential theories and they will be
discussed in the three

chapters that make up Part

I.
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CHAPTER

II

CARNAP

One of the most interesting and widely
discussed accounts
of belief sentences may be found in
Rudolf Carnap's Meaning and

Necessity.

1

Carnap's theory is that belief sentences may
be

analyzed by metalinguistic sentences expressing
between believers and sentences.
this theory, 2

I

a

certain relation

Although he eventually rejects

think a discussion of it will serve as

a

useful

background for the theories to be discussed in later
chapters.

I

A.

Carnap's theor y.

Carnap begins his discussion of belief

sentences in Meaning and Necessity by asking us to consider the
sentence

1.

'D'

S,

John believes that

is an

D.

abbreviation of some sentence

that is "not

a

symbolic system but

a

of an object language,

part of the English

O

language." 0

sentence of

(1), apparently,

is also an abbreviation of a

S.
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Discussion will be easier if we
proceed in terms of

a

sample belief sentence instead
of an abbreviation such as
(1).

Therefore, we will recast what Carnap
said about (1) so that
it applies to:

2.

John believes that the earth is round.

We shall assume that (2) is a sentence
of S.

Carnap's view is that (2) can be "interpreted"
or
"analyzed" in terms of John's dispositions
to make affirmative

responses to sentences.

In part

(B)

of this section

I

will

examine Carnap's view on the nature of the relation
that must
hold between (2) and

a

sentence that analyzes it.

For now let

assume that any sentence that analyzes
(2) must be logically

equivalent to it.
Carnap notes that it will not do to analyze
(2) by

3.

John t
round'

s

disposed to respond affirmatively to 'The earth

is

There are at least two objections to the view that (2) may be

analyzed by (3).

First, as Carnap points out, since John might

not understand English, it is possible that he is not disposed
to respond affirmatively to

'The earth is round'

although he

does believe that the earth is round/
Second, since 'The earth is round' can be

many different languages,

a

sentence of

and it can have many different
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meanings, John might use the sentence
to mean something other than
that the earth is round, and tend to
respond affirmatively to it
even though he does not believe that the
earth is round.
(2)

Thus,

and (3) clearly are not logically equivalent,
and (2) cannot

be analyzed by (3).
In

order to meet these problems Carnap proposes

more complicated formulation of his theory.

a

slightly

It is that (2)

is

analyzed by:

4.

John is disposed to respond affirmatively to some
sentence T
as a sentence of some lanquage S' such that T in S'
is
synonymous with 'The earth is round' in S.

Carnap thinks that (4) overcomes the problems encountered
by (3), and it seems to do just that.

(4), unlike (3), allows

John's responses to be to a sentence of any language at all.

It

does not require his responses to be to an English sentence.

Furthermore, the fact that the sentence to which he does
tend to respond affirmatively may be part of several languages
seems to be no problem.

All that is relevant to the truth of

(4) are his responses to the sentence as a part of a certain

language.
Tin's

last point may not be as clear as it first appears.

While it is easy enough to tell when a person is responding to

a

certain sentence, it is not as easy to tell whether or not he is

responding to it as

a

part of a particular language.

Suppose,
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Tor example, that John is just
learning English and tends to

confuse the words 'flat' and 'round’. 6

Assume that he does

not believe that the earth is
round, i.e., that (2) is false,
but that he tends to respond
affirmatively to 'The earth is

round', because he thinks that it
means that the earth is flat.

Snould we say that he is disposed to
respond affirmatively to
this sentence as an English sentence?
It is not clear what the correct
answer to this question
is.

On the one hand, John does speak
English and does intend

to be responding to the sentence as
an English sentence.

On

the other hand, he doesn't understand the
English sentence, and
is taking it to mean something other than
what it means in

Engl isn.

Perhaps, then, we should say that he is responding
to

it not as an English sentence, but as a sentence of
his own

version of English, English^
In

order to avoid

a

clear counterexample to his theory,

Carnap must take the latter alternative.

Otherwise in the

circumstances described, (2) is false although its proposed
analysis, (4), would be true.
is disposed to respond to

of English, but as

a

Thus, Carnap must say that John

'The earth is round' not as a sentence

sentence of English..

In English.

J

'The

j

earth is round' means that the earth is flat and therefore is
not synonymous with 'The earth is round' in English.

So we

may assume that John is not disposed to respond affirmatively
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to any sentence in Engl ishj
(or any ether language)
synonymous

with

1

The earth is round

1

in English.

Therefore, (4) is false.

This view also has some troubling
consequences for Carnap's
theory.

It requires him to say that
there are an unusually large

number of languages, probably one for
each speaker and time.
This shows that the term 'language'

in Carnap's theory must be

understood differently from the way in
which it is ordinarily
understood.

But perhaps this fact, in itself, is
not an

objection to the theory.

7

Although Carnap introduces the concept of
synonymy into
his analysis of (2) in order to permit
John's response to be to

sentences in languages other than

S

(English), it has an

important consequence concerning the substitution of
sentences
of the same language in belief contexts.

sentences

The earth is round

synonymous in

S.

If (4)

is

1

and

Suppose that the

'The world is round

1

are

the analysis of (2), then the analysis

of

5.

wi

6.

John believes that the world is round

1 1

be

John is disposed to respond affirmatively to some sentence T
as a sentence of some language S' such that T in S' is
synonymous with 'The world is round' in S.

It may easily be shown that

(4) and (6) are logically
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equivalent, and therefore, the sentences
they allegedly analyze,
(2)

and (5), must be logically equivalent
as well.

world

is

Since 'The

round' and 'The earth is round' are
synonymous in S,

if John is disposed to respond
affirmatively to some sentence

of some language synonymous with one
of these sentences in S,
it follows by transitivity of synonymy
that he is disposed to

respond affirmatively to some sentence of some
language

synonymous with the other sentence in

S.

So (4) and (6) are

equivalent and, according to Carnap's theory, the
English
sentences (2) and (5) are equivalent.
On Carnap's theory, then, we may substitute for
'The earth
is round'

in

(2)

any sentence synonymous with it, and the

resulting sentence will have the same truth value as
(2).

generally, we may say that if

<J)

and

V

F

are synonymous English

sentences, then V may be substituted for
form

believes that

sentence.

More

in sentences of the

without altering the truth value of the

We may express this point by saying that on Carnap's

theory synonymy is the criterion for substitution of sentences
in belief contexts.^

Carnap goes on to offer an analysis of synonymy.

It is

that sentences are synonymous if and only if they are intensionally
isomorphic.

precision, but

concept here.

Intensional isomorphism is defined with some
I

think we need not concern ourselves with this

Many philosophers have criticized Carnap's
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analysis of synonymy, 10
in his later writings. 11

and Carnap
But

I

seems to have abandoned it

think that

precise account of

a

synonymy is not required for an evaluation
of his proposal to
analyze (2) by (4).

More generally, it seems that the question
whether belief
sentences may be analyzed in terms of

a

relation between

believers and sentences is independent of the
question of what
the criterion for substitution of sentences
in belief contexts

Since the former question is the one

is.

here,

I

I

wish to explore

will confine my attention to it and will not
discuss the

latter question.

I

will assume, therefore, that we have a

sufficiently clear notion of synonymy to understand sentences
like (4) and (6) and that we understand
(4) and (6) well enough
to evaluate the proposal that they analyze
(2) and (5)

respectively.
I

Before turning to an evaluation of this proposal,

will clarify a few points about the nature of Carnap's theory.

The nature of Carnap's theory

.

In

various places Carnap

describes the general nature of his theory, and some of these

descriptions differ significantly from others.

When he first

presents the theory in Meaning and Necessity he says that his

view is that

a

sentence such as (2) is

a

sentence of an object

language, S, that may be "interpreted by the.

sentence" (4).

.

.semantical

(4), then, would be a sentence in a
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metalanguage, M, for S, and would provide
the truth conditions
for (2).
In other places, however, Carnap
describes his theory in

rather different terms.

In his

"Replies and Systematic

Expositions" he says that on his theory
"belief-sentences belong
to the

metalanguage M." 13

He adds, "I translate them [belief

sentences] into metalanguage." 1 ^

Elsewhere Carnap says of

a

modified version of his theory

that it has certain disadvantages, namely, "it
abolishes the

customary and convenient device of indirect discourse,
it uses
the metalanguage, and it becomes cumbersome in the
case of

iteration (e.g.,

'James asserts that John believes that...'

would be replace d by

a

sentence about

These later remarks all suggest

Carnap's theory.

sentence about a sentence.)" 15

a

a

second account of

This second account is that he favored

a

formal

reconstruction of English that consists of an object language,
S,

and a metalanguage, M, and perhaps additional meta-metalanguages

Belief would be expressed not in S, but only in M (and

possibly higher).

Thus, in order to express belief in this

system, one would use metalinguistic sentences such as (4).

Furthermore, in Carnap's system indirect discourse and

that-clauses would be abolished and therefore sentences like
(2) would not occur anywhere in the system.

Carnap's reason for

banning indirect discourse is that he thinks it causes enormous

unnecessary complexity.^ 8
The difference between these two
interpretations of

Carnap

s

theory is significant.

On the first account belief is

expressed by object language sentences
such as (2), which will
be interpreted by metalinguistic
sentences such as (4).

On the

second account, (2) is simply banned from
the object language
and belief is expressed only in the
metalanguage by sentences

like (4).

think that the textual evidence clearly
supports the

I

second account of Carnap's theory.

In

discussing Carnap's

views Donald Davidson notes that there is an important

difference between Carnap's treatment of modal sentences and

treatment of belief sentences. 17

Carnap gives

a

semantical

account of modal sentences, explaining the rules of
substitution for expressions in such sentences. 18

However,

Davidson explains, Carnap's treatment of belief sentences is

significantly different.

[Carnap]. .does not provide a semantical analysis
of [belief sentences] in the sense of showing how
out of the meanings of expressions of less than
sentential scope the meanings of the sentences are
constituted.
Rather the analysis translates
such sentences as wholes into other sentences
to which, tnen_, Carnap's full semantical analysis
.may be applied.-^
.

.

.

In

commenting on Davidson's paper Carnap raises no

objection to this description of his method, and adds that

a

hi
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direct semantical analysis of
belief sentences would require
a theory like (PV). 2 °
It seems clear, therefore,
that
should
understand Carnap's theory in the
second of the two ways

«

described above.
As

I

understand it, then, Carnap's
proposal is that

English belief sentences such as
(2) will be expressed in

a

formal system in the metalanguage
in terms of sentences like
(4).

Locutions such as (2) will not be
admitted into the system at
all. P l

It is this view that will

be discussed in the remainder

of this chapter.

This account of Carnap's theory leaves
open one important
matter.

I

have described the theory by saying that
sentences

oF English will be expressed formally by
certain sentences, but

have not said what relation must hold bet ween
the original

English sentence and its formal counterpart.

Carnap seems to

have thought that the sentences should be logically
equivalent,

but not synonymous. 22

synonymy.

Other philosophers, however, would demand

While there may be some serious problems with

Carnap's weaker demands,

I

will

ignore them here, and evaluate

his theory in terms of his own standards. 22

II

Objections to Carna p'

s

theory

.

I

believe that a few examples will
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Show that (2) and
(4) are not logically equivalent
and therefore
that (4) is not a proper
analysis of (2). The examples
all make
use of the fact that a
person may not be disposed to
respond
affirmatively to sentences in a
way that indicates his
beliefs.

Suppose that John is
the earth is round. 24

chronic liar who does believe
that

a

Being

a

liar, John generally denies

every sentence that he cakes
to express something he believes
and affirms those sentences
he thinks are false.
Let us
suppose that John speaks English
and no other language, and that
he properly understands the
sentence

English.

'The earth is round'

in

Given all these conditions
(2) is true, but John is

not disposed to respond affirmatively
to

The earth

is round’

as an English sentence, nor is he
disposed to respond

affirmatively to any sentence synonymous with
'The earth is
round'

in

English.

Hence, (4) is false and therefore does not

properly analyze (2).

Other examples lead to the same conclusion.
be unconvinced by Columbus'

discoveries and remain

John might
a

secret

member of the Flat Earth society and advocate of the view
that
the earth is flat.

Yet, because he is embarrassed to admit his

peculiar views, he is disposed to respond affirmatively to The
earth is round'.

In this case,

(4)

is true but (2) is false.

These examples show that linguistic dispostions are not

conclusive evidence for belief.

While it may be that people
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generally do tend to respond
affirmatively to the sentences
that they take to express their
beliefs, they do not always have

such tendencies.

This may happen for

a

variety of reasons.

A

person may be inclined to lie, or may
have something wrong with
his ears so that he consistently
mishears certain sounds or, more

incredibly, may be afflicted with some
rare disease that has as
a

symptom yelling 'No' whenever someone utters
some particular

sentence even though he believes what that
sentence expresses.
A defender of Carnap's analysis might contend
that none of

these examples is counter to the proposed
analysis.

Consider the

case of a liar who believes that the earth is round,
but always

denies it.

One might argue, in Carnap's behalf, that such

a

person has two conflicting dispostions, one to respond

affirmatively to 'The earth is round' and one to deny

His

it.

belief accounts for the former disposition and his tendency to
lie accounts for the latter.

The reason he always responds

negatively to 'The earth is round

1

is that the dispostion to lie

is the stronger of the two and it overrides the disposition to

tell

the truth.

This defense of Carnap's analysis is inadequate.

Although

it may explain the cases in which (2) is true but (4) seems

false

-

that is, the cases in which John has the belief but does

not seem to have the disposition

-

the other cases, those in

which (4) is true but (2) is false, are yet to be explained.
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Postulating some overriding disposition
is of no help here.

He

simply does have a disposition to
respond affirmatively to 'The

earth is round' as an English sentence
but does not believe that
the earth is round.

Another way to defend Carnap's theory is
to suggest some
minor changes and improvements in his
analysis of (2).

It is

not clear, however, that any satisfactory
modification of (4)

can be constructed that does not make
use of the expression
'believes' or some other expression that may
only be understood
in terms of belief.

Let us consider one possibility, and let us

replace (4) by

7.

If John were completely honest then John would
be disposed
to respond affirmatively to some sentence T of some
language S' such that T iri S' is synonymous with 'The
earth is round' in S.

There are at least two problems with (7).

First, it is

not clear that it overcomes all the objections like those

raised against (4).

Suppose John is completely honest,

understands that 'The earth is round' means in English that the

earth is round, but tends to mishear certain sounds and as

a

result tends to respond negatively to 'The earth is round' even
though he believes that the earth is round.

It seems that in

such a case (2) is false but (7) is true.

Another problem with (7) is that in appealing to the
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concept of honesty, we seem
to make covert use of the
concept
of belief.

For the antecedent of
(7) seems to mean that John

would be disposed to respond
affirmatively to
only if he believes that it is
true.

a

sentence if and

But if (7) is to be

analyzed, ultimately, with reference
to the concept of belief,
the analysis would seem to be
circular. 25

Ocher attempts to repair Carnap's analysis
lead to

similar difficulties, but since Carnap
eventually rejected this
theory,

think we may overlook these other attempts
here.

I

Instead,

I

will turn in the next chapter co the
theory that

Carnap proposed when he abandoned this one.

Ill

It may be useful

to conclude this chapter by pointing out

an important difference between Carnap's theory and (PV).
is that,

It

in a certain respect, Carnap's theory is more ambitious

than (PV).

According to (PV), belief sentences express

a

relation between believers and propositions, but no attempt was

made in Chapter

I

to provide any analysis or explanation of that

relation.
Carnap, however, proposes that belief be analyzed in terms
of a relation true of believers, sentences and languages.

It is
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in the analysis of the relation
that his theory goes wrong.

However, no argument was given here
against Carnap's weaker
claim, i.e., that belief can be analyzed
in terms of

a

relation

true of believers, sentences and
languages.

The theories to be considered in the next
four chapters
are more like (PV) than like Carnap's theory
in this respect.

That is, they are all proposals to the effect
that belief may
be analyzed in terms of a relation true
of believers and certain

other objects, such as sentences or inscriptions,
but in no
case is there any attempt to characterize this
relation.

Because these theories do not contain any analysis of the
relation in terms

Oi

which belief may be analyzed, they are more

difficult to criticize than the theory discussed in this chapter.
For we cannot object, as we did here, that analyzing belief in

terms of some particular relation is not correct.

Instead, it

must be shown that there is no relation true of the specified
kinds of objects that can be used to analyze belief.

Although it

is difficult to prove conclusively that there is no relation

true of believers and sentences, or between sentences and

inscriptions, such that belief may be analyzed in terms of it,
I

think that there are some compelling reasons for concluding

that there is none and in the following chapters

these reasons.

I

will state
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Systematic Expositions", p. 945
.

23.

It seems to me that Carnap's standards
for analysis are seen
to be implausible when applied to
analyses of necessary
truths.^ On his view,
4" is a good analysis of

'2x2=

o x J — y

.

24.

Partee makes this point, op. cit.

25

r d scussion of a re "!a1:ed point, see
Roderick Chisholm's
,
!
A Note
on Carnap's Meaning Analysis" in Philosophical
Stuaie_s 6, 1955, pp. 87-89 and "A Note
of 5ayinq: A Reply
to Mr. Landesman", Analysi s 24,
1964, pp. 182-184.

‘
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CHAPTER III
CARNAP AND CHURCH

By the time Carnap came to write "On
Belief-Sentences" 1
he no longer thought that belief
sentences could be analyzed
in terms of sentences about linguistic
behavior.
he still

Nevertheless,

thought that belief could be analyzed in terms
of

a

triadic relation whose terms are believers,
sentences, and
languages.

Carnap's theory in "On Belief-Sentences", and some

criticisms Alonzo Church has made of it, 2 will be
the topic of
this chapter.

Additional criticisms of this theory will be

offered in Chapter

4.

I

A.

Carnap's new theory

.

Carnap takes the dispute between himself

and advocates of (PV) to be a dispute about the "best form for

belief sentences in
a

a

formalized language of science." 3

(PV)

belief sentence will be expressed in the formal language in

the same way it is expressed in ordinary language.

1.

In

Thus,

John believes that the earth is round,

will be a sentence of the formal language as well as of English.
39
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On Larnap's view belief
sentences will be expressed in
a

different way in the formal language.
discourse; here
a

a

His way "avoids indirect

belief-sentence does not like
[(!)] contain

Partial sentence expressing the
content of the bel ief but
,

instead the name of such

a sentence." 4

(1), he says, will be

expressed by:

2

h
’

he relati °" 8 t0

of English

'

The earth 1s round

'

as

sentence

3

Although (2) may be confirmed to some
degree by sentences about
John's observable behavior, it is not
derivable from such
sentences.
a

Carnap expresses this point by saying
that

1

B

1

is

"theoretical construct".^

Carnap describes (2) as follows:

he rules For B would be such that
[(2)] does not
imply that John knows English or any language
whatsoever.
On the other hand, the reference to
an English sentence in [(2)] may be replaced by
a
reference to any other synonymous sentence in any
language; e.g., [(2)] is taken to be L-equivalent
i

wi th

3.

.-g

John has the relation
of German.

In

B

to 'Die Erde ist rund' as a sentence

evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of his

theory, in comparison to

(

PV )

,

Carnap says:

...[The sentential theory] has certain disadvantages; it
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abolishes the customary and convenient
device of
1300
50 ’ it; uses the metalanguage,
and
i'JrnLf cumbersome in
it becomes
cases of iteration (e.q.
James asserts that John believes
that..." would
be replaced by a sentence
about a sentence about
a sentence).
The main disadvantage of [(PV)] is
the complexity of the language,
whereas the language
for the [sentential theory] may
be extensional and
therefore very simple. The introduction
of logical
modalities produces already considerable
complications,
ut the use of indirect discourse
increases them
still more

^

.

.

A more general statement of Carnap's
theory is that all

English sentences of the form:

4.

a^

where

believes that

<j>

<f>,

is a sentence, may be replaced in the
metalanguage, M,

for the formalized language of science, by sentences
of the
form:

4.

a_

has the relation

P>

to

<j>

as a sentence of English.

Carnap asserts that if anyone stands in relation B to

sentence

4>

a

of a language L, then he stands in the same relation

to any sentence of any language that is synonymous with

cf>

in L.

This assertion may be expressed in terms of the following rule
of M:

6

t

.

(x)( 4>)(¥)(L)(L )'(If x has the relation B to
as a sentence
of L and
in L is synonymous with ¥ in L', then x has the
relation B to ¥ as a sentence of L').
<j>

<f>
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It may be useful

previous theory.

to compare this theory with
Carnap's

On both theories Carnap favors
eliminating

typical English belief sentences
from his formalized reconstruction
of English, and replacing them
with metalinguistic sentences.

But

the replacement sentences of
these two theories are significantly

different.

Whereas the replacement sentences in
the old theory

are recognizable English sentences,
the new replacements are
not.

That is, sentences of the form of
(4) in Chapter

are

II

English sentences that we do understand
reasonably well, whereas

sentences of the form of (5) are not English
because
a

B
'

'

is not

predicate in English.
Since

B

is not a predicate in English, and
sentences of

the form of (5) are not English sentences,
Carnap's new theory
is difficult to evaluate.

of Carnap

s

Consider, for example, the implication

theory that (1) may be analyzed by (2).

do not know what

1

B

1

Since we

means, and therefore do not know what (2)

means, it is difficult to evaluate the claim that
(1) may be

analyzed by (2).
In

effect, Carnap's new theory makes a more modest

assertion than his old one.

The new theory seems to assert no

more than that there is some triadic relation, expressed by

B
'

'

and holding of people, sentences, and languages, such that

belief may be expressed in terms of it.

In

order to refute this

theory, one must show that there is no such relation.
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'

0ne ml 9ht

°W ect

th

^

Carnap's theory, even if true,
has

little ontological significance.8

For it may be true that there

is some relation, B, holding
of a person, sentence, and
language

such that belief sentences may
be expressed in terms of it.

But

it may also be true that this
relation obtains only if the person

involved stands in some appropriate
relation to

a

proposition.

Thus, the truth of Carnap's theory
need not imply that we can

escape commitment to propositions.
Some may think that it is in fact
the case that there is
a

relation of the kind required for the
truth of Carnap's theory

and that this relation can only obtain
if there are propositions.
For it would seem that belief sentences
may be expressed in terms
of the following triadic relation:

expressed by

in the language

believes the proposition
.

Thus, (1) would be

equivalent to:

7.

John believes the proposition expressed by 'The earth
is
round' in English.

Thus, it seems that we can analyze (1) by a sentence relating
a person to a

sentence and

appears to be true.

a

language, and Carnap's theory

But this triadic relation appears to

obtain only if there is some proposition expressed in English
by 'The earth is round' and John believes that proposition.
So despite being true, Carnap's theory may be committed to

exactly the same entities as (PV).^
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What this shows,

I

believe,

is

that the truth of Carnap's

theory would not show that there
are no propositions or that
we
can avoid them in analyzing
our language.

Perhaps that

conclusion can only be established by
proving that the relation
B

is not like the one considered
in

(7).

Therefore, even if no

strong arguments against Carnap's
theory are forthcoming, we

should not conclude that there are no
propositions or that (PV)
is committed to more entities than
Carnap's theory.

II

Some of the most interesting discussions of Carnap's

theory of belief, and of sentential theories generally,
are

contained in Church's paper, "On Carnap's Analysis of Statements
of Assertion and Belief", and the responses it has elicited
from

Hilary Putnam, 10 Donald Davidson, 11 and others. 12
Church's brief paper contains several distinct, but

related arguments against Carnap's proposal.

While it may be

that we should accept Church's criticisms only if we make
certain methodological assumptions Carnap would not make,

I

think a thorough discussion of his arguments is well worthwhile.
For one thing, it will help us clarify the nature of Carnap's
proposal, as well as some others that will be examined later,
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by bringing out some of the
metatheoretical views it relies
upon.

Furthermore,

Church

s

a

number of commentators have dealt
with

objections too hastily, and missed
their full force.

The methodological assumptions
Church makes that Carnap
does not share concern the nature
of analysis.

Church seems

to think that an English sentence
can only be expressed properly
in a formal

language by a sentence that is synonymous
with it 13
.

Carnap, however, thinks that an English
sentence can be expressed

properly in

a formal

language by a sentence that is logically

equivalent but not synonymous with it . 14
settle this methodological difference,

I

Rather than try to
will merely try to

indicate all those points at which it becomes
important.
Church

s

arguments are actually directed at an analysis

of statements of assertion that he correctly believes
to be

similar to Carnap's analysis of belief sentences that
was

discussed in Chapter

II.

The main point of his arguments,

however, is to show that there is an "insuperable objection" to
all

such "analyses that undertake to do away with propositions

in favor of such more concrete things as sentences ." 15

Thus,

even though Church's arguments deal directly with an analysis

other than Carnap's latest one, they are intended to apply to
it.

Moreover, they do pose an insuperable objection to this

analysis if and only if they pose an insuperable objection to
Carnap's analysis.

Therefore, no harm will be done if we ignore

the analysis of indirect discourse Church actually discusses, and
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apply his arguments directly
to Carnap's analysis of
belief.
As

I

will formulate Church's
arguments here, they will be

directed at the view that the
English sentence (1) may be
analyzed by (2), which is a
sentence of M. Church presents
at
least four arguments against
this view.
I will discuss
three
of them in this section.
His fourth argument concerns
iterated
belief sentences, but it is not
clear to me exactly what that
argument is.
I think that there
is a problem in formulating
such

sentences on Carnap's theory, and
will discuss it in Chapter

A.

Lhurcl^fi^^upm.

in this

IV.

Church's first argument is contained

passage:

However, [{2)] is likewise unacceptable
as an analysis
(lj.
ror it is not even possible to infer
(1) as
a consequence of
[(2)], on logical grounds alone - but
only by making use of the item of factual
information,
not contained in [(2)], that [ he earth
is round ]
means in English that [the earth is round].
or

1

'

i

16
In this
Sa

argument Church seems to assume only that one
sentence,

can be an analysis of another. S', only if
S implies S'

7

He dees not here rely upon his stronger
assumption, that the

sentences must be synonymous.

With this assumption made explicit,

we may formulate the argument this way:

ARGUMENT

1

(])

(ii)

(S) (S'
IF (2)

If S is an analysis of S', then S implies S')
is an analysis of (1), then (2) implies (1)

) (
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_(iii)
(ivj

(?)
(

2

)

does not imply ( 1
is not an "analysis of (f)

The crucial premise in Argument

1

is

(iii).

Church's

only defense of it is his claim
that in order to infer
(1) from
(2) we need the additional

8.

'The earth is round

1

premise:

means in English that the earth is
round.

Church thinks that (8) is contingent
and not implied by (2).
Thus, since the contingent premise
(8) is required to derive (1)
18
from (2), (2) by itself does not imply
(l).
In a

recent discussion of Church's paper,

R.

J.

Haack

argues that sentences such as (8) are not
contingent. 13

He claims

that the fact that the 'The earth is round'
might have meant, for

example, that the earth is flat, does not imply
that (8) is
contingent.

For, he claims, if 'The earth is round' were to

change its meaning, then (8) would also change its meaning,
and
remain true.
Haack'

s

reasoning is seriously defective.

His argument

seems to be that (8) is not contingent because in all

circumstances, the sentence, as used by speakers in those

circumstances, would be true.
this argument.

There are two things wrong with

First the premise is simply false.

use (8) to express anything they like,

express falsehoods.

ar.d

People can

some may use it to

So there are circumstances in which (8),
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as used by speakers, in those
circumstances, is false.

Second, the argument is invalid.

To say of a sentence

that it is necessarily true
is to say that, given the
meaning
it actually has, it is true
relative to every possible

circumstance.

It does not mean that in
every possible circumstance

has a meaning such that it is
true in those circumstances on

that meaning.

How others might use the sentence
has nothing to

do with its contingency as used
by us.

So, even if, for some

inexplicable reason, everyone had to
use (8) to express

a

truth,

it would no: follow that, as
used by us, it is a necessary truth.

Of course the failure of Haack's
argument for the necessity

of (8) does not show that
(8) is contingent.

Although it would

be desirable to have some argument
for that conclusion. Church

himself never offers one.

argument like Argument

1

However, G.

E.

Moore once proposed an

in certain respects, and he gave two

reasons for thinking that sentences such as
20
(8) are contingent.
The sentence Moore discusses is:

9.

Tne sentence At least one person is a King of France
that at least one person is a King of France.

Moore's first reason for thinking that (9)

is

1

means

contingent is that

it means the same as:

10.

Les r.:cts 'At least one person is a King of France' veulat
dire qu'une personne au moins est un roi de France.
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do),

he thinks, is quite
obviously contingent, so

(

9

)

must be

contingent as well.
It seems to me, however,
that (10)

contingent than (9) is.

is no more obviously

Perhaps (9) is more obviously
true to

SPeak6r °f Engl1sh tha "
00) is, but that doesn't even suggest
that either is contingent.
Appeal to (10), then, does not
show
that (9) is contingent.
3

Moore's example may be used to
make

a

similar, but

somewhat stronger argument for
the contingency of sentences
like
If

(9).

n

(9) and (10) are

e
'

necessary truths, then so is:

e P ersonne au m01' ns

C

mears that
means
tha? at
at'le
least one person is

(9) and

a

un roi de France'
King of France.

(11) imply

The sentence 'line personne au moins
est un roi de France'
means the same as 'At least one person

is a King of France.'

If (9) and (11) are both necessary,
then, since they imply (12),

(12)

is also necessary.

not necessary.

But (12), it seems to me, is surely

It seems that it is a contingent

matter of fact

that the two sentences mentioned in
(12) mean the same.
(9) and

(11) are not both necessarily true.

is not necessary,

Therefore,

But if one of them

then neither of them is.

Moore's second reason for thinking that (9) is contingent
is tnat

At least one person is a King of France' might have meant
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something entirely different
than it does.

This, I think, is true.
But it also leads us to
see an important difference
between (8) and
(9).
For it is true that 'At
least one person is a King
of
France' might have meant
something different from what it
does

mean (in English).

other language.

It might be or have been
a sentence in some

But what is less clear is that
it could have

meant something other than it
does mean in English and still
have
been English.

For (8) to be contingent and
required in the

derivation of (1) from (2), it must
be that sentences could have

different meanings in English than
they actually have.
Cnurch says that in his argument he
"assumes that the word
English'

in English

...

has a sense ... something like 'the

language which was current in Great Britain
and the United States
in A. D.

1949’. 21

He observes that one might consider
taking

the sense of 'English'

in English to be

such and such semantical rules hold'.
in this

'the language for which
If

'English'

is defined

second way, he thinks that the objection that
(1) is

not a consequence of (2) "would disappear." 22

Church's point seems to be this.
in terms of its semantical

If

'English'

is defined

rules, then (8) means the same as

something like

13.

'The earth is round' means in the language in which 'The
earth is round' means that the earth is round and ... that
the earth is round
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Uhat is omitted from (13) is

a

specification of all the other

sentences of English and their
meanings.
English sentences is infinite,

a

(Since the number of

more plausible reading of
(8)

would replace the specification of
the meaning of each sentence
with a specification of the meaning
of each primitive symbol
plus the rules for determining the
meaning of sentences from the

meanings of the primitive symbols.)
Furthermore, if 'English' is defined in
this way, (2)

would mean something like:

14.

John has the relation B to 'The earth is
round' as a
sentence of the language in which 'The earth
is round'
means that the earth is round and...

(What is omitted from (14) is
of all

a

specification of the meanings

the other sentences of English.)
It does seem that (14) implies
(1), so if (2) and (14)

mean the same, tnen (2) implies (1).

Indeed, we may conclude

that (2) implies (I) even if (2) and (14) are logically

equivalent but not synonymous.

(2) and

(14) are logically

equivalent provided 'English' necessarily has the same
extension as the description of the language having all the rules
of English.
is

Thus, Argument

equivalent to such

a

1

turns upon whether or not 'English'

description.

is false and the argument is unsound.

equivalent to such

a

If it is, then premise (iii)
If

'English'

is not

description, but rather to something like
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'the language current in the
United States and Great
Britain in
A.D. 1949', then (iii)
is true, and the argument
is sound.
I

think that it is clear that
English could have had

different semantical rules than it
has, and therefore that
'English'

is not logically

equivalent to

a

description of the

language having all the rules
English actually has.
see, Carnap seems to agree
with this.

(m)

is true and that Argument

1

Thus,

is sound.

I

As we will

would say that

However, it is

difficult to prove that English could
have been different, so
perhaps we should not conclude that
Argument

1

presents a

decisive objection to Carnap's theory.

Before moving on to Church's second
argument,
to examine a comment that Carnap
makes on Argument

I

1.

would like
In

"On

Belief-Sentences" he says that the argument
"does not apply to my
analysis because.

.

.[it] does not refer to historically given

languages, but rather to semantical systems,
which are defined
by their rules.

1,22
i

t j nd this

comment extremely puzzling,

even though a number of commentators on Church's
arguments have

accepted it. 24
a

Apparently, Carnap thinks that Argument

1

poses

good objection to the claim that an English sentence
such as

(I) can be analyzed by (2).

His own analysis, however, is not

intended to be applied to English sentences, but to sentences
in artificial

semantical systems.

There are

a

few things that are important to note about
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this comment.

First, Carnap's comment
may have been at variance

with his previous exposition.
belief sentences in

He introduces his
discussion of

^in^anOecess^

by saying,

"

W e take here
as our object language
S, not a symbolic system,
but a part of
the English language.

Second, all the examples he
gives to illustrate his

analysis are in terms of sentences
in natural languages. 26

So

there is good reason to think
that when he wrote all the
articles

containing these examples, he did
intend the analysis to apply
to natural

To

languages.
bs.

fair,

I

should note tnat he does make
reference to

the rules of the object language
S.

So it is possible that he

thinks there is a part of English
which includes belief sentences,
for which semantical rules can be
specified.

Perhaps, he regards

this part of English as a formal system.

The problem with this view is that Carnap
never develops
a

system with sentences like (1).

In

fact, as

I

mentioned in

Chapter II, he thinks any system admitting
such sentences to
be needlessly complex and prefers his
own system in which sentences
27
like (1) are "replaced by" sentences like
(2).

Finally, if we do not regard Carnap's theory to be
that

English sentences like (1) may be expressed formally by
(2), it
is not at all

clear what we should take his theory to be.

it only applies to formal

If

systems, what does it say about them?
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What formal systems does it
apply to?
Since Carnap never provides any
answers to these

questions,

I

think it is best to interpret
his theory in the

way suggested here, and ignore
his comment to the effect that
his analysis does not apply
to English.

B

Church's first argument against

‘

Carnap's theory relies on

a

disputable assumption about the

meaning of the word 'English' and
for that reason it may not
constitute

a

decisive objection.

We will turn now to his

second objection, which makes use
of the "translation test"
first discussed by Langford. 28

Church's argument is contained in this
passage:
Following a suggestion of Langford we may
bring
out more sharply the inadequacy of
[(2)] in an
analysis of (1) by translating into another
language, say German, and observing that the two
translated statements would obviously convey
different meanings to a German (whom we may
suppose to have no knowledge of English). The
German translation of (1) is [(1
(Johann
)
glaubt, die Erde is rund)].
In translating
[(2)], of course, 'English" must be translated
as 'Englisch' (not as ’Deutsch') arid ['The
earth is round’] must be translated as ['The
earth is round'] not as ['Die Erde is rund'].
'

2g

This argument makes reference to sentences (1) and
(2)
and their German translations.

1'.

The translation of (1) is:

Johann glaubt, die Erde ist rund.
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The translation of (2) would seem to be:

2‘.

Johann hat das Verhaltnes B zu dem Satz 'The earth is
round' auf Englisch.

the argument Church assumes that if (2) is an analysis

In

of (1) then the two sentences "convey the same meaning".

I

assume that this means that they mean the same or, in other

words, are synonymous.

Since the translations of (1) and (2)

are synonymous with (1) and (2) respectively, all four sentences,

0

) ,

1

(2

),

0')>

(2), and (2'), should be synonymous.

But

(1
'

)

and

Church thinks, are not synonymous since they convey

different meanings to

a

German who does not know English.

We can formulate this argument as follows:

ARGUMENT

2

(i)

(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(

vi

(vii)

(S)(S')(If S is an analysis of S', then S and S'
are synonymous)
If (2) is an analysis of (1), then (2) and (1)
are synonymous
(1) and (!') are synonymous
(2) and (2') are synonymous
If (2) is an analysis of (1), then (1‘) and (2‘)
are synonymous
( V )
and (2 ) are not synonymous
is’
not an analysis of (1
(2)
1

The two crucial premises of Argument

2

are (i) and (vi).

Church thinks that (vi) turns on the same issue raised in

connection with Argument 1, namely, the contingency of
sentences like;
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8.

'The earth is round'
means in English that the
earth is
round.

Apparently, his reason for
thinking this

is that if

(8)

is

necessarily true, then (2')
and (T) are synonymous.

If, on

the other hand,
(8) is contingent, then (2') and

are

(V)

not synonymous.

Church's contention that
Argument
is surprising.

turns on this point

2

He seems to think that
Arguments

1

and 2 are

roughly the same, the main
difference being that Argument

2

makes use of translation in an
effort to be more compelling.
However, there is, or at least
there seems to be,

significant difference between the
two arguments.

a

According to

Argument 1, (2) does not satisfy the
conditions for being an
analysis of (1) because it is not
logically equivalent to (1).

According to Argument 2, (2) does not
satisfy the conditions
for being an analysis of
(1) because it is not synonymous with
( 1

).

Church holds,

I

believe, that logically equivalent

sentences may have, or convey, different
meanings, so it seems
that in Argument 2 he places

a

than he does in Argument

It

1.

stronger requirement on analyses

may turn out that (2) and (1)

are logically equivalent, but not synonymous

Argument

1

would be unsound but Argument

2

.

In

that case,

would be sound.

It

seems, then, that it is a mistake for him to think that
these
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two arguments are
roughly the same.

Clearly, the different
methodological assumptions
of
Carnap and Church
mentioned at the beginning
of this section
are of great importance
in Argument 2.
For Carnap would
reject
premise (1) on the grounds
that it places too strong
a
requirement on analyses.
So he would reject
this argument no
matter what we say about
(vi).
It

is

important to note that Carnap
agrees that (1) and
(2) are not synonymous and
therefore that he must appeal
to his
own weaker view of
analysis in order to respond
to Argument 2. 3 °
Anyone favoring a stronger
view of analysis cannot
consistently
maintain Carnap's theory of
belief.

However, since Argument
point,

I

will

2

turns on this methodological

not discuss it further.

I

think that there are

some questions that may be
raised about Church's claims
on the
synonymy or non-synonymy of
certain sentences, but similar
issues arise in connection
with Argument 3, and

I

will discuss

them in considering that argument.

C*

s

argument.

thlriLl!3Hggj]^

We can turn now to Church's third

He describes one that does
not turn on the contingency

of sentences such as (8).
The argument is contained in this
passage:
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the P roposa1 ’ for English,
to analys e
WS aVe> f ° r ^ Srma
rman,
n
.
thp
nrnnncal
+
the
proposal
r
to
analyse (1) as. ..[(2")
which is 'Johann hat das
Verhal tens B zu dem Satz
'Die Erde ist rund' auf
Deutsch'].

ofafr'fpn

5

Because of the exact parallelism
between them the
two proposals stand or
fall together
Yet [(2")]
in German and
[(2)] in English are not in any
acceptable sense translations
of each
othc,.,
;r.

3

As

understand it, the point of this
argument is not

I

just to show that (1) and
(2) are not synonymous, but to
demonstrate a different defect in
Carnap's proposal.

The idea

is that if Carnap's proposal
were correct, then when it is

applied to the German translation
of (1), it should result in
a sentence which is the
German translation of (2).

get, however, is (2") which is
not

What we

translation of (2), since

a

it refers to a different sentence
than (2) does.

We can formulate the argument this
way:

ARGUMENT 3
( 1 )

(ii)

;(A)(A )(If S and S' are synonymous and
A
and A are analyses of S and S'
respectively,
then A and A' are synonymous)
If (I) and (1‘) are synonymous and
(2) and (2")
are analyses of (1) and (l
respectively,
)
then
(2) and (2") are synonymous
and (1
(
are synonymous
)
(2) and (2") are not synonymous
(2) and (2") are not the analyses of (1) and (!')
res pec ti vely
If (2) and (2") are not the analyses of
(1) and
respectiv ely, then (2) is not the analysis of fll
( r_)
~
is not the^na1'^lToT~nT^
1

( i i i

1

(iv)
(v)

(vi)
(vi

l

n?7

'

—
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I

will

consider two objections to
Argument

is that premise

(

iv)

is false because
(2) and

The first

3.

(2") are

translations of one another, and
therefore are synonymous. A
number of philosophers have
pointed out that it is not
clear
that (2) and (2 ) are not
acceptable translations of one
!l

another, and if trarislatabil
ity is
is not

a

mark of synonymy, then it

clear that they are not synonymous. 32

circumstances the appropriate translation
of
will

be the translation of that
sentence.

translating

a

novel

In
a

many

quoted sentence

For example, in

in which there is a great deal

of quoted

dialogue, one would translate the
words inside the quotes,
rather than leave them in their
original language.

Similarly,

then, perhaps one should translate
the quoted sentences in (2)
and (2") and shift the reference to
(2) and

a

language.

So, perhaps

(2") are acceptable translations.
It

is

surely true that in some cases the correct

translation of

a

sentence containing quoted expressions would be

one in which the quoted expressions are
translated rather than
left

in

their original language.

There are, however, cases in

which the quoted material surely should not be translated, 33
e.g.

,

11.

'Grass is green'

In

in

is an English sentence.

translating (11) into German, for example, one would not
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translate 'Grass is green'
into its German equivalent.
I„ orde r
to decide whether or
not (2) and (2") are
correct translations,
we would have to decide
whether these sentences are
more
appropriately translated like
sentences in a novel, or
like

(11).

Both sides in this dispute
seem to assume that
(2) and
(2") are synonymous if
and only if they properly
translate one
another.
Since they have differing
views about proper

translation, they come to
different conclusions on the
synonymy
of (2) and (2").
I think, however,
that this shared assumption
may be false and that it
may be the source of some
confusion. 34
Whether (2) and (2") are
cotranslations seems to be a pragmatic
matter depending upon the context
and purposes of the translation.
But I would say that
(2) and (2") clearly are not synonymous.

One asserts that John stands in

a

certain relation to an English

sentence and the other asserts that
he stands in the same relation
to a

different sentence of

a

different language.

Since they are

about different objects,
(2) and (2") are not synonymous.

I

think,

therefore, that this objection to Argument
3 fails.
Donald Davidson has raised another
objection to Argument
35
3.

is

He argues that the demand that
(2) and (2") be synonymous

unreasonable since Carnap holds that

logically equivalent to

a

a

sentence need only be

sentence that analyzes it.

Thus,

Davidson would say that (i) is unreasonable in
view of Carnap's
position on analysis.
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1

thlnk that

(i

)

ma y wel

'

be mistaken, for a
reason

sitmlar to, but not identical
with the one Davidson
suggests.
(i) does not imply
that a sentence must be
synonymous with its
analysis,
(i) should be distinguished
from another principle
quite like it:

^

A
A
S and S
are s y non ymous and
^and
A' ]h
A and A
the analyses of S and S'
respectively
then S and A and S' and
A' are all synonymous')
'

^

’

1

is similar to the principle
Church appeals to in Argument
2,
and it is one Carnap would
reject,
(i), however, is somewhat
(i

)

different.

What it requires is, roughly,
that sentences which

analyze synonymous sentences be
synonymous themselves.
requirement might hold even if
with

a

a

This

sentence need not be synonymous

sentence that analyzes it.
The following situation might be
analogous to the one

under consideration.

Suppose we have

one premise, P, and the conclusion,

C.

a

valid argument with only
Now, since the argument

is valid P implies C, although they
need not be synonymous.

If

we were to construct the same argument in
another language, we

would want the new premise,

P

*

,

to be synonymous with P, and

the new conclusion, C', to be synonymous
with C.
it is not required that C‘

be synonymous with

Again, however,

1

P

.

Similarly, in the case of analysis, we might say that
if
A is the analysis of S, and S’

is synonymous with S, then the
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analysis of S', A', should
be synonymous with A.
imply that A and S or A'
and

S'

This does not

are also synonymous.

Thus, simply pointing out
that Carnap holds

of analysis than Church holds
does not show that it
to appeal to (i).

(i

)

a

weaker view
is

unreasonable

does not imply that Carnap's
view of

analysis is wrong.
However, (i) may well be
objectionable.

Carnap can

argue that

a

analyses.

There is, then, no such thing as
the analysis of

given sentence may have several
non-synonymous

particular sentence.

a

The conclusion of Argument 3 can
be accepted

by Carnap: his claim is that
(2) is an analysis of (1), not that
it is the only one.

We might try to revise Argument 3 to
conclude that (2) is
not even an analysis of (I).
(i)

In

order to do that we might replace

by:
(i

(S)(S')(A)(A )(If S and S' are synonymous and A
and A' are analyses of S and S' respectively,
then A and A' are synonymous)
,

)

But (i") is clearly false, given the possibility
of multiple

non-synonymous analyses of
not help to repair Argument

a

given sentence.

Thus, (i") will

3.

There is only one other way

I

can see to repair this

argument.

Church says that the proposal that (2") is an analysis

(T

"analogous" to the proposal that (2) is an analysis of

of

)

is
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(1).

commenting on the argument,
Putnam says that these
two
analyses are “constructed
along the same lines". 36
Perhaps we
can say that analyses
constructed along the
In

same lines from

synonymous sentences should be
synonymous.

Thus, we would use

as our first premise:

^

^

s and S' are synonymous
and A
and A are analyses of S and
S' constructed
along the same lines, then A and
A' are
synonymous)

We could then construct an
argument like Argument 3, but use
Ci

)

instead of (i) as the first premise.

Some other changes

would have to be made, but we can
overlook them here, since

1

(i

")

seems unsatisfactory.
It

is,

first of all, not at all clear when two
analyses

are constructed along the same lines.

But even if we do admit

that there is some sense to this concept,
it is not clear why

we snould think that

( i

‘

)

is true.

If one sentence may have

several non-synonymous analyses, why should
not some of them be

constructed along the same lines?
favor of (i'"),

I

Since we have no argument in

think we must reject any argument that makes

use of it.

Church's third argument thus seems less successful than
the

previous two.

Although neither Argument

1

nor Argument 2 proves

that Carnap's theory is wrong, they do force any defender
of the

theory to hold two controversial views.

First, that sentences in
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Ensllsh riecessa!''ly mean whatever
they do, in fact, mean; and
second, that analysis should
be construed in a weak
fashion

requiring only that

sentence be logically equivalent
to

a

sentence that analyzes it.

a

Argument 3, however, has no interesting

consequences like these.
Cnurch offers

fourth argument against Carnap's
view,

a

concerning iterated belief sentences,
but it
exactly what his argument is.

I

is not

think there is

a

clear to me

problem in

formulating such sentences on Carnap's
theory, although
sure that the problem

I

In the next chapter

will

I

I

am not

see is the same as the one Church
sees.

discuss three objections to Carnap's

theory, one of which concerns the
formulation of iterated belief

sentences

,.

.
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CHAPTER IV

OBJECTIONS TO CARNAP'S THEORY

In this

chapter

I

will

discuss three objections
to

Carnap's theory of belief
sentences.

The first is that there
is

no way to properly
express iterated belief
sentences in his
theory. The second is
that his analysis of belief
sentences fails
unless sentences are taken
to be abstract objects
such as

properties or universals.

The third objection, and the
most

serious one, is that his theory
fails to deal adequately with
a problem caused by the
existence of ambiguous sentences.

I

l^CiL®±heLief^te^_es.

In addition to an account of
typical

belief sentences such as:

1.

Kissinger believes that detente is good

an adequate theory of belief
sentences ought to provide some

account of iterated belief sentences, such
as:

2.

Brezhnev believes that Kissinger believes that
detente is good.
68

69

Carnap says that on
his theory

replaced by

a

sentence about

a

a

sentence like (2)
"would be

sentence about

a

sentence".

1

Although Carnap never
says what sentences
would replace
sentences like (2), I
think his view can be
reconstructed in
the following way.
The embedded belief
sentence should be analyzed
first, and then his
analysis applied to the
resulting sentence.
In the case of
(2) his analysis should first
be applied to the
content sentence, yielding:

^

3
'

^Detente
e ifooodis good
as

a

K1s 1n 9* r haS ths relat1
°"
?
sentence of English.

B to

Next, his analysis is
applied to (3), yielding:
4

r

h

h

‘

B to "Dete nt^i-s
S

sentence o? M.

(4),

I

re1a ion B to 'Kissinger
has the relation
!i
35 3 Sentence of E "9"sh'
9 °° d
a

«

believe, is the sentence about

a

sentence about

a

sentence

that would replace (2).
Let us assume for the moment the
adequacy of Carnap's

analysis of (3), i.e., that
(3) and (4) are equivalent.
it can be shown that
(4)
13) and

(4)

think

I

is not a correct analysis of
(2).

imply that Brezhnev has

a

belief concerning

English sentence, but (2) has no such
implication.

(2)

a

For

certain

is

consistent with Brezhnev's having no
knowledge of English, and
his having no beliefs on the relations
Kissinger has to any

English sentence.

So

(3) and

(4) attribute to Brezhnev a belief
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(2) does not attribute to
him.

(3) and (4), then, are not

equivalent co (2), and therefore
Carnap’s analysis of
(2) is
incorrect.
Davidson notes that Carnap's
analysis of sentences like
(2)

is

sourc_

subject to this objection, and
correctly locates the
o.

the problem.

It is that

we replace the occurrence
of (1)
5

in transforming

in

(2)

(2)

to

(3)

by:

'

61311 0 " B t0

‘

slnt'enL^in^EngHsi;

'

Dete " te is 9 °° d

'

35 3

But, on Carnap's view of analysis,
(1) and (5) are logically

equivalent but not synonymous.

The substitution of logically

equivalent sentences in belief contexts
is, as Carnap notes, 3
not always truth preserving.

Thus (2) and (3) are not logically

equivalent, and consequently (2) and
(4) are not logically
equival ent.

Davidson goes on to argue that

a

"simple and plausible

convention would save Carnap's analysis of sentences
like [(2)]
from... [this] line of attack: in cases of iteration,
the analysis
is

always applied to the larger context first." 4

In accord with

this suggestion we would analyze (2) not by
(3) or (4) but by:

6.

Brezhnev has the relation B to 'Kissinger believes that
detente is good' as a sentence of English

Davidson adds, "The words enclosed in quotation marks

in

5
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C

<

6) ] Sre n ° W ineli9ib,e
for furtf'e'" analysis
since they merely

help form, with the
aid of the quotation
marks, the name of a
sentence.
[ ( o j j tons constitutes
the complete analysis
of [( 2 )]
in accord with Carnap's
5
method."

Although

I

have no decisive objections
to this proposal,

think that there are some
problems caused by bringing
the
embedded belief' sentence
,
- r,ce in
,n (?) inf/i
into (c\
(b) unanalyzed
and inside
quotation marks.
First
a
/<ni Q n -F r
sc, it ic
is a
rule
or Carnap's system that if
a person has relation
B to a sentence S in
L, and S in L is
I

n

synonymous with
in L*.

In

S'

in

i

then that person has relation

order to apply this rule to
(6) Carnap

B to

S'

must have an

account of synonymy applicable
to the sentence mentioned
in it,
1

*

e

t0

” 0)
^

and
(5).
a

-

^

1

riot

But in ord0r t0 havp

account of synonymy applicable

a"

seems that he must give

a

semantical account of (1),

just of the sentence that he uses
to analyze (1),

i. e .,

However, Carnap thinks that including
sentences like (1) in

language for which

a

semantical analysis is given leads to

"the greatest complexity". 6
A second problem with Davidson’s
suggestion is that it

seems to render invalid some intuitively
valid inferences.
For example, from (2) and

7.

I

Mao believes that Kissinger believes that
detente

believe that we may infer

i

good
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8

.

There is something such that both
Brezhn ev and Mao believe
that Kissinger believes it

This inference seems to involve an
existential generalization on
the final that-clauses in
(2) and (7).

Such a generalization

would not be permitted in Carnap's analyses
of (2) and (7), since
on his formulations the that-clauses
would be inside quotation

marks.

Thus, bringing embedded belief sentences
into the

metalanguage inside quotation marks has
it prevents all

a

second disadvantage:

logical operations from being performed on
them,

yet some logical operations on embedded belief
sentences seem
proper.
It seems, then, that there is some difficulty
in

expressing iterated belief sentences in Carnap's system.

I

think

it would be extravagant to claim that this constitutes
a decisive

objection to his theory since, for one thing, it remains possible
that some more satisfactory way to express such sentences in his

theory will be developed.

Moreover, iterated belief sentences

may pose problems for (PV) as well and Carnap's theory may be no
less successful

in dealing with them than

(PV) is.

7

II

The existence of sentences.

Few writers on sentential theories
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seem to devote much attention to an
account of sentences, and

Carnap seems to say nothing at all on
the topic.

However,

I

think

that important problems arise for
Carnap's theory, and sentential

theories generally, unless sentences are
assumed to be necessarily

existent objects, perhaps properties such
as being such and such
a shape.

Since sentential theories are often
advocated in an

effort to avoid commitment to any entities
of this sort, this is
an unwelcome conclusion for sentential
theorists.

The problem can best be formulated in terms
of Carnap's

analysis of

9.

a

typical belief sentence, e.g.,

John has the relation
of English

B

to

'The earth is round' as a sentence

which analyzes

10.

John believes that the earth

is

round.

If Carnap's theory were correct, then (9) and (10) would be

logically equivalent.

But it seems that they are net, since (9)

implies the existence of the sentence 'The earth is round',
O

whereas (10) does not.

Moreover, (9) implies the existence of

the English language, whereas (10) does not, so we have an

additional reason to doubt that (9) and (10) are logically

equivalent.

Perhaps we can say that English exists provided the

sentences in it exist, and consider only the question of the
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existence of sentences.

If we discover that
(10) does imply the

existence of the sentence, then
we may assume that it implies
the existence of the language
as well.
If (10) does not imply that
the sentence

round

'The earth is

exists, then there are circumstances
in which (10) is

true but 'The earth is round'
does not exist.

that there are such circumstances.

It

may seem clear

For example, John might exist

and believe that the earth is
round in some world in which English
is not spoken or written at all.

The sentence 'The earth is

round' would not seem to exist in
such a world, despite the truth

of (10).

Hence (10) does not imply the existence
of

whereas (9) does.

a

Therefore, (9) and (10) are not logically

equivalent., and (9) is not a proper analysis
of (10).

this 'the existence of sentences objection
In

sentence,

1

Let us call

to Carnap's theory.

order to evaluate this objection, we must come to some

decision on the nature of sentences.

For if sentences are

necessarily existent objects, then the objection fails.

If on

the other hand, it is true that John can believe that the
earth
is round without

'the earth is round'

existing, then the objection

succeeds.
In

Word & Object^ W.

accounts of sentences.

V.

0.

Quine discusses three possible

He writes,

Prima facie... a sentence is not an event of utterance
but a linguistic form that may be uttered often, once.

75

itS existence is not
compromised by

faiiure of utterance.

But we must not accept this
9 m ° r ° P recisel y what these
linquist1c
C f0
foms a
T?
J
If a sentence were taken
as
I:*
th. c
.e its utterances,
th^class
of
then all unuttered
^ntences would be reduced to one,
viz., the null
laso.
They might as well not
exist as far as
propositions are concerned, for all
distinction
lapses among them.
Nor should I like to take a
sentence as an attribute of
utterances; for, I shall
tes.
But there is another
pw
^
Jk '"9 sentences
and
other
linguistic forms
“IT'
JuL
nat leaves their existence
uncompromised by failure
or utterance.
We can take each linguistic form
as
the sequence ... of its
successive character as a
class of utterance events, there
being here no risk

0nSlden

h

f

*

i»f

1

of non-utterance.

-j

0

Let us look at each of these
accounts in some more detail.
(I) The first account Quine
mentions is that a sentence is

the class of all its utterances.

sentence is

a

This means,

I

believe, that

a

class of all utterances sounding a
certain way.

Although Quine does not say this, it is
reasonable to assume that
the class also includes all

inscriptions of the appropriate shape.

Since utterances and inscriptions are probably
best construed as
events, a sentence, on view (I), is a class of
utterance-events
and inscription-events.
will

In

what follows reference to inscriptions

be omitted, but can be added in obvious ways.

The details of this view may be developed

depending upon how we count utterances.
that an utterance of

'I

in

various ways,

For example, we may say

don't believe that money grows on trees'

contains an utterance of 'Money grows on trees' and an utterance
of 'Money grows', or we may not.

It is not clear that one view
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is better than the
other.

Another respect in which
developments of view (I) may

differ also concerns what is
to be counted as an utterance
of
particular sentence.
If we assume that similar
sounding

a

utterances may occur in two or
more languages, then we may say
that all such utterances belong
in one class and that this
class
is a single sentence, or
we may say that all

utterances belonging

to one language constitute
one sentence and all those belonging
to another language constitute
another sentence.

Our decision on this alternative
is slightly more important
than our decision on the previous
one.

For if a sentence is a

class of all utterances that sound
alike of

a

certain language,

then the same sentence cannot be part
of more than one language.
This would make expressions like "The
earth is round" ambiguous,

possibly denoting any of several different
sentences.

Which one

iu denotes can be specified by following
it with a reference to a

language.

On the other view of sentences, when a sentence
is

the class of all appropriate sounding utterances,
"The earth is
round" is not ambiguous, but the sentence it denotes
is ambiguous,
in

that it can have any of several different meanings.

reference to
ambiguity.

a

Again,

Inaguage can resolve any problems caused by this

^ ^

It is somewhat difficult to evaluate the existence
of

sentences objection, given view (I) of sentences.

This view
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seans to imply that
expressions like "The earth
is round" are
finite descriptions, naming
different objects in different
poss.ble worlds.
It will, apparently,
name the null class in
worlds in which there are
no utterances of the
appropriate kind.

Therefore, there are no worlds
in which (10) is true and
(9)
false simply because 'The
earth is round' does not exist. 12
It is clear, however,
that

unsatisfactory for Carnap.

s

view (I) of sentences is

It has the

consequence, as Quine

notes, that all sentences that
are unuttered in
identical in that world.

i

a

world are

If $ and ¥ are both English
sentences

that have not been uttered,
then * and ¥ are identical with
the
null

class.

Hence, if someone stands in relation

0

to

<(,

as an

English sentence, then he stands in
relation B to ¥ as an English
sentence.
and

T

S

Carnap's theory would thus analyze

believes that yl in such

for all unuttered
unsati

factory

,

<j>

since

that go unuttered.
(II)

and ¥.
S

a

f

S believes that

way that they are equivalent,

That result, however, is clearly

might believe only some of the things

View (I) of sentences, then, must be rejected.

second view of sentences that Quine mentions
is

that they are attributes or properties.

along these tines

is

that

a

The most plausible view

sentence is the property of sounding

such and such a way (or being shaped such and such
Pi

operti es

,

4.''

a

way).

like propositions, are said to exist necessarily,

so there would be no worlds in which 'The earth is
round' fails
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to exist.

Hence, the existence of
sentences objection to Carnap's
theory fails, given view
(II) of sentences.

Quine rejects this account
of sentences because it
requires
the existence of properties,
which he finds as offensive as
propositions.

Carnap may not have regarded
the existence of

properties as such an objectionable
requirement, and thus may have
accepted view (II). But many
philosophers who reject (py) do so
for reasons like Quine's, and
thus cannot accept this account
of

sentences.
(Ill) The final account of sentences
Quine mentions is that

they are ordered sets of characters
or phonemes.

Characters and

phonemes, on this view, are sets of
utterances or inscriptions.
The letter 'a', for example, would be
the set of all inscriptions
looking like this:

a.

A written sentence-type would be the
ordered

set of each of its characters.

An utterance-type of a sentence

might be the ordered set of the phonemes making
up the sentence,
a

phoneme being the set of all utterances of

Quine contends that on this view there

non-utterance

.

a

given kind.
is

"no risk of

His point is that every English character and

phoneme has been inscribed or uttered, so no character or
phoneme
is

identical with the null set, and they are all properly

individuated.
will

Therefore, each intuitively diverse sentence

be identified with a diverse ordered set of characters or

phonemes, and sentences will be properly individuated.
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However, when we turn
out attention to other
possible
worlds, we will find
some in which English
is not written or
spoken at all, and each
character and phoneme is
identical with
the null class.
Each English sentence,
then, will be an ordered
set, each member of
which is the null class.
So sentences
having the same number
of characters or phonemes
will be identical
Relative to such worlds,
if a person has relation
B to * as a

sentence of English and 6
and Y have the same number
of characters
or phonemes, then that
person has relation B to Y
in English.
Thus, ir 4, and Y have the
same number of characters
or phonemes,
then r S believes that
and r S believes that Y*
are analyzed by
sentences that are equivalent
in worlds in which English
is not
1

used.

But this seems incorrect,
since these two sentences may

have different truth values
relative to such worlds.
On Quine's third account
of sentences, the existence
of

sentences objection fails.

In

every world every sentence is

identical with some set, possibly
an ordered set each member
of

whi„h is the null set.

Therefore, there are no worlds in which

(10) is true and (9) is false simply
because the sentence 'The

earth is round' does not exist.

there is

a

However, as we have just seen,

problem regarding the individuation of
sentences

similar to the problem that arose in
account (I).
I

conclude that although the existence of
sentences

objection fails on each of these three
accounts of sentences,
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other serious problems
arise.

Accounts (I) and (III)
yield

improper individuations
of sentences, while account
(II) implies
existence of properties,
which is inconsistent with
the
nomina! ist leanings of many
sentential theorists.
However, it
seems to be the only
acceptable account of sentences
available
to them.

Ill

—

On Carnap's theory, belief
sentences are

analyzed in terms of

a

triadic relation true of believers,

sentences and language.
belief in terms of

a

The reason Carnap does not analyze

dyadic relation true of believers
and sentences

is that a sentence can occur in
more than one language and thus

have more than one meaning.

analyzed in terms of

distinguish between

a
a

Consequently,

if belief were

dyadic relation, we would be unable to

person's having that relation to

a

sentence

as it occurs in one language and
his having it to that sentence in

another language.
implies that if

a

Ihus, it seems that the dyadic relation
view

person believes what

a

sentence expresses in

one language, he believes what it expresses
in another language.
The problem with the dyadic relation view may
be put in
a

slightly different way.

Suppose belief were analyzed in terms
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of

dyadic relation, B, true
of believers and sentences.
the sentence

11

a

•

Jonss

Sieves

Then

that the earth is round

would be analyzed by

12. Jones has relation
B to

'The earth is round'

There are two reasons why
this view

is

unacceptable.

First,

there should be a synonymy
rule in the language in
which (12)
occurs to the effect that
if a person has the relation
B to one
sentence, then he has B to
every sentence synonymous
with that
one.
But, since the same sentence
may occur in many different

languages and have many different
meanings, synonymy only makes
sense as a relation between a
sentence in a language and a
sentence in a language (i.e., as

a

four termed relation or

a

dyadic relation true of ordered
pairs of sentences and languages).

Therefore, the synonymy rule cannot
be applied to (12) as it
stands, but only if

a

reference to

a

language is added to it.

There is another difficulty with
(12).

Suppose that 'The

earth is round' occurs in some language,
L, other than English
and in

I.

it has a different meaning than
it has in English.

Suppose further that S does not believe
what is expressed by
The earth is round'

earth is round.

in

I.,

although he does believe that the

There seems to be no more reason to say, in
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these circumstances, that
(12) is true than that it

is false.

For he believes what 'The
earth is round' expresses in
English
but not what it expresses
in the other language.
If W e say,

however, that B is

a

triadic relation true of believers,
sentences

and languages, then we may
say that it is true that
13

h
'

relat1 ° n B t0

'

of EngHsh

The earth iS r0und

'

as a se «ence

and false that

M.

S^has the relation

I

belief as

3 to

'The earth is round' as a sentence

think, however, that there is
a

a

problem in treating

triadic relation true of believers, sentences
and

languages that is analogous to the problem in
treating it as
dyadic relation true of believers and sentences.

The problem

3
is caused by the existence of ambiguous
sentences.^

Just as

a

one sentence may have more than one meaning
because it may be
part of more than one language,

a

sentence may have more than

one meaning within one language.

There are many sentences that vary their meaning, or at
least what they express, within

sentences with demonstratives

,

a

language.

such as

'That is a clock'

what they express from context to context.
possible to say truly

'S

For example,

vary

As

a

result, it is

believes that that is

a

clock but does

i

,
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not bel eve that that is

a

clock'

provided the two demonstratives

are accompanied with
gestures indicating different
objects.

Other sentences without
demonstratives are also ambiguous,
e.g.,

'Sam is near a bank', which
may mean that Sam is near
a

financial institution and may
mean that Sam is near

a

river side.

Simi larly, then, belief
sentences may be ambiguous, e.g..
15. John believes that Sam
is near a bank

(15) may mean that John believes
that Sam is near a

financial

institution and it may mean that John
believes that Sam is near
a

river side.
We have seen that it is wrong to
say that (15) may be

analyzed in terms of
is near a bank'

a

relation holding between John and 'Sam

because this sentence may be part of
different

languages and have different meanings.
to say tnat

John,

Similarly, it is wrong

(lb) may be analyzed in terms of a
relation true of

'Sam is near a bank

1

,

and English, because the sentence

may have different meanings even in English.
Assume tnat John does believe that Sam is near
institution, but does not bel ieve that Sam is near

a

a

financial

river side.

Consider Carnap's analysis of (15):

16. John has the relation B to

of English

'Sam is near a bank' as a sentence
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It seems that (16)

should be both true and false,
since it

analyzes (15) in both senses of
the latter.

Obviously (16) must

have only one truth value, and
thus cannot properly reflect
both

John's belief and his disbelief.
I

think that the seriousness of
this objection to Carnap's

theory may be brought out by
contrasting the way (PV) might be

modified to account for ambiguity
with the possibilities open to
Carnap.

Since (15) is ambiguous, it seems
best to avoid simple

attributions of truth or falsity to it, but
instead to say that
a

particular utterance of (15) is true or
false, or else to treat

truth as a relation between sentences,
speakers and times.

Following the latter course, we will say that
(15) is true

relative to

a

speaker, p, and

conditions obtain.

a

time, t, if and only if certain

Those conditions will vary with

p

and t.

The truth value of (15) on a given occasion depends
upon

how the speaker on that occasion uses the v/ord 'bank'.

If he

uses it to mean 'financial institution', then
(15) should be

true (given our assumptions about John's beliefs) but
(15) should
be false for a speaker at a time if that speaker at that time
uses
'bank'

to mean

'river side'.

A defender of (PV) may say that the proposition referred
to by 'that Sam is near a bank'

by a person at a time depends

upon how he uses 'bank' at that time.

Thus, instead of a sense
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and reference simply being
assigned to 'bank', one might
say
that the expression is
assigned a sense and a reference
relative
'•o

a

person and time.

Since the assignment to 'bank'
can thus

vary, the proposition named
by the that-clause in
(15) may vary,
and as a result, the truth
value of (15) may vary from
speaker to
speaker and time to time.

Berore it could justifiably be
claimed that

a

solution to

ambiguity problem can be found
within the framework of (PV),
the above suggestion must be
developed in more detail. But it
does seem possible that some
solution to the problem can be developed

without abandoning (PV) entirely.
Prospects for

a

solution to the ambiguity problem
within

the framework of Carnap's theory seem
less promising.

For even if

we relativize truth of sentences to
people and times, it is hard
to see why the truth value of
(16) would vary.
it contains no ambiguous expressions.
is not ambiguous,

For unlike (15),

The sentential name in (16)

even though the sentence it names is ambiguous.

So there seems to be little hope of success
in following a course
in this case similar to the one that seems
promising in the case

of (PV).

There are two more radical departures from Carnap's theory
that may provide solutions to the ambiguity problem.
taxe the objects of belief to be sentence tokens

utterances or inscriptions.

-

One is to

particular

One might argue that despite the
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ambiguity of sentence types, sentence
tokens are unambiguous,
their meaning being determined by
the person producing them and
their context.

Another possible solution to the ambiguity
problem is to
construe belief as
a
a

speaker and

a

sentence, and

a

relation between a person,

time, rather than as
a

language.

sentence is ambiguous in
speaker at
In

a

a

a

sentence, and

relation between

a

The idea here is that even if

person,
a

language, it is not ambiguous for a

a time.

the cnapters tnat follow

I

will

examine theories that

adopt the approaches just outlined.

IV

In this chapter

theory of belief, and

I

I

have raised three problems for Carnap's

believe that these objections apply to

sentential theories generally.^

The first, and least serious

objection is that there seems to be no way to properly formulate
iterated belief sentences in Carnap's theory.

Of the two possible

formulations, one saddles believers with beliefs about sentences
and languages that they need not have.

The other formulation may

be preferable, but it seems to invalidate certain valid inferences

and to force Carnap to provide a semantical account of ordinary
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belief sentences, and not
just to the sentences that
he uses to
analyze them.
The second problem is that
an adequate account of
sentences
seems to require that they be
properties or universal (or
perhaps
some other kind of abstract
object).
To admit the existence of
such entities is to abandon
the nominalism that is often
the

motivation for adopting
It should be admitted,

a

theory like Carnap's in place
of (PV).

however, that Carnap's motivation
for

adopting his theory was not nominalism
but rather its alleged
logical simplicity.

Finally, the existence of ambiguous
sentences poses

a

serious problem to Carnap and other
defenders of the view that

sentences are the objects of belief.
one thing expressed by

a

sentence in

Since
a

a

person can believe

given language but

disbelieve something else expressed by
that sentence in that
language, it seems improper to analyze
belief simply in terms of
a

relation true of believers, sentences and
languages.
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PART

2

INSCRIPTION THEORIES

In Part 2

I

will discuss two alternatives to (PV) that are

rather different from the sentential theories discussed
in Part
Both of these theories take sentence tokens

utterances

-

as the objects of belief.

-

inscriptions or

The first theory,

proposed by Israel Scheffler, is advanced in an effort to avoid

commitment to all abstract entities, including sentence types.
The second theory, proposed by Donald Davidson, is designed to

overcome the ambiguity problem, discussed in Chapter
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CHAPTER V

SCHEFFLER

in

this chapter

I

will discuss a theory of belief
sentences

proposed by Israel Scheffler 1 who
,
claims that his theory avoids
commitment to sentence-types, word-types,
properties, and
propositions

2
.

The central idea of Scheffler's
theory is to

treat that-clauses as predicates
true of sentence-inscriptions,
and to take inscriptions as the
objects of belief.

Such treatment,

he contends, enables his theory
to avoid all the undesirable

commitments of other theories.

I

The fullest development of Scheffler's theory
is found in

The Anatomy of Inquiry

.

There Scheffler develops

a

theory of

"desi res-that" sentences in some detail, and then proposes that

believes-that sentences be treated similarly.
is

Although there

some doubt that desi res-that sentences and believes-that

sentences should be treated similarly,^

I

will overlook that

issue and consider Scheffler's account of desires-that sentences.

A.

Scheffler's account of desires-that sentences

.

Scheffler begins

^
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by distinguishing two senses
of the word 'desire'.

One sense of

the word is found in sentences
such as

1.

John desires the book.

In

sentences such as (1), where the object
of desire is some

concrete object, we may say that 'desires'
has its "objective
sense".

Desires

2.

has its second sense in sentences such
as

John desires that John qualify for entrance
to medical school.

Here, what John desires appears to be

a

state of affairs or,

perhaps, a proposition, although Scheffler argues
that this

appearance is deceptive.

Let us call this the "propositional

sense" of 'desires'.
3.

Scheffler suggests that in sentences in which 'desires'
occurs in its objective sense, it may be replaced by 'desires
to
nave

without changing the sense of the sentence.

has its propositional

Where 'desires'

sense, such replacement radically alters

the meaning of the sentence, indeed, it seems to make it senseless.

Scheffler mentions that the objective sense of 'desires'

may ultimately be defined in terms of the propositional sense.
Thus, (1) might mean:

John desires that John have the book.

.

.
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where 'desires' now has its propositional
sense.
In

order to avoid confusions that might
arise out of the

ambiguity of 'desires', Scheffler proposes
that we use 'desirestrue

to express its propositional sense
and reserve 'desires'

For the objective sense.

Thus, he suggests that we "replace"

(2) by:

4.

John desires-true that John qualify for
entrance to medical
school

One of the problems that

I

have in understanding Scheffler's

theory is that I'm not sure what he thinks is gained
by replacing

with (4).

{?.)

As we shall

see, understanding this process

becomes crucial when he goes on to replace (4) by other
sentences
that look even less like ordinary English than
(4) does.

Scheffler next says that we may represent

(4)

symbolically

by:

Dtr That(QJ).

5.

J

In

(5)

and

'J'

stands for 'John',

'DTr'

stands for 'desires-true',

'That(QJ)' for 'that John qualify for entrance to medical

school

'

The essential elements of Scheffler's theory are described
in the following passage:

)' as a predicate forming
Now, we take 'That(
operator, so that [(5)7 becomes:
DTrJx)
[6.] (Ex) (That(QJ)x
.

g

,

.
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read:
'There is some x, such that x is
a that-Johnqual if les-for-entrance-to-medical
-school, and John

desires-true x
The range of the variable x is here
restricted
to concrete inscriptions (though a
broadening of the
range to include concrete utterances as
well is
also conceivabl e) r
1

.

1

'

5

Scheffler explains the import of his proposal
this way:
...we have. ..proceeded to construe
[(2)] after the
manner of [(6)]. The import of this construal is
to
'

'

0r ^ inar ^ ,(^ esi ri n 9 that' statements, such as
r?ofn
L(2)J, as tantamount to statements expressing a
certain relation between agents and inscriptions.
The total effect concerns the lo gical form and
o ntological c haracter of
des i ri ng that' statements
rather than their substa ntive analysis, i.e., the
specification of those conditions under which they
hold true.
In fact, [(6)], for example, is presumed
true just under those conditions in which
[(2)] is
presumed true.
Any further, substantive analysis
of 'desire , specifying the operative conditions for
the tru :h of [(2)j, and hence of [(6)], is theoretically
welcome, however, as an independent step.
Statement [(5)] thus represents a way of
construing the logical form and ontology of 'desiring
that statements.
Nor can [ ( 6 ) J be charged with
obscurity by those favoring an interpretation in
terms of states [propositions].
For [(6)] is
itself explicable in terms of the latter approach:
one can, generally, explain the desiring-true of a
given inscription, to proponents of s tates , as the
desiring of that state which is purportedly
represented by the inscription in question. Also,
as noted, the 'desires-true' formulation is to be
taken as true under just those conditions in which
its ordinary 'desires that' counterpart is
considered true.
In particular, for an agent to
desire-true some given inscription does not imply
that he produce, possess, wish to possess, be
aware of, or even understand the inscription in
question.
'

1

1
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In thase passages

That(QJ)

.

Scheffler introduces a novel
predicate,

More will be said about such
predicates later.

For
now, it will suffice to say
that they are true of any
inscription
Of the sentence in their
7

parentheses.

B*
a

i

6f sentences

.

Scheffler proposes

treacment of belief sentences very
similar to his treatment of

desi res-that sentences.

Corresponding to the objective and

propositional senses of 'desires', there
are objective and

propositional senses of 'believes'. 8

The objective sense occurs

in:

7.

Jones believes John Dean

and the propositional

8.

sense occurs in:

Jones believes that John Dean told the truth.

Perhaps these t vvo senses can be distinguished by
pointing out
that the objective sense may be defined in terms of
the

propositional sense.

Taking the propositional sense as basic,

the objective sense might be defined as 'believes what is
asserted
by', where 'believes'

has its propositional

sense.

Analogous to

the case of 'desires', Scheffler proposes that we use 'believestrue'

to express the propositional

sense of 'believes'.

Sentence (8) goes through the same kinds of transformations
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(1) did,

9.

(9)

(fcx)

and Scheffler's final replacement
for it is:

(That- ( John -Dean -to! d-the-truth)x and
Jones be! ieves-true x).

can be read:

There is some x, such that x is a
that-(John-Dean-told-thetrucn, inscription, and Jones be!
ieves-true x)
Thus, on Scheffler's theory, a typical belief
sentence such
as

(8)

turns out to be replaceable by

person to an inscription

a

sentence that relates

a

and avoids all mention of propositions.

Scheffler explains the import of this construal of
belief
sentences in mucn the same way he explained the import
of his
construal of desires-that sentences:

...the proposal concerns the logical form and
ontological character of 'believes that' statements,
rather than a substantive analysis of the conditions
under which such statements are true.
In fact, the
construal ... presented is presumed true just under
those conditions in which ordinary 'believes that'
statements are considered true, no matter what
these conditions may be.
It follows that, when
the bel ieves-true' relation holds, it need not be
expected that, the agent produce, be aware of, or
even understand the inscription believed-true. Nor
can the proposal well be criticized as more obscure
than one appealing to states (or propositions) for
the bel ieving-true of an inscription can be explained,
in the latter terms, as the believing of that state
(or proposition) associated with it.
Q
'

,

y

In the next two sections of this chapter

Scheffler's proposal.

I

will evaluate
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II

Scheffler apparently thinks that the
fact that (8) may be
rewritten as (9) somehow clarifies
the "ontological character"
of (8).

I

assume that this means that we gain
insight into

the ontological implications of
(8) by rewriting it as (9).

In

particular, what we learn is that
(8) does not imply the existence
of

a

proposition, or is not ontological
ly committed to

propositions.

What

I

want to examine in this section are the

reasons for thinking that our ability to
rewrite (8) as (9)
has any implications about the ontological
character of (8).
In

"Propositions and Inscriptions" 10 Herbert Heidelberger
addresses

himself to this topic and formulates two arguments
that Scheffler

might use to show that rewriting (8) as

does give us insight

(9)

into the ontology of (8).

A.

One account of S cheffler

1

s

argument

.

Hei

demerger's first

suggestion is that Scheffler thinks that (9), unlike (8), is

a

sentence whose ontological implications are clear and does not
include propositions.
have the

Since (8) and (9) are equivalent, (8) must

same implications

as

(9) and,

therefore, does not

imply the existence of propositions either.

11

Heidelberger contrasts this proposal with another one along

^
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the same lines, once made by C. H. Langford.

He writes:

Langford considers the sentence
[10.] The present King of France is the present King
of France.

Suppose some metaphysician believes (not implausibly)
that [(10)] is true and holding (perhaps less
plausibly) that [(10)] implies
[11.] The present King of France exists
is led to suppose that the present King of France
exists in some metaphysical realm.
How should we
go about showing him that he is in error? Langford
suggests that [(10)] may be interpreted as

[12.] If something has the property of being the
present King of France, then something has
that property.
If we can get our metaphysician to agree that [(10)]
is logically equivalent to [(12)] it might be easier
to persuade him that [(10)] does not imply [(11)].
For it may be obvious that [(12)] does not imply [(H)]
and if, as we have supposed, [(10)] is logically
equivalent to [(12)], [(10)] does not imply [(H)]
either.
Again, the merit of the suggested paraphrase
is that the existential implications of [(12)] may
be more apparent than those of [(10)].

Heidelberger argues that there is an important disanalogy
between Scheffler's proposal and Langford's.

(9)

is not an

English sentence, it contains the unfamiliar predicate

true

1

,

which has not been analyzed

1

believes-

and consequently is not a

sentence whose ontological implications are especially clear.
Indeed, since all we really know about (9) is that it is supposed
to be true when (8) is, its implications are exactly as clear as

98

those of (8), but no clearer.

(12), on the other hand, is an

English sentence whose
implications are reasonably clear.

Hence
we do gain an insight into
the implications of
(10) by rewriting
it as

(12).

Rewriting (8) as (9) does not seem
to have similar

advantages.

B.

Lsecondj^

HeTdelberger points

out that Scheffler may not intend
to make

Langford's.

a

proposal analogous to

Instead, he may be making a proposal
about the

logical form of (8). 13

His argument might be as follows.

Since

no expression in (9) is a name of
a proposition, and the quantifier
in

(9)

does not range over propositions, 14
(9) does not imply the

existence of

a

proposition.

not imply the existence of

(8), being equivalent to (9), does
a

proposition either.

This is the

second argument Heidelberger formulates that
Scheffler might use
to show that rewriting (8) as
(9) reveals the ontological

implications of (8).

Heidelberger thinks that this argument is invalid, and in
order to show that it is, he likens it to the following
argument:

Consider
[13.] Socrates and Plato exist

and
[14.] Socrates exists.
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[15.] There is an inscription which
is a thatSocrates-and-Plato-exist and which is true.

Following Scheffler's lead we shall
interpret
JUSt in case
is true.
Note
th
f
tnat
LUoJJ does not mention Socrates; in fact
his name is not used in
[(15)] at all. Moreover,
the quantifier of [(15)] ranges
over inscriptions
and not over persons.
Shall we say that since
L(.I5)J does not mention Socrates, and that
since
its quantifier does not range over
persons, [(15)]
does not imply [(14)], and therefore
[(13)] does
not imply [(14)]?
Surely not.
Surelv [(131]
^^)], ancJ
is a rephrasal
of [( lj )]> then [(15)] implies
[(14)] as well.

r/rnT

^

]5

The argument that Heidelberger asks us to
consider

concerning (13), (14) and (15) seems to be the following:
A RGUMENT

1

(13) is equivalent to (15).
Socrates i > not named in (15) and the quantifier in
(15)
does not range over persons (and therefore does not
include Socrates in its range).
18. (15) does not imply that Socrates exists (i.e., (15) does
not imply (14) ).
19. (13) does riot imply~(7TT
16.
17.

We are to assume that the first premise of Argument

1

is

true, analogous to Scheffler's assumption that (9) is equivalent
to (8).

The second premise of Argument

1

would seem to be

obviously true, since (15) contains no names at all, and there
seems to be little doubt that its quantifier ranges only over

inscriptions.

(18) is supposed to follow from (17), and the

.

ICO

validity of this inference
will be discussed at length
below.
Finally, (19) follows from
(13) and (16).

Of this last inference

there can be no doubt.

Heidalberger says that this
argument is surely unsound,
for (IS) is quite obviously
false.
in

He asserts that the mistake

the argument "comes in
passing from [(15)] does not
mention

Socrate^ and its quantification
does not range over persons,
to
[(15)] does not imply that Socrates
16
exists."

Thus, Heidelberger's

contention is that the objectionable
feature of Argument
inference from (17) to (13).

1

is the

He seems to think that this

inference is tne only place at which
the argument could go wrong,
and since it is unsound, this
inference must be invalid.
It seems to me, however, that
there is another place at

which Argument

1

could go wrong, and that we ore not
justified

in concluding that the inference
from (17) to (18) is invalid

until we show that the argument does
not go wrong in this other

place, or else adduce independent grounds
for thinking that (17)
ooes not imply (18).
in

The second possible source of difficulty

the argument is its premises.

I

think that we must show that

they are consistent before we can justifiably
conclude from the
i

act tna t Argument

1

is unsound, that the inference frcm
(17) to

(18) is invalid.

One might feel that these premises are not controversial
(15) has been stipulated to be equivalent to (13), just as
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Scheffler stipulated that (9) is equivalent
to (8).

Since we can

stipulate that we'll use (15) however we like,
the first premise,
(15), seems incontestable.

The second premise, (17), seems to

be too obvious to contest, so the two
would seem to be

consistent, and Heidelberger justified

Argument
I

1

in

placing the error in

where he did.

think, however, that the truth of (16) cannot simply be

stipulated, given the truth of (17).

In

(17), sentence (15) is

said to have certain semantical properties, namely, having

a

quantifier ranging over inscriptions, and having no name of
Socrates.

What is said in (16), whether it be stipulated or

asserted, is that (15) has another semantical property, namely,
being equivalent to (13).

And these properties, it seems to me,

may well be incompatible.

Perhaps (13) cannot be equivalent to

a

sentence having only certain kinds of quantifiers and names.
To see that the compatibility of (15) and (17) is not

something we should jusc. assume, let us consider an analogy.

Suppose someone were to note that in

20.

There is some sport such that it

is

more popular than football

the quantifier ranges over sports and there is no name of

person.

a

This will be analogous to noting that (17) is true.

Now, suppose this person were to go on to stipulate that as he
will

use (20), it is equivalent to:
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21.

I

Mixon exists.

think we would all want to protest
that this stipulation cannot

be made.

Since the quantifier in
(20) ranges over sports, and

(20) implies the existence of a sport,
which (21) does not, (20)

and (21) cannot be equivalent.
Of course one could stipulate that
(21) will be used in
such

a

way that it is equivalent to (20).

But then how (20)

is to be interpreted, i.e., the range
of its quantifier, is not

something that can be stipulated as well.

For the equivalence

of (20) and (21) rules out certain
interpretations of (20), e.g.,
its most natural one.

Analogously, then, one might stipulate that
(13) and (15)
are equivalent, but then one is not free to
interpret the

quantifier

in

(lb) any way one pleases.

In

particular, one may

not be free to interpret it as ranging over inscriptions.

If one

insists that the quantifier ranges over inscriptions, then one
is not free to stipulate that (13) and

(15) are equivalent.

Returning to Argument 1, then, we may say only the

following: since its conclusion, (19), is false, the argument is
unsound.

The only possible explanations of this are: (i) that

the two premises, (16) and (17), are incompatible; and (ii) that

the inference from (17) to (18) is invalid.

However, we are not

as yet justified in claiming, as Heidelberger does, that the
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inference from (17) to 08) is the source
of the difficulty.
I

does

riot

true.

want to argue now that Heidelberger'

s

imply (18), although not yet justified,
is nevertheless

The argument for this is fairly simple.

from (17) to (18) is based upon

(P)

assertion that (17)

a

The inference

principle such as this:

For any sentence <f, if the quantifiers
in $ do not
include a certain object in their range, and
no
expression in cf names that object, then
does
not
$
imply that that object exists.

That (P) is

a

false principle, and that inferences such as

the one from (17) to (18) which appeal to it are
invalid, may be

shown as follows.

22.

Consider the sentence

Jack is married to Jill.

(22) quite obviously implies

23.

Jill

exists.

One

is

free to view the syntax of (22) in various ways,

although one view might be better than another.
view is that 'Jack'

one-place predicate.

is a name, and

'is

One possible

married to Jill'

is

a

Since 'Jack' names Jack, and there are no

quantifiers or other names in (22), we can conclude, via (P), that
(22) does not imply (23).
(P)

is

false.

However, since (22) does imply (23),

.
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it should not be argued
that this objection to (P) turns
on

taking an unnatural view of
(22).

For one could imagine

a

predicate, say, 'is fortunate,' being
constructed as an

abbreviation of 'is married to Jill'.

The sentence

24. Jack is fortunate

then, is equivalent to (22) and
therefore implies (23).

(24),

however, contains only the name 'Jack'
and the predicate 'is
fortunate'.

Therefore, if (p) is true, we may conclude
that

L?A) does not imply (23).
is also false.

Since that conclusion is false, (P)

So, the above objection does not turn
on an

implausible construction of (22).
I

think that an explanation of the falsity of (P)
can be

achieved by recognizing the existence of predicates that
are
"implicitly relational".
effect of concealing
'is

These are predicates that have the

reference to an object.

a

married to Jill,' or 'is fortunate

1

,

For example,

as it was defined,

conceal references to Jill.

Unfortunately

am unable to provide any precise account

I

,

of implicitly relational predicates, but the following account
should be satisfactory in the present circumstances.
n

predicate,

P

,

is

implicitly relational provided that for some

constants, ai,'«..,a
x f a )a

m
Ps

(x,ai

equal to n +

1

, .

An n-place

.

r

n
.a

n
P

P

(ai

,.

.

.

9

a

)' 1

implies

n

for some R

m
,

r

(Ex) (x / ai

...

where m is less than or
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On this account,

'is married to Jill'

and

'is fortunate'

are implicitly relational because
'Jack is married to Jill' and
'Jack is fortunate* both imply
'(Ex)(x f Jack * Jack is married
to x)', where
Ic is

'is married to'

is a two-place predicate.

important to realize that many place predicates
may

also conceal references and thus be
implicitly relational.

example, 'having

a

sole intermediary

true of Kennedy and Mixon.

because
/•

is a two-place predicate

This predicate is implicitly relational

Kennedy and Mixon have

'(Ex)(x

'

For

a

sole intermediary' implies

Kennedy a x f Nixon a x is either

a

successor or

a

predecessor of Kennedy)'.
The recognition of the existence of implicitly relational

predicates provides us with an explanation of the falsity of
(P).
We may now justifiably assert that the problem (or
with Argument

1

a

problem)

is the invalidity of the inference from (17) to

(18), since that inference relies upon (P).

Finally, we can return to Scheffler's argument concerning

belief sentences.

Scheffler's argument, analogous to Argument 1,

might be formulated as follows:

ARG UMENT

2

(9) is equivalent to (8)
No proposition is named in (9) and the quantifier in (9)
does not range over propositions
2 7. (9) do es not imply the existenc e of a proposit ion
23. (8) does not imply* the existence' of a proposition
25.
26.

.
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Just as the inference from
(17) to (18) fails in Argument

because it relies on the false
principle, (P), the inference
from
(26) to (27) also fails because
it too relies on this false

princi pie.
I

think that this objection to
Argument

2

can be

strengthened by pointing out that
there is good reason to think
that a predicate in (9) is
implicitly relational.
That is, I
think

some evidence can be accumulated
to support the view that

‘bel ieves-true'

is

implicitly relational.

Moreover, the

references it seems to conceal are to
propositions.

Scheffler tells us only

a

few things about

One is tnat it is true of people and
inscriptions.
that

it

would be desirable to analyze it further.

'

bel

ieves-true

'

Another is
And the

third is that, for those who prefer
propositions, "the believing-

true of an inscription can be explained.

.

.as the believing of

17
the state (or proposition) associated with
it."
bel ieves-true'

Thus,

does seem to conceal references to propositions,

and until some reason is adduced for thinking that
it does not,
I

think we should assume that it does.
In this

section

I

have considered two arguments Scheffler

might give to defend the claim that the equivalence of
(8) and (9)
shows that it does not imply the existence of propositions.

have defended lleidelberger'
unsound.

s

claim that the first argument

In the case of the second argument,

I

I

is

have offered some

106

needed justification for
his claim that it is
invalid.

Ill

A.

(9)

—to—

Scheffler says of

chat it is "presumed true
just under those conditions in

which

(8)

,s

true, "no matter what those
conditions may be." 19

He also claims that the
existential quantifier in (9) ranges
over

inscriptions, and thus that
(9) implies the existence of an
inscription.

19
In

this section

I

will argue that these

additional claims are incompatible
with Schef tier's presumption.
(Thus,

i

think that premises (25) and
(26) in Argument

fact incompatible, and that there is,
therefore,

2

are in

second

a

objection to that argument.)
Let us assume that (9) is a part of a
language for which
an interpretation has been specified.

interpretation assigns to

Jones

1

Assume that the

the individual Jones, to

'believes-true' a set of ordered pairs of people and

inscriptions and to 'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)

!

a

set of inscriptions.

Scheffler says that the inscriptions assigned to

predicate such as 'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)
the following conditions. 99

'

a

should meet

Every inscription in its
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interpretation should be

a

"rephrasal" of the sentence

inscription in the parentheses in
the predicate.

A rephrasal

Of an inscription, I, Scheffler
says, is a sentence inscription
ordinarily assumed to represent
the same sentence" as I. 21
Inscriptions represent the same
sentences when (i) they are
spelled alike;
(

i' e *

5

both

( i i )

they have a "similar language
affiliation

French

lack indicator terms.

,

both Italian, etc.)"; 22 and (iii)
they

The interpretation of every inscription

of 'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)

1

,

then, is the set of all

English inscriptions of ‘John Dean told
the truth'.

Scheffier never says how the language
affiliation of an
inscription is determined, but he seems to
think that it is
a

feature of its context. 23

Perhaps, then, the intentions of

its inscriber determine the affiliation
of any inscription.

At any rate, Scheffler asserts confidently that
no inscription
is

"part of more than one language" 24 and takes
this to be an

important advantage of his theory over theories that
take

sentence types as the objects of belief.
There is some doubt that all inscriptions have

language affiliation.

a

unique

Someone might produce an inscription

that is part of more than one language in order to make

a

joke

or just to point out that there are such inscriptions.

I

will

overlook this point, however.
Assuming that the method for interpreting (9) is now
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reasonably clear, we can turn to an
evaluation of Scheffler's
claim or supposition that it is
true in exactly the same

circumstances as (8).

think that there are circumstances
in

I

which these sentences (sentence-inscriptions)
would differ
truth value.

——

I

^

will

in

describe two such cases.

Suppose Jones does believe that John
Dean told

•

-

the truth, but out of

a

fear that the president's men have

bugged his house, he never voices his belief
and never writes ic
down.

Furthermore, suppose everyone else shares Jones'
fear,

reacts similarly, and as
tol d- uhe-trutn

)

result, there are no that-(John-Dean-

a

inscriptions.

In

these circumstances, (8)

would be true, but (9) would not, since it implies
the existence

of

a

that-( John-Dean-tol d-the-truth ) inscription.
^ ase 2 .

Imagine

a

world (i.e.,

a

set of circumstances)

much like the real world, with the exception that all people
who speak English in the real world speak Spanish in that
world.

Suppose that John Dean makes the same accusations against the

president in that world that he does in this world, and that Jones
believes these accusations and that John Dean told the truth.
these circumstances, (8)

is

In

true but (9) is false, again because

it implies the existence of a that-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)

inscription.

Since English is not used in that world, there are

no such inscriptions.

Both of these cases,

1

believe, present circumstances in

109

wmch

(8)

is true and

is

(9)

not.

Hence, (3) and (9) are not

true in all the same
circumstances; Scheffler's claim
or

supposition that they are equivalent
is false; and he has not
shown that belief sentences
may be reformulated in terms
of
sentences expressing

a

relation between persons and
inscriptions.

Scheffler is aware that there is

a

problem for this theory

concerning the existence of
inscriptions and he hints at one
reply that might be made to these
objections and claims that
there is no conclusive objection
to another reply.

I

will

consider these replies, taking the
hint first.

B

reply

*

.

Scheffler points out in several

places that any inscription of

a

predicate of the form 'That- (4)'

contains an inscription of which the predicate
is true.

At one

point he remarks that the "existence of an
inscription denoted
by the predicate is thus guaranteed by the
existence of the

predicate-inscription itself." 25
At another point he says, "We need, moreover, not
worry
that tnere might perhaps be no appropriate inscription
in existence
to warrant an analysis such as [(9)].

the question

For merely to formulate

wnether John Dean told the truth "is to produce

an inscription of the right sort." 26

Scheffler notes that

the question might be put orally, but envisages extending his

no
predicates to apply to utterances as
well as inscriptions. 27
Sc heftier is surely wrong
in claiming that the
formation of

the question produces the
required inscription or utterance.

The

question might be formulated by
following an assertion that Nixon
told the truth with the question
"How about Dean?"

Furthermore,

the question might be formulated
mentally, without thereby

producing any inscription or utterance at
all.
Setting aside this point, one may wonder
why the fact that
the existence of the predicate-inscription
guarantees the existence

of the required inscription or the fact
that forming the question

produces the required inscription is of importance
here.
-~~-e

1.

In

there is no predicate-inscription in existence
of the

required sort, so it doesn't bring about the existence
of the
needed inscription.

Moreover, the question of Dean's truth

telling, we have assumed, is only formed mentally in Case
1.
Thus neither of the facts Scheffler mentions implies that there
is an inscription of the needed sort in Case

1

.

And in Case

2

there also is no inscription of the required kind, since there

are no English inscriptions at all.
I

ca.fi

see only one way in which the two facts Scheffler

cites may be of any aid in replying to these two examples.

Scheffler might argue that in both cases

I

failed to describe

any circumstances in which (8) and (9) differ in truth value.
In

order to differ in truth value in

a

given set of circumstances,

Ill
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8 ) and

(9) would have to exist in those circumstances.

Since

they do not exist in the cases described, they do
not differ in
truth value.

In

any cases in which they do exist, the required

iriscriDtion must exist, and thus they can agree in
truth value.
I

think that this reply is inadequate, and that it trades

on an ambiguity in the sentence

the same circumstances
to the sentence.
in all

.

'(8) and (9) are true in all

There are,

I

believe, two clear readings

On one reading to say that (8) and

(9) are true

the same circumstances is to say that (8) and (9), as used

by inscribers in any set of circumstances, have the same truth

value.

We could agree that they have truth values in a set of

circumstances, in this sense, only if they exist in those
circumstances.
There are two things that are clear about the expression
'(8) and

sense.

(9) are true in all

the same circumstances' in this

One thing is that it is false.

We can imagine

circumstances in which (8) is the negation of (9) and so they
do not have the same truth value.

The second thing that is clear about this sense of this

sentence is that it has nothing whatever to do with the claim
that (8) and (9) are logically equivalent, or that one may
be used to replace the other.

What is of importance to these

claims is that (8) and (9) have truth conditions such that

any circumstances satisfying the truth conditions of one
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satisfy those of the other.

When this obtains,
(8) and (9) are

true in all the same
circumstances, in the second
sense of this
Phrase.
Perhaps this would be
expressed more clearly by
saying
that (8) and (9) are true
at, or relative to. all
the same

circumstances.

There is no reason to
think that (8) and
(9)

must exist in a certain
circumstance in order to have
a truth
value relative to those
circumstances. The sentence 'There
might have been no inscriptions'
is true and the sentence
'There
are no inscriptions' is
(logically) possibly true because
there
are circumstances relative
to which they are true.
Of course,
the latter could not exist
jn^ such circumstances,
but it is

trua relative to them.
Thus, relative to the circumstances
described in Case

and Case_2, (8) is true and
(9) is false.

1

That they do not

exist in these circumstances is of
no consequence.

C‘

s

s^nd^rgDli/,

i

second reply to these examples.

n

a

footnote Scheffler offers

Following Goodman and Quine,

he suggests that we might count as
an inscription any

appropriately shaped spatio-temporal region even though
[it]
be indistinguishable from [its] surroundings
in color". 28

In

the examples described above, there surely were
some

appropriately shaped regions, so there were some that-(John-

a

.

.
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Dean -told- the- truth) inscri
ptions

Thus,

(9)

is true relative to

those circumstances.

Scheffler admits that accepting
this suggestion requires
adopting "a somewhat artificial
notion of inscriptions" but
observes that there seems to be
"no conclusive argument against
it.

There are, however, some
considerations that should lead

us to reject this view.
Fir-ot, as

Scheffler admits, it is "somewhat
artificial".

Il renders false many of
cur intuitions about counting

inscriptions.

For example,

I

would have thought that

I

knew

how to count sentence-inscriptions,
and thus, could determine
how many inscriptions of a given
sentence there were in

certain area, say, on

a

blackboard.

a

But, on this view, there

are countless numbers of inscriptions
of every sentence
everywhere.

There are some, perhaps an infinite number of

very small ones, in the dot above an

i
'

'

Second, Scheffler cites as an advantage of his
view the

fact that inscriptions, unlike sentence-types, are
not ambiguous.
The reason for this is that every inscription occurs
in
and is

a

part of no more than one language.

inscription has

a

Thus,

a

a

context

particular

specific meaning, detennined by its context,

which apparently includes the intent of its inscribes

These

indistinguishable spatio-temporal regions, however, have no
inscribers, are not part of any particular language, and thus
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would not seem to have

a

particular meaning.

Third, and most importantly, no
such inscription is
tha t-( John -Dean -told- the-truth)

inscription.

a

It is clear

that the indistinguishable
spatio-temporal regions are not

ordinarily assumed to represent any
sentence at all, and it
seems unreasonable to attribute
any language affiliation to
them.

So even if there are such
inscriptions, they are not

that-(John-Dean-told-the-truth) inscriptions, given
Scheffler's

account of these inscriptions, mentioned
at the beginning of
Section III.
I

conclude, therefore, that Scheffler has
offered no good

reply to my claim that Case
in which

1

and Case

2

provide circumstances

(8) and (9) differ in truth value.

IV

In this

chapter

I

have raised two important objections

to Scheffler's theory of belief sentences.

Scheffler's view

is that belief sentences like (8) may be paraphrased by

sentences like (9) and he contends that this shows that we
can avoid commitment to propositions.

I

have argued that

even if we can paraphrase (8) by (9), it would not follow

that,

I

we can avoid commitment to
propositions.

Furthermore,

have argued that (8) cannot be
properly paraphrased by (9).
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CHAPTER VI
DAVIDSON

Donald Davidson 1 has presented

a

non-propositi onal theory

of indirect discourse that, he thinks, "opens

a

analysis of psychological sentences generally ." 2
to treat the objects of the psychological verbs,

'believes', etc., as utterances.

lead to the
His idea is
'said',

On his view the that-clause

in these sentences is neither a name of the utterance believed

nor a predicate true of it.

Instead,

'that'

functions as

a

demonstrative referring in each case to the utterance of the
words immediately following it.
In

this chapter

I

will present Davidson's theory of

indirect discourse and discuss how it might be extended to cover

belief sentences.

I

will argue that the theory cannot treat all

belief sentences properly.
I

think that Davidson's theory has many virtues, and

some of them are best seen through an examination of a slightly

more formal version of the theory than will be developed in the
body of this chapter.

In an appendix to the

describe the highlights of

a

chapter

I

will

more formal treatment of Davidson's

theory and assess its adequacy.
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A.

D^dM^prc^osal.

Davidson's goal

is

to provide truth

conditions for sentences in
indirect discourse, and
ultimately
for all sentences in
natural language.
In order to do this,
he
must show how the truth
value of any sentence is
a function of
the extensions of the
terms in
it.

Davidson develops his theory
of indirect discourse through
a consideration of the
sentence:

1*

Galileo said that the earth
moves.

Me begins by rejecting the
view that the that-clause in
(1) names
the sentence 'The earth moves'.
He says that the problem with

this view is that the sentence
'The earth moves' may occur
in

many different languages and have
many different meanings. 3
Davidson does not explain why he
thinks this is a problem, but

perhaps his reasons are similar to
those discussed in Chapter IV.
Davidson next considers the possibility
that (1) means the
same as:

Galileo spoke a sentence that meant in his
language what 'The
earth moves' means in English.

He rejects this view for two reasons.
the "translation test

4

11

.

I

The first is that it fails

am not at all sure that Davidson is

i

right about this, but will not discuss the issue here.

Objections

similar to those raised against Carnap's theory in Chapter
IV
apply equally well to this theory.
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Davidson's second reason
forrejecti n 9 this theory
is that it
contains a reference to a
language and
languages (as Quine remarks
in

express identical propositions.

a

similar context in

We see

then
that
quotahonal theories of indirect
discourse. ?hose
n " ot c1aim an ^vantage
ove/theoriertha-^M
0

“

enmi'el

?^

start?
5

lntr ° dUCe inte " Sio " al

'

*

It is difficult to
determine whether Davidson is
right on this

point and we need not decide
hers.

What is important to realize

is that Davidson does
oppose reference to and quantification
over

languages.

Davidson next considers the view
that the that-clause in
(1) names the proposition that the
earth moves.

The problem with

this view, he thinks, is shown by
Quine's arguments concerning the

indeterminacy of translation. 6
Davidson's own proposal can best be brought
out by examining
the possioility that (I) means
the same as:

3.

Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his
mouth what 'The
earth moves means now in mine.

He thinks that (1) and (3) are similar but
not identical in

meaning.

words

The difference between them is that "in uttering the

The earth moves'

(in

(3))

I

do not, according to this

"
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account, say anything
re.otely
hu.e s_id,

I

,i ke

what Galiieo is
clai,ned to

do not, in fact,
say anything .

Tte P ° int

l,ere

iS

that

l

-y that Galileo uttered a
sentence that had the
same meaning for
him that a particular
expression has now in
my mouth. The expression
in my mouth when
6r
thai 1S supposed t0
mean the same as
Galileo's is the
expression
The earth moves
Put
that expression
But that
was not in my
mouth when I utte^r!
u.te.ed (3), for TI did
not use it but merely
mentioned it.

^

(3)

I

"

1

1

.

.

Pe rhdpb tne point
will

•

be made clearer if we
note that the

expression 'The earth moves'
names
therefore be replaced,
same sentence.

.

a

sentence in (3), and it
can

sal^eritate,

5y any othep name

Thus, assuming that 'The
earth moves'

()f

thfi

is Davidson':

favorite sentence,
(3) has the same truth value
as:
6^
sentence that meant in his
?
mouth what
Davidson'^^fT'
Davidson
s favorite sentence
means now in mine.

Since (4) implies that Davidson's
favorite sentence is in my mouth
now, and that sentence is
not in my mouth now,
(4) is false.

Similarly, then, (3) is also false.
One is tempted to suggest that
we amend (3) slightly to

overcome this problem.

5.

We might say that (1) means the
same as:

Galileo uttered a sentence that meant
in his mouth what 'The
earth moves’ would mean now in mine,
if I were to utter it.
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Or perhaps one would say:

6.

Galileo uttered a sentence that
meant in his mouth what 'The
earth moves' means
the language I speak now.

m

Davidson does not discuss either
of these possibilities,
but

1

believe that he would reject both.

As we have seen, he finds

references to languages objectionable
and so he would find (6)

unsatisfactory.
however, may be slightly better.

(5),

However,

subjunctive conditional raises all sorts
of difficulty.

I

think the
I

could

mean many different things by 'The
earth moves' now, and in many
cases there may be no telling what it
would be.

Nevertheless, we frequently do knew what
someone would mean
by a certain sentence, so perhaps we
should not be too hasty in

rejecting (5).

There are, however, some cases in which it
seems

clear that (1) and (5) would differ in truth value.
suppose (1) is true and
that you and
means

-hau

I

I

have

a

I

utter it at time

t.

Suppose further

code according to which 'The earth moves'

nave just successfully bribed the mayor into giving

us some lucrative contract for excavating the city.

case, if

I

For example,

In that

were to utter 'The earth moves' it would have this

unusual meaning.

We can safely assume that Galileo never said

anything having that meaning, so (5) is false despite the truth
of (1).
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Neither (5) nor (6), then,
seems to be an acceptable
lodi

1

i

call on or (3), and we can
turn now to what Davidson
proposes.

The idea that underlies
our.
paraphrase is that
: When
1
Say that Gali]eo said that
the
earth moves, I represent
Galileo and myself as
same sayers, .The form
"(Ex)(Galileo's utteranc-x
and my utterance
y make us sarnesayers)" is thus a
n9 any say1 "9 1
to Galileo
1
Way ° f re P lac1n 9
by a word
or nhral^h
an a
utterance
of mme.
mine
Anf surely there is PP™P^te
And
a way I can do this*
roduCG tne reciuired utterance
and
replace y Pby a reference to
it.
Here goes:
.

.

eLfh~“~-r
.

M.3W^ ^

^
V

The earth moves.
(Ex) (Galileo's utterance
x and my last
utterance make us sarnesayers).

Definitional abbreviation is all
that is needed to
bring this little skit down to:
The earth moves.
Galileo said that.

Here the 'that' is a demonstrative
singular term
referring to an utterance (not a sentence).

This form has a small drawback in that
it leaves
the hearer up in the air about the
purpose served
by saying "The earth moves" until the
act has been
performed.
As if, say, I were first to tell a
story and then add, "That's how it was once
upon
a time
There's some fun to be had this w
a/,
and in any case no amount of telling what the
il locutionary force of our utterance
is is going
to insure that they have that force.
But in
the present case nothing stands in the way of
reversing the order of things, thus:
.

Galileo said that.
The earth moves.
Perhaps it is now safe to allow a tiny orthographic
change, a change without semantic significance,
but suggesting to the eye the relation of
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introducer and introduced we may
suppress the
stop after 'that' and the
consequent capitalization:
Galileo said that the earth moves.
TU
!,!9

P r °POsal then is this: sentences in
indirect
discourse, as it happens, wear their
logical torn/
on their sleeves (except for
one small point).
hey consist of an expression referring
to a speaker
the two-place predicate 'said',
and a demonstrative
referring to an utterance.
Period.
What follows
gives the content of the subject's saying,
but has
no logical or semantic connection with
the original
attribution of a saying. This last point is
no
doubt the novel one, and upon it everything
depends:
from a semantic point of view the content
sentence
in indirect discourse is riot
contained in the
sentence whose truth counts.
0
.

,

!

.

I

O

—Qrne

obj ectjjons__ to Dav i dson

is an unusual
a

1

s

proposal

..

Davidson's proposal

one, and his presentation of it has given rise to

number of objections.

The objections rest,

I

believe, on

misconceptions, but it may be useful to consider these objections
with a view to clarifying the proposal.

Davdson claims that

(1)

of:

7.

Galileo said that.
The earth moves.

which he says is equivalent to:

8.

The earth moves.
Galileo said that.

is

just an orthographic variant

.
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And (8)

niS v,ew *

•

ls a

he earth
v.,,
lU y C3 .
moves.
(tx)
>r.x) v(Galilee
C-an iso's utterance

"definitional abbreviation”
of:

i

,

same sayers

x and

;

William

G.

l.ycan

9

has raised what appears
to be an obvious

objection to this proposal.
that (1),

(/),

equivalent.

(

my last utterance make
us

It seems that Davidson
has suggested

8 ) and (9) are synonymous,
or at least logically

But (8) implies:

(lx)(x - my last utterance).

10.

whereas (1) does not.

Therefore, Lycan concludes,
Davidson's

analysis saddles (1) with

a

consequence it does net actually

have.

Lycan is probably right in
claiming that (9) and
(1) are
not logically equivalent, but
Davidson should not have said
that
they are.
I believe that his
theory can be interpreted in a
way
that avoids the objection.
He should say that (9) is
equivalent
to,

but not logically equivalent
to:

11.

The earth neves.
(Ex) (Gal 1 T eo s utterance x and that
make us samesayers).
‘

Sentence (9) tells us to what the
demonstrati ve in (11) refers.
Similarly, the sentences 'That is a chair'
and 'The thing at which
I

am pointing is

a

chair' are equivalent, and the latter tells
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us to what the demonstrati
ve in the former refers.

Instead of saying that
(8) is

a

definitional abbreviation

of (9), Davidson should have
said that it is a definitional

abbreviation of (11).

since (11) does not imply
(10), he need

not hold that (8) implies
(10).

(Similarly, 'That is a chair'

does not imply 'There is something
at which

I

am pointing'.)

On this interpretation, since
Davidson is not committed
cc the view tnac (3)

implies (10), he is not committed to
the

view that either (7) or (1) implies
(10).

Thus, we can interpret

Davidson's theory in such a way that it does
not saddle (1) with
a

consequence that it does not actually have,
and we thereby

overcome Lycan's objection.

Another serious problem

in

understanding Davidson's

proposal arises when we look more closely at
(7), (8), and (11).
It is not clear what we are to make of the
two sentences in each
o<

these and of the claim that (1)

combinations of two sentences.

is

somehow equivalent to these

Moreover, we have to make sense

of Davidson's claim that the content sentence is not contained
in the

sentence whose truth "counts".
In orde:-" to

attain a clearer understanding of the problem

here, and its solution, let us consider an objection that might be

raised to Davidson's theory.
(8), and (11) are all

Let us grant to Davidson that (7),

logically equivalent.

that none of these is equivalent to (1).

One might object

For (7), (8),

arid

(11)

;
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each implies:

12.

i

he earth moves,

which (1) obviously does not imply.
Davidson surely would claim that
(7), (8), and (11) do

not imply (12)

arid

that this objection fails.

accept this claim, we need
(S),

and (11;.

Un

1

1

a

Before we can

clearer account of sentences (7),

we have a better understanding of them,

we do not fully understand Davidson's
proposal.
In

a

critical discussion of Davidson's theory,

puzzles over similar matters.

R.

J.

Haac!<^°

He attributes to Davidson the view

than (7) does not imply (12) because in
(7) the first sentence.

Galileo said that

,

is "asserted" whereas the second sentence.

The earth moves', is displayed.^

(Similar explanations can be

given for the failure of (8) and (11) to imply
(12).)

regards this as

a

Haack

satisfactory rationale for the failure of the

implication, but thinks it leads to a problem in the case of

iterated said-that sentences.

We will turn to this problem

shortly.

Haack never explains exactly what he means by 'asserted'

and 'displayed', so it is difficult to determine exactly why he
thinks the fact that 'Galileo said that' is asserted in (7)

while 'The earth moves' is displayed explains the failure of the

inference from (7) to (12).

However, his idea might be something

like this: The truth value of (7) depends only upon the truth
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value of 'The earth moves'.

We may say, then, the
former sentence

is asserted in (7) and that
the latter is displayed in
(7).
'ihe earth moves'

is only displayed in

not affect the truth value
of (7).
the falsity of 'The earth
moves'.
false.

(7), its truth value does

Thus, (7) may be true despite
Thus,

Hence, (7) does not imply
(12).

not say that (7)

Since

(7)

may be true and (12)

Therefore, Davidson need

or (9) or (11) has an implication
that (1) does

not have.

Haack believes that this explanation
of the failure of (7)

to imply (12) leads to difficulties when
we consider iterated
said “that sentences.

13

.

He contends that a sentence such as:

Davidson said that Galileo said that the
earth moves

will, on this theory, be broken up into:

14

.

Davidson said that.
Galileo said that.
The earth moves.

According to Haack, (14) is "clearly unacceptable" because the
middle sentence,

Galileo said that', is both asserted, relative

to 'The earth moves', and displayed, relative to 'Davidson said
that'. 12

Apparently he thinks that no sentence can be both

asserted and displayed in the same sentence.
I

believe that Haack 's objection can be answered, but in

order to state that answer clearly, Davidson's theory must be

.

stated more complete!*.

There seen, to be three
assertions central

to Davidson's proposal:
first, sentences in indirect
discourse are.
in some sense, made
up of two sentences;
second, in any utterance
of a sentence in indirect
discourse the utterance of
'that' refers
to she utterance of the
sentence immediately following
it; and
thu-d, the truth of the
entire sentence depends entirely
upon the

truth of the first of the two
subsentences and not at all upon
the
truth of the second.
I

sentence,

think that we can find
(1),

a

way to interpret our sample

that reflects these three
points.

First, we can

rewrite (1) in a slightly more
perspicuous way:
lu.

Galileo said that: the earth moves.

Syntactical ly, (15) should be viewed as
a molecular sentence

containing two subsentences connected by
functions as

a

sentential connective.

a

colon, which here

This captures the first of

the three points listed above, namely
that (1) is made up of two

sentences.

Written perspicuously, (1) is a molecular
sentence

made up or the sentences 'Galileo said that'
and 'The earth
moves'

The second and third points will be reflected in the

interpretation given to (15).

We can interpret 'that' as

a

demonstrative and stipulate that in any utterance of
(15) it
refers to the utterance of

'

f

he earth moves' contained in that

3

:
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utterance of

(

15 ).

Finally, we may say
that any utterance
of (15) is true if
only if that utterance
of ,aHleo sai d thaf

-

is true.

last

pent nay

^

provide an explanation
of Haack's suggestion
that
in U5) the first
sentence is asserted
and the second displayed.
The first sentence is
asserted because the truth
of (15) depends
upon Us truth.
The second sentence
is displayed because
its
truth is irrelevant to
the truth of (15) even
though it occurs in
(i5) and is not enclosed
in quotation
marks.

These points all require
some elaboration, but we
should
K.ady
able to explain why Haack's
objection fails, fin

iterated said-that sentence
such as (13) should now be
written
1
this way

16.

Davidson said that: (Galileo
said that: the earth moves).

The parentheses in
(16) indicate that the first
colon, which is a
binary connective, connects
'Davidson said that' to the entire

molecular sentence enclosed
in

parentheses.

That sentence

turn vs composed of two
subsentences connected by a colon.
In

(16)
in

in the

accord with the account of Davidson's
theory just given,

is true

(loj,

is

if and only if 'Davidson said
that', as it occurs
true.

The truth of 'Galileo said that'
does

af.ect the truth of (16).
’Galileo said that

1

riot

Thus, Haack is correct in saying that

is displayed in

(16).

131

WS Can also provide some
support for Haack's claim
that

'Galileo said that'

is asserted in

(15).

Although the truth value

of -Galileo said that' is
not relevant to the truth
value of (16),
it is relevant to the
truth value of the second of
the two
subsentences of (16), that is,
it is relevant to the
truth value
or 'Galileo said that: the
earth moves'.
Since the truth value
of this part of (16) does
depend upon the truth value of
'Galileo
said that , perhaps there
is sense in which 'Galileo
said that'
1

is

asserted in (16).

Thus, we have some support for
Haack's claim.

We now have a clearer
understanding of why Haack believes

that 'Galileo said that' is both
asserted and displayed in (16).
But we have no reason to think
that there is anything improper
or unacceptable about this.

So far as

presented no argument to show that

a

I

can tell, Haack has

sentence cannot be both

asserted and displayed in the way 'Galileo
said that' is
So

C.

I

in

(16).

conclude that there is no reason to accept
Haack's objection.

A_ detailed _acc ount of Davidson's theory
.

more detailed account of Davidson's theory.

I

will turn now to a

The central aim of

the theory is to provide an account of the truth
conditions of

sentences such as (15).

Ir.

stating truth conditions for (15)

we encounter a problem due to the presence of the
demonstrative.

Since the demonstrative constantly shifts its reference, the

^
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truth conditions for (15) are
constantly changing.

In

dealing

with this topic, Davidson
writes:

I assume that a
theory of truth for a language
containing demonstratives must strictly
apply to
utterances and not to sentences, or
will treat
ruth as a relation between
sentences, soeaker c

and times.

In

TruJi and Meaning"^ Davidson also
discusses truth

definitions for languages containing
demonstratives,

arid

there he

seems to favor the second of the
two possibilities mentioned in
the passage above.

(A)

He gives the following example:

'That book was stolen' is true as
(potentially)
sp oxen by p at t if and only if the book
demons era ted by p at t is stolen prior
to t

The significance of (A) should emerge from
a discussion
of a few examples.

Suppose Jones utters

at time t and points to

a

'That book was stolen'

book at that time.

If the book

demonstrated by Jones had been stolen, then (A) yields the
result
that the sentence is true as spoken by Jones at
had

not.

t.

If the book

been stolen, then the sentence is not true as spoken by

Jones at t.

Davidson does not explain why he includes the word
'potentially'

in the left side of (A),

for him to do so.

Suppose

p

but there is good reason

demonstrates

but does not say 'That book was stolen' at

a

stolen book at
t..

t,

The fact that he
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demonstrates

stolen hook together with
principle (A) implies

a

that 'That book was stolen'
is true as (potentially)
spoken by
Had 'potentially been omitted
P at t.
from (A), then (A) and our
assumptions would have implied
that 'That book was stolen is
true
as spoken by p at t.
But this implies that 'That
book was stolen
was spoken by p at t, and this
conflicts with our assumption.
1

1

1

Hence,

(A), without

'potentially

1

inserted, would have had some

false consequences.
The above considerations may lead
one to think that what
(A) actually provides are the
conditions under which

was stolen

would be true if it were spoken by

is not the case.

bay

p

at

'That book
t.

We can imagine circumstances in which

But this
p

does not

That book was stolen' and does not
demonstrate any book.

we may assume, if he were to say 'That
book was stolen'

also demonstrate

a

book which was in fact stolen.

So,

he would
in

these

circums unices

That book was stolen' would be true if it were

spoken by p at

t.

However, since

p

did not demonstrate

But,

a

stolen

book at t, the right hand side of (A) is false, so
(A) yields the

result that 'That book was stolen' is not true as (potentially)
spoken by p at

oncer which

t.

Thus,

(A)

does not provide the conditions

That book was stolen' would be true if it were spoken

by p at t.

The above examples show that if we accept (A) we should not

take "'That book was stolen' is true as (potentially) spoken by
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P

by

at t"
p

to naan

either “’That book was stolen'

is

true as spoken

at t“ or "'That book was
stolen' would be (or would have
been}

true if ft were spoken by

p

at t".

Moreover,

I

can find no

ordinary English equivalent to the
expression "'That book was
stolen*

is true as

(potentially) spoken by p at t" as it is

explicated in (A).
Since it is not clear exactly what
is being explicated by
(A), it is difficult to assess
its adequacy.

way to evaluate it, and the method

I

The most charitable

will follow here, is to see

if there are any possible circumstances
in which 'That book was

stolen'

is spoken by a person at a time and

(A)

yields an

intuitively incorrect truth value for the sentence
as spoken by
that person at that time.

must be rejected.

If there are any such cases, then (A)

If there are none, then (A) may be accepted.

One problem with (A) is that it fails to make any
reference

to

a

language.

but is speaking

Suppose p utters 'That book was stolen' at
a

language in which every sentence has the same

meaning as its negation has in English.
'Negengl ish'

.

t.,

Call this language

It would seem that if p demonstrates a stolen book

at t, and utters 'That book was stolen' as a sentence of

Negengl ish, then that sentence is false as spoken by him at
that time.

Principle (A), however, implies that it is true as

spoken by him at the time, since its right side is satisfied.

There are several way s to overcome this problem.

We could

135

amend (A) as follows:

<B)

n

tM ^

ns

‘

1

SvV^?
4
P at t if

L>

demonstrated by

p

S t rUe

?* P° tent1a Hy spoken

and, only if the bonk
at t is stolen prior to t.

Alternatively, we might say that
"'That book is stolen’
in English as potentially
spoken by p at t iff...",

is

true

but this would

have the consequence that the
sentence could be true in English

for a person and time such that
the person who uttered it at that

time was speaking

a

different language.

This seems to me to be

an odd result, and since the
formulation as in

find (B) slightly preferable.

(B)

avoids it,

I

There is, however, no significant

difference between the two formulations, and
either may be used.
There is one important objection to adopting
(B) as

modification of Davidson's proposal.

a

As we saw earlier, Davidson

believes that languages are as poorly individuated
as propositions,
and therefore is opposed to including any
references to languages
in his theory.

So he would find the reference to English in
(B)

objectionable.

Despite his aversion to references to languages,

Davidson seems prepared to make use of predicates such as
in-English',

!

true-in-French

'

true-

7

1

,

etcJ'

For some reason, all

these

truth predicates are acceptable even though references to languages
are not.

Thus, a principle more in keeping with Davidson's

position than (8) would be:
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(C)

'That book was stolen' 1S true-in
-English as potentials
spoken by p at u ...
if and only if the book
demonstrated
by p at t is stolen prior to t.
.

I

_,

must admit that

I

do not understand why these truth

predicates are acceptable if references
to languages are not and
berieve that this is

Nevertheless,
I

I

a

problem in Davidson's overall position.

will overlook this point here.

assume that Davidson intended to define
truth as

a

relation between sentences, speakers, and times,
for all sentences,
and not just for those with demonstratives.

This relati vization

cf the truth predicate will be vacuous in many
cases, in that many

sentences will have the same truth value relative to
all speakers
and times.

Indeed, if we ignore complications caused by tense,

and assume a tenseless language, the only sentences that
will vary
in truth value will

be those containing demonstratives or

ambiguous expressions.
We can turn now to the truth conditions for sentences in

indirect discourse.

It should be recalled that these sentences

are treated as molecular sentences, that the word 'that'

treated as

a

is to be

demonstrative, and that the truth value of the whole

sentence depends entirely upon the truth value of its first
component.
be:

A first approximation of their truth conditions might
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[<->/

Gal ileo said that: the
earth mo vs s' is true- nEnglish as potentially spoken
b/ p at t if and
oniy if Galileo said the
utterance demon stra tad
by p at t.
i

It may

seem that there

utte ranee demonstrated by

p

is an

obvious objection to (D).

The

at t, when he says 'Galileo said
that:

the earth moves', is an
utterance of his own, not one of
Galileo's

ourely Galileo did not say the
demonstrated utterance.

If anvone

did, it was p.

This objection is mistaken and
turns upon a failure to

properly understand how Davidson uses
the word 'said'.

As

Davidson uses it, this predicate is
to be understood

terms of

his primitive,
a

'samesaying'

samesaying with it.

(E)

.

iri

To say an utterance is to produce

Thus, (D) can be rephrased as:

Galileo said that: the earth moves' is true
-inEnglish as potentially spoken by
at
t
if
and
p
only if Galileo produced an utterance that is
a
samesaying with the utterance demonstrated by
p
K
at t./

'Samesaying'

is,

I

believe, an obscure primitive, and

is at least as obscure as the notion of synonymy.

it

For some

reason Davidson finds 'synonymy' objectionable, but not
'samesaying'.

I

can see little reason to prefer one to the other.

It is difficult to decide which predicates are acceptable

as primitives and which are not, but one criterion might be the

extent to which we have

a

preanalytic understanding of the

138

predicate and how well this
understanding can be supplemented
by
informal descriptions of its
meaning'.
The better this understanding,
the more acceptable the
predicate is as a primitive.
In the case of

'samesaying' we may be able to
give an

informal description of its
meaning by saying that two
utterances
are samesayings when the
propositions expressed in the
utterances
are the same.
However, such an appeal seems
illegitimate for

Davidson, since he proposes to
do without propositions.

So any

account or his primitive must
proceed along different lines.
There are, then, reasons to have
misgivings about the

primitive Davidson appeals to, but

I

suggest that we overlook

tnem for now, and allow its use in
providing truth conditions

for indirect discourse.

There is one simplification that can
be made in (E).

can always tell, in any utterance of

speaker is demonstrating.
the earth moves'

(

We

15 ), what utterance the

It is always his own utterance of

at that time.

We can make use of this fact

and replace (E) by:

\,F)

‘Galileo said that: the earth moves' is true-inEnglish as potentially spoken by
p at t if and
only if some utterance of Galileo's is a samesaying
with p's utterance of 'the earth moves' at t.

It is not difficult to extrapolate them from (E) and

stare truth conditions for any sentence in indirect discourse:
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(G)

For any constant a and sentence
(
a said that: <0
<J>,
is true- in -Engl ish as potentially
spoken by p at t
if and only if some utterance produced
by the referent
of a is a samesaying with p's utterance
of
at t.
<j>

If (G) does state proper truth
conditions for English

sentences in indirect discourse, then it has
many advantages over

other possible accounts of the truth conditions
of these
sentences.

The primary advantage, and the one with which
we are

most concerned here, is that (G) does not require
propositions
to be in the domain of the interpretation.

It does, of course,

require that there be sentences, but this requirement
seems

acceptable to Davidson, and is often found less objectionable
than
the requirement that there be propositions.
In the next section

I

will discuss how this theory might

be extended to belief sentences.

II

Davidson suggests that his theory of indirect discourse
"opens a lead to the analysis of psychological sentences

generally." 8

If this is true, then we should be able to provide

truth conditions for belief sentences that are somewhat similar
to those provided for indirect discourse.
In

addition to Davidson's claim that his proposal opens

a
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dd t0 accounts to other
psychological sentences, there
are

a

number of other reasons to think
that any adequate account of
the
truth conditions of indirect
discourse should allow for belief
sentences to be treated similarly.

For one thing, there is

a

great similarity between the
grammatical structure of belief

sentences and sentences in indirect
discourse, the most prominent

difference

•

etwee n them being that one contains
‘believes

the other contains ‘said

1

.

1

where

So there is at least a prima facie

reason to suppose they have similar
logical forms as well.

Moreover, the objects of belief seem to be
the same as the
objects of saying.

That is, whatever kind of thing it is that
we

say also seems to be the kind of thing
we believe.
can express

a

Thus, we

truth by saying "I believe what you said".

So we

ought to be able to interpret belief sentences
as relations

between people and utterances, just as we did sentences

in

indirect

discourse.
Let us take as a sample belief sentence:

17.

Galileo believed that the earth moves.

If (17) is to be interpreted in a manner similar to
(15)

(1)) then

18.

v/e

(and

should first rewrite it as:

Galileo believed that: the earth moves.

Sentence (18),

like

(15),

is a molecular sentence containing
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tivo

sentences, connected by the connective

'That'

is a

demonstrative referring in any utterance of
(18) to that
utterance of 'the earth moves'.

Sentence (18) will be true, any

time it is uttered, if that utterance of
'Galileo believed that'
is true.

As truuh conditions for (18) we might offer
the followinq:

Galileo believed that: the earth moves' is true-inEnglish as potentially spoken by
p at t if and only
if Galileo believed p's utterance of 'the earth
moves'

(H)

at t.

(H) has the following peculiar consequences.

It implies

that (18) is true as spoken by me now if and only if Galileo

believed an utterance made by me now.

Even if utterances are

what we believe, it seems odd to suppose that Galileo believed
one of my utterances.

If he believed any utterance, it seems

more reasonable to suppose that he believed one of his own, or
at least one that he had heard.
A similar point was made about Davidson’s account of

'said

1

.

According to principle (0), discussed earlier, (15) is

true as spoken by me now if and only if Galileo said some

utterance of mine.

But if Galileo said any utterance, it would

seem to be one of his own, and not one of mine.
This oddity of Davidson's theory was explained by the

introduction of 'samesaying’ into the metalanguage.
one of my utterances if and only if he produced

a

Galileo said

sarnesaying

with it.
to

Given this understanding of 'said

1

it is reasonable

,

say that Galileo said one of my
utterances.

Of course, this

requires us to understand the notion of
samesaying, but that we
have agreed to accept.
In the

similar claim.

case of 'believes', however, we cannot
make a

That is, we cannot explain the oddity of
saying

that Galileo believed my utterance by
going on to say that what

this means is that he produced some samesaying
with my utterance.
It is clear that (17), for example, could
be true even if Galileo

never produced any utterance at all.
Moreover, we cannot even explain this unusual interpretation
of 'believes' in terms of tendencies to produce sarnesayings
with

my utterance.

The following Carnapian type proposal

objections of the kind discussed in Chapter

(I)

is open to

I:

'Galileo believed that: the earth moves' is true-inEnglish as potentially spoken by p at t if and only if
Galileo was disposed to produce some utterance that
would be a samesaying with p's utterance of 'the earth
moves' at t.

(I) resembles the Carnapian analysis discussed previously, and
it is open to the same objections that made repairing Carnap's

proposal seem to be a hopeless endeavor.

In

particular, liars do

not say what they believe, so (I) seems not to provide the truth

conditions for belief sentences.
It seems, then, that we must leave

'believes' primitive in

.
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the metalanguage, instead of
explaining it in terms of 'samesaying'

This makes the treatment of 'believes'
rather different from that

of

said

result.

and it seems fair to say this is
not a desirable

,

It

is by no means clear

what the relation is that holds

between Galileo and some utterance of mine
now, if (18) is true
as spoken by me now.

So if (18)

is to be analyzed in terms of

such a relation, it is desirable that some
further analysis of

that relation be given.

However, it is not clear that there
that can be made along these lines.

unmoved by the problem.

is

any fatal objection

Indeed, Davidson would be

He distinguishes two tasks: uncovering

the logical form of sentences and giving their truth
conditions;
and analyzing the predicates of a language.^
in

(18) we display perspicuously the logical

in

(H) we give its truth conditions.

He might say that

form of (17) and

He would readily admit that

we do not as yet have an analysis of 'believes', but that he

would regard as another matter that need not concern him.
It seems, then,

chat (H) is the best we can do as a

Davidsonian account of the truth conditions for one belief
sentence.

A general

account of the truth conditions for all

belief sentences can be given by:

(J)

For any name a and sentence 4, r a believes that: (jO
is true in English as potentially spoken by p at t
if and only if the referent of a believes p's
utterance of 4 at t..
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Although the samesaying relation does
not appear

in this

account of the truth conditions of
belief sentences, it does
Play an important part in their
semantics.

For it should be

a

rule of the system that if a person
believes some utterance,
then he believes every samesaying
of that utterance.
This completes my explanation of
Davidson's theory.
Jie remainder of this chapter

I

will

In

discuss some of its

advantages and disadvantages.

Ill

Chapter IV we saw that Scheffier's inscriptional theory

In

ran into a difficulty over the existence of the entities
it

selected as the objects of belief.

Specifically, the problem

was that a sentence such as (17), ’Galileo believed that the
earth moves’, could be true relative to situations in which

there were no inscriptions of 'The earth moves'.
Scneffl er

'

s

Since

theory required that there be such an inscription

for (17) to be true, his theory was not quite right.

Since Davidson takes utterances to be the objects of

belief, it might be thought that his theory faces
problem.

a

similar

However, his theory overcomes this problem by

relativizing the truth of sentences to speakers and times.

It
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reinains true that Galileo could
believe that the earth moves even

if there are no utterances of

'The earth moves'.

does not conflict with this fact.

All

But the theory

that his theory implies is

that (17) (or, more properly,
(18)) can only be true relative to

speaker and time if there is an utterance of
'The earth moves'.

a

Thus,

if

I

by me now.
,

.

fms.

20

am silent now, (17) is not true as potentially
spoken
but it is not clear that there is anything wrong
with

For if

I

do utter (17) now, then it will

as spoken by me now.

It seems

come out true

reasonable to be concerned only

with the truth value of sentences relative to speakers and
times
such that the speaker does utter the sentence at the time.

And

so far we have seen no reason to think that Davidson's
theory

yields the wrong result for any such sentences.
Davidson's theory has another marked advantage over the

theories discussed earlier.

ambiguous sentences in

a

We saw that the existence of

language posed serious problems for

Schef Tier's theory and for other sentential theories.

Davidson's

theory, however, seems to deal with this problem sati sfactori ly.

Consider the ambiguous sentence:

19.

Jones said that the bank will collapse.

Since there are at least two different meanings of 'The bank will

collapse', (19) is ambiguous.
the financial

It might mean that Jones said that

institution will collapse, and it might mean that

he sa id that the river side
will

collapse.

one of these senses

In

it might be true even though
it is false in the other.

Presumably, however, when someone utters
(19) he has one
of these senses in mind.

Thus, in uttering (19) he utters

The bank will collapse' and has some
specific meaning in mind
i

or this ucterance.

and

(19) will

be true relative to this speaker

time ir and only if Jones has produced a
samesaying with the

speaxer

s

utterance of 'The bank will collapse

1

at the time.

Since Jones will have produced such a samesaying
if and only if
he said something that meant in his mouth
what 'The bank will

collapse’ meant in the speaker's mouth at the time,
we seem to

get exactly

t.he

right results.

If

I

utter (19) now and mean

by 'The bank will collapse' that the financial
institution will

collapse, then (19) comes out true as spoken by me now if and
only ir Jones said something that had the same meaning.
the other hand, when

I

utter (19) now

I

If, on

mean by 'The bank will

collapse' that the river side will cave in, then (19) comes out
true as spoken by me now if and only if Jones said something

that had this meaning.

This seems to be exactly right.

Thus, Davidson's theory seems clearly superior to the

theories discussed previously.

There are, however,

respects in which it may be deficient.
will discuss two of them.

a

few

In the next, section

I
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IV

In

this section

Davidson's theory.

I

will discuss two objections to

The first is that an apparently valid

inference seems invalid on the theory.

The second is that when

we turn to certain other sentences containing
'believes'

,

the

natural extension of Davidson's theory seems
to provide them

with incorrect truth conditions.
The first objection is a variation on

Bruce Aune.

A rgument
17.
20.
21.

21

a

point made by

The following inference is valid in English:

_I

Galileo believed that the earth moves
New to n beli e ved t hat the earth moves
Gaifleo and Newton believed the same thing

When we give Davidson's interpretations of the sentences in this

argument, however, it seems to be invalid.
for this is that 'that'
'that'

in

in

Roughly, the reason

(17) has a different referent than

(20), and so (21) seems not to follow.

Aune’s argument raises

a

number of interesting problems.

First of all, it is not exactly clear how we should even go

about evaluating inferences, now that truth is relativized to
speakers and times.

Ordinarily, we would say that the inference

from (17) and (20) to (21) is valid if and only if (21) is true

under every interpretation (17) and (20) are.
say that Argument

1

That is, we would

is valid if, given an assignment to ail

the
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constants and predicates in
(17),

(20, and (21),

premises are true, then so is the
conclusion.

premises

rnay

if the

But now that the

vary in truth value from one speaker
and time to

another, even under the same assignments
to the constants and

predicates, it seems clear that another
approach is required.

t>.e

One possibility is to say that the inference
is valid if
and only if for any interpretation and any
speaker and time,
if the premises are true under that interpretation
relative to

that speaker and time, then so is the conclusion.
Let us examine the consequences of adopting this

possibility.

Consider any arbitrary speaker and time,

What we want to know
i

elative to

p and t,

is

p

and

t.

whether, if (17) and (20) are true

then (21) is true as well.

In other words,

we want to know whether the following argument is valid:

A rgument
17'.
20'
21'.

.

1

1

Galileo believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
New ton believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
Newton and Galileo believed the same utterance

This argument does appear to be valid.

mistaken in thinking that Argument

I

Perhaps, then, Aune was

came out invalid on Davidson's

theory.

There is, however, an interesting feature of Argument
By evaluating all the premises and the conclusion of Argument

I'.

I

relative to the same speaker and time, as we did in Argument I',

U9
in

re,

effect we make both occurrences
of
e)

eru.

'

that

'

have the same

Both seem to refer to p's utterance
of 'The earth

moves' at t.

Actually, however, if

and conclusion of the argument.

different utterances.

p

were to utter the premises

'that' would refer to two

That is why Aune thought the argument

would net be treated properly by the
theory.
i

hi

suggests that it would be more in keeping
with

j

Davidson's proposal to evaluate the validity
cf the argument by
seeing if it follows from the fact that
(17) is true as spoken
by P at t and (2b) is true as spoken
by p immediately thereafter,

say at t +

1

,

then (21) is true as spoken by
p at

t

+ 2.

On

this approach the argument is valid if and
only if the following

argument is valid in the metalanguage:

Argument

"
I

17".

Galileo believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
ieve d p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t +
20/
21". flew ton ana Gaiileo believed the" sarne"
utterance
jtewton bel

Argument

Galileo

is.

I"

seems to be invalid.

1

Since the utterance

said to believe in (17") is diverse from the utterance

Newton is said to believe in (20"), (21") does not follow.

Even

if we invoke the principle mentioned earlier, that if a person

believes an utterance he believes every samesaying with that

utterance, the inference remains invalid.

In

valid, we would need the additional premise:

order

to

make it
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22

.

p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
is a samesayinq of
p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t +
1

(22), it would appear, is contingent.

Hence, Argument

I"

remains

invalid unless the additional contingent premise,
(22), is
suppl ied.

Thus, there seem to be two ways to evaluate inference
in Davidson's theory.

I

One way is to evaluate the premises and the

conclusion relative to the same speaker and time, as in

I'.

The

argument does come out valid this way, but we seem to change an
essential feature of Davidson's theory, namely, that 'that', in

any utterance of (17), should have
'that'

a

different referent from

in any utterance of (20).
If, on the other hand, we evaluate Argument

I

by seeing

if (21) must be true as spoken by a person at a time if (17) and

(20) are true as spoken in sequence immediately previously, then

we get Argument I", which is invalid.
This does seem to present a serious problem for Davidson's

theory, although the problem presumes
and validity about which

I

a

treatment of inferences

am only speculating.

Perhaps some

other way can be developed that will have better results.
A second objection to Davidson's theory is somewhat similar
to an objection raised against Scheff'ler's theory in Chapter V.

We saw that Scheffler's inscriptions! theory failed to provide
the proper truth conditions for belief sentences, since

a

person
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can have

a

belief without there being an inscription
expressing

the concent of that belief.
no

~

Although this exact problem does

a **sct Davidson's theory, a similar
one does.

Consider the sentence:

23.

Galileo believed something.

Toe truth conditions for (23) are given by
the following

principle:

(K)

'Galileo believed something' is true-in-Engl ish as
potential ly spoken by p at t if and only if there
is some utterance such that Gal ileo believed it.

It seems clear that (K) does provide the natural

truth conditions for (23).

I

Davidsonian

think, however, that (K) is

incorrect.

Suppose, for example, that Galileo's only belief is that
the earth moves.

In that case,

if

I

were to utter (23), then

it should be true-in-Engl ish as spoken by me now.

In fact,

since

(23) contains no demonstratives, it should be true relative to

me and now, whether

I

speak it or not.

However, it is possible

that Galileo's only belief never has and never will be verbalized,
arid

So

that there is no utterance such that Galileo believed it.
(K) would imply that (23)

is false in these circumstances,

despite the fact that it would actually be true.
Davidson's theory, then, is subject to an objection very

much like the one to which Scheffler's theory was subject.
In this case, however,

the problem arises for sentences

like

{c.o)

and not for typical belief sentences.

There are many important ramifications
of this objection.
If it is correct, then the theory
will

provide improper truth

conditions for other sentences in which we
refer to the objects
of someone’s belief without expressing
the content of that
belief.

24.

For example, sentences such as:

Galileo believed something true,

and

25.

will

Galileo and Newton believed the same thing,

not be treated properly, for reasons similar to those
for

which (23) is not treated properly.
I

can see only two possible responses to this objection,

but neither of them seems very plausible.

One is to allow the

objects of belief, and the relata of the samesaying relation,
to oe possible as well

as actual

utterances.

Thus, we might say

that there is some possible utterance that Galileo believed, in
the situation described above, even though there were no actual

utterances he believed.
This suggestion poses

a

number of problems.

Admitting

possible objects into the ontology seems every bit as troubling
as admitting propositions in the first place.

At any rate, it

seems fairly clear that Davidson would not encourage this

procedure.

Furthermore, there seem to be no
grounds for deciding
v/hicn possible utterances are
samesayings.

In the case of

actual utterances, we can appeal
to the intentions of the

utterer to help determine which utterances
are samesayings.
But in the case of possible utterances,
no such appeal is

possible, and thus the notion of

a

samesaying becomes even more

obscure than it had been.
The other possible response to the
problem is to posit
the existence of mental utterances as
well as physical utterances.

Thus, we would say that in the case of
(23) in the situation

described above, what Galileo believed was

a

mental utterance.

It is diiiicult to evaluate this proposal

developed into
concept of

a

more complete theory.

a mental

until

it is

For one thing, the

utterance is unclear.

are such tilings, it is not clear that it

Granting that there
is

sentences, and not

propositions, that we utter mentally.
Moreover, it is not clear that there even must be

utterance accompanying every belief.

a

mental

That is, it is not clear

that if Galileo believed that the earth moves, it follows that
at some time he uttered mentally 'The earth moves'

sentence synonymous with it).

It seems possible,

some beliefs are never entertained.

In

(or some

at least, that

that case, the original

objection would still hold: (K) yields the wrong truth conditions
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for (23)

,

even if mental utterances are admitted.

Unless one of these alternatives can be made to work out

properly, it appears that Davidson's theory, despite its many

advantages, is open to this one serious objection.

APPENDIX

In

this Appendix

I

formulate and discuss the highlights

will

of a more formal version of the theory discussed in the body of
this chapter.

I

believe that the theory about to be described

is a reasonably accurate formulation of Davidson's theory.

The idea here will be to construct

a

language, D, as much

like the lower predicate calculus (LPC) as possible, but containing
1

indirect discourse and belief sentences.

These sentences will be

interpreted in the manner proposed by Davidson.
a

It is clear that

number of important changes muse be made in LPC

iri

order to

accommodate sentences interpreted in this manner.
Two of the most important changes are:
the vocabulary of some demonstratives and

a

(i

)

the additions to

colon as

a

connective;

(ii) the relativization of truth to speakers and times.

The syntax of
a

few ways.

D

In

.

The syntax of D must differ from that of LPC in

addition to the connectives, logical signs,

constants, predicates, and variables of LPC, we need

demonstratives and the additional connective,
of D, then, is as follows:

(1) Connectives:
(2) Logical Signs:

/s,
(

,)

v
,

,

>, e,

,E,
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:

in

D some

The vocabulary

)
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(3) Variables: x,xi,x 2 ...
(4) Individual Constants: a,b,c,e
J

y6
(

\

)

Demonstratives: d,d!,d 2 ,...
n-place Predicates: P,Q,...

It will

be useful

.z,ai 5b!

to isolate a class of two-place

predicates that we may call the
"propositional predicates".
These will be used to express
'believes' and 'said'.
will

be che predicates used for
these purposes.

*B

'

and 'S'

Additional

propositional predicates, expressing
'desires', 'knows', etc.,
1

could easily be added.
We can turn now to the rules for
forming the well -formed

formulas (wffs) of

wff of LPC as

a

0.

The idea here will be to include every

wff D, but add wffs to express belief sentences

and indirect discourse.

The definition of wff in D, then, will

be exactly like that of wff in LPC,
with the addition of a clause

for belief sentences and indirect discourse, and
a minor change
in the rule for forming quantified wffs.

The following recursive

definition should suffice:

(1)

If ai,a 2 ,...,x^ are constants of D, and P is an n-place

predicate of D, then
(2)

r

P(ai

.

.

.a^)'

is an atomic

wff of

D

If a is a constant and d is a demonstrative and P is a

propositional predicate and $ is
is a wff of D.

.

wff, then

r

P(a,d)

1

:(<{>)

(The context inside the parentheses

immediately following
of the colon"

a

a

colon will b? called "the scope
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If

(3)

cp

and

are wffs, then

if

,

Afvif

1

and

,

are wffs.
If

(4)

<f>

is a

scope of
'(

vi

ff and a is a constant not occurring in the

colon in f and x is

a

!<P(x/a)'

1

and

r

!:

(

x)(cf(x/oO

This definition requires
as

1

Fd

1

because

are not wffs in
'd

1

such as

is not a constant.

’That is ugly

1

a

variable not in

cf,

then

are wffs.

few comments: (i) Formulas such

They do not satisfy clause (1),

D.

their formulation either.

a

)''

Clearly, no other clause licenses

A consequence of this is that things

cannot be expressed in

D.

It is possible

to alter the language to allow such things to be expressed, but

that would only add some complications that are not relevant to
our purpose.

Demonstratives may occur only as the second term of
propositional predicate
colon.

in

D,

a

and must always be followed by a

These restrictions simplify the language considerably.
(ii) Clause (4) allows all normal quantified wffs to be

formed, but prevents formulas like
well -formed.

'

(Ex)(S(g,d) :(Fx))

1

from being

The reason this restriction is desirable is that

such formulas represent an illegitimate kind of quantifying in,
and are best banned from the language.

Later on

I

will

briefly discuss the possibility of allowing

similar formulas to the above to be well -formed, in order to
express de re beliefs.

In

however, they are not wffs.

the initial version of the language,
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(iii) This does not prevent quantification
over the objects

of the propositional predicates.

We want to be able to say things

like 'Galileo believes something' in D, and the
formula used to
say it is

1

(F.x)B(g ,x)

'

.

This is a wff since

)
'

B(g ,a

'

is an atomic

wff, and clause (4) allows the formulation of the
desired

quantified wff.

that

a

(iv) We also can express things like

'Everyone believes

is F‘.

is a

The formula

'

(x)B(x,d) (Fa)
:

'

wff and will

express this.
A complete account of the syntax of 0 would include a

discussion of the axioms and rules of inference in the language.
For the most part, these will be entirely standard, with the only

differences coming in the existential generalization rule,
will only allow generalization upon constants

of a colon.

will

I

which

not in the scope

not go into the details of these aspects of

the syntax here.

The semantics of D

semantics for

D

.

There are

a

number of ways in which the

may be developed, but here

I

will examine only

one of the possibilities.
An interpretation function for D will be exactly like one

for LPC.

That is, it will be

a

function that assigns to each

constant some object in the domain of
predicate

a

D

and to each n-place

set of ordered n- tuples from the domain.

No
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assignment will be made by an
interpretation function to the
demonstratives.
We can turn now to the
truth defintion for D.

It is here
that the most interesting
features of the language are found.
We saw in the main part of
this chapter that it is best
to define
truth for languages with
demonstratives as a relation between

sentences, speakers, and times.

That is how we will proceed in

D.

We may call any ordered pair
of

a

person and time an "index"

and thus evluate sentences relative
to indices.

definition will do

is

What the truth

provide ways to fill in the blanks in

expressions of the form

is

"<J>

at index (p,t) iff

",

true in D under interpretation
0 r, more simply,

"4,

is

I

truej at <p,t)

iff

Sentences without demonstratives will have the
same truth

value at all indices, so the relativization to
indices will be
vacuous for such sentences.

Although Davidson countenances the

possibility of giving truth defintions for languages
with
ambiguous sentences, which might also vary in truth value
from
one index to another,

D will

not include such sentences.

The truth conditions for all sentences without demonstratives
will De the same in D as they are in LPC.

The interesting

features of D arise in the truth conditions for sentences

containing demonstratives.

Consider the sentence:

d
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1.

B(g,d):(Me)

(1)

is intended to represent the English

'Galileo believes that

the earth moves'.

The truth conditions for (1) are supposed to be very much
like the truth conditions for English belief sentences as

discussed in the main part of this chapter.
utterance of (1)
'Me'.

(1)

1
'

is

Thus, in any

supposed to refer to that utterance of

is true, moreover, for any speaker and time, if and

only if 'B(g,d)' is true for that speaker and time.

There is
at this point.

consists of

a

a

convenient feature of

D

that can be explained

When we evaluate (1) at an index, the index

speaker and a time.

At that index

'd'

is supposed

to refer to that speaker's utterance of 'Me' at that time.

Consider any interpretation function,

I.

(1)

is true under

I

at any index, <(p,t), provided 1(g), i.e., Galileo, believes p's

utterance of 'Me' at

t.

In other words,

(1)

is true^ at <fp,t)

iff the ordered pair consisting of 1(g) and p's utterance of
'Me'

at t is in 1(B).
We can, for now, identify p's utterance of 'Me' at

the ordered triple

identification later.
a set of

'Me')>.

t

with

More will be said on this

Given this identification, 1(B) should be

ordered pairs, each pair being

utterance, i.e., an ordered triple.

a

person and an

p
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The truth conditions for
(1) can now be stated more

precisely:

'B(g,d):(Me)' is true at

it

is

<p,t>

iff

<I(g),<p,t,'Me ^eI(B)
,

not difficult to go on from here to
specify truth conditions

for any belief sentence:

For any wff

<f>,

\I(a).<P.t,'Me

if

is

>)

e 1(B)

,

r

B(a! d):(ip)l

then

<}>

is true iff

Truth conditions for sentences in indirect
discourse would be
similar.
A full

statement of the truth definition for

It makes use of the notion of a "nominal

D

follows.

variant", which is

defined this way:

I

is a nominal variant of I
at a in D (N(I s r,a)) iff
(i) I and I' are interpretation functions for D
(ii) a is a constant in D
(iii) I and I* make assignments into exactly the same domain
(iv) I and I' make exactly the same assignments except
1

possibly at a

The truth definition is as follows:

If

r

P(ot!
.ot
is an atomic wff in D, then it is true
)
T
1
at any index <b,t> iff <fl(cn)
,I(a )SeI(P)
(2) If 'P(a,d) ($)' is a wff in D, then it ?s true T at <0,0
7
1
iff <I(a).<b,t.*^eI(P)
is r ~ip ] then <p is true
(3) If
at (p,t> iff ip is not true T
T
1
at <p,t>
^
then
is true, at <(p,t') iff \ is true,
(4) If (p is
1
at <p,'t> arid x is truej at <p,t)>

(1)

.

.

,

:

<j)

<j>

.

.

.

.
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(

5

)

(

6

)

If
is r (Ex)(^x/a)^ then 4» is true, at <p,t>
iff
(El ) (N( I , I ,a) and ip is true, at
<J,t>
1
If $ is ‘(x)(ipx/ a)' then
is true, at /p,t> iff
(I'JtNd.I'.a) =» 4, is true at <p,l>
<j>

'

'

1

<j>

x

Finally, we can define validity in D this way:

The inference from
to ip is valid in D iff for every
interpretation I and every index i,
is true^ at
<j>

The advantages of D.

Since D is essentially

a

i

formalized version

of the theory discussed inthe main part of this chapter, it has

many of the same advantages as that theory.
First, its ontological commitments are minimal.

Although

it does require the existence of sentence types, it avoids

propositions
Second, it seems to properly render valid inferences such
as the one from ‘Galileo believes that the earth moves'

believes something'.

to

'Galileo

This inference will be represented in D

by the inference from (1) to

1.

(Ex)(B(g,x))

To see if this inference is valid, we need merely see if,

for any

I

and any index

is as well.

(p,^,

if (1) is true^ at

Suppose (1) is true^ at <(p,t>.

(2) of the truth definition, <J(g),

is truej at

(pjO

then (2)

Then, given clause

<p,t,'Me'>/

is in 1(B).

iff there is some nominal variant of

I

(2)

at, say.
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a

such that

Surely there

'

B(g ,a

is

)
'

is true under that variant
at

<p,t>.

such a variant; any nominal
variant of

that assigns <p,t,'Me'> to

will do.

'a'

I

at 'a'

So the inference is

val id.

As we saw in the main part of
this chapter (section III),

some of the problems found in
earlier theories seem to be

overcome by this theory.
(1) will

For example, no belief sentence
such as

come out false for

a

person and time, if the person

utters it at that time, simply because
there is no utterance of
the appropriate type (cf.
pp.

144-145).

Moreover, if D can be made to accommodate
ambiguous

sentences at all, no additional problems will
be caused by belief
sentences.

Sentences of the form

just as they have been, even if

There are

a

<j>

r

B(a,d)

:

(<f>)l

is ambiguous.

may be interpreted
(Cf.

pp.

145-145.)

number of other advantages to this theory that

were not mentioned previously.

We could add a truth predicate

to the language, so that things such as

'It is true that the

earth moves' may be expressed in the object language.

We might

express this this way;

3.

Td: (Me)

We

rnay

also add a predicate for de re believing and one

for da r e saying.

4.

Thus, we could express the English:

Rodino believes of Nixon that he

is

guilty
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This will be expressed in terms
of

a

three-place predicate true

of believers, objects and open
sentences or predicates.

A more

perspicuous English rendition of
(4) might be:
5.

Rodino believes of Nixon that: he is
guilty

In D this might be expressed
by:

6.

B'

(r,n,d) (Gx)
:

These additions to
syntax and semantics,

D

would require some changes in the

for one thing, we would have to relax the

ban on unbound variables in the scope of

a

colon.

The truth

predicate may bring in some semantic paradoxes, but

I

suspect

that they can be dealt with in some standard way.

The disadvant ag es o f

Along with all these advantages, D

D.

does have a number of disadvantages.
some obscure primitives.
B;

For one, it does appeal to

As D has been presented here,

'S'

and

are both primitive predicates that express relations between

individuals and utterances that may occur thousands of years

after they have lived and in languages they do not understand.
Some of the obscurity of

'S'

can be removed by the introduction

of samesaying into the language, but it is difficult to imagine

how

*3'

might be defined in terms of samesaying.

'samesaying'

itself is

a

fairly obscure primitive.

Moreover,
(Cf.

pp. 141-144.)

.

1

Another problem in

D
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concerns inferences such as:

B(g ,d) (Me)
B(n,d) (Me)
8. (Ex)(B(g,x)^B(n,x)
1.

:

7.

:

This inference might be used to represent
Argument
earlier.
I

(Cf.

i

pp.

I

discussed

147-150.)

we deiine validity the way we have, this inference
will

come out valid.

Cut this has the effect of treating the two

demonstratives as if they both referred to the same utterance.
This seems to conflict with the basic intent of
Davidson's theory.
If, on the other hand, we change the definition
of

validity so that the lines in the inference are evaluated at
different indices, it

is

no longer clear that the inference is

val id

Finally, there is some problem
1 i

iri

representing sentences

ke

Galileo believes something
2. (Ex)B(g,x)
9.

The problem is similar to the one discussed earlier.

(2) will

(Cf.

pp.

150-154.)

be true under an interpretation at any (and all)

indices provided there is some object (namely, an utterance, or

ordered triple) such that it is the second member of some element

.
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of 1(B) of which 1(g) is the first member.

But, as we saw

earlier, there is no reason to think there must be such an

utterance, even though what (2) is supposed to express is true.
It is clear, however,

that there are many ordered triples,

such that p did not utter $ at t.

<CP»t,c{)'>

This suggests that

there may be something wrong with our identification of utterances

with these order triples

-

the triples exist even when the

corresponding utterance does not.
We can distinguish triples in which the person did utter

the sentence at the time from those in which he did not.
call

the former "actualized" ordered triples.

We can

No problem arises

from the identification of actualized ordered triples with
utterances.
have assumed until now that the only ordered triples in

I

elements of 1(B) are actualized ordered triples.
source of the difficulty.

This is the

If Galileo believes only that the

earth moves, but no one has ever uttered 'The earth moves', or

any synonymous sentence, then there will be no actualized

ordered triple such that Galileo believed it.

So (2) will

be

false when it should be true.

The only apparent way to get around this problem is to

allow unactualized ordered triples into elements of 1(B).
we might say that <I(g) ,(p,t, 'Me'))
did not utter 'Me' at

after

al

1

t.

is in

Thus,

1(B) even though p

That way, (2) might come out true
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The problem with this suggestion

is

that the meaning of

unactual ized ordered triples is
indeterminate.

There would seem

to be no grounds upon which we
could decide which unactualized

ordered triples

a

person believes, and which he does not.

Furthermore, when the samesaying relation
is introduced into the
language, there will be no grounds for
making some unactualized

ordered triples samesayings, and some not.
This objection is not as decisive as one
might hope.

What

it amounts to, essentially, is that if
we allow unactualized

ordered triples to be the objects of saying and
belief and the
relate of the ssmesaying relation, these relations
become

unacceptably obscure.
a

There seems to be no reason for thinking

person believes one unactualized ordered triple and not

another.

,,
,,

,
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PART

1 1

NON-RELATIONAL THEORIES

According to all the alternatives to (PV) discussed in
Parts
a

I

and II,

a

belief sentence expresses

believer and some other object.

a

relation between

The differences between the

various theories have been with regard to the nature of these
other entities.

In Part III

I

will turn to some significantly

different alternatives to (PV).

These are theories that

construe belief sentences as non-relational and dispense with
objects of belief altogether.

I

will

"non-relational theories of belief."
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refer to such theories as

CHAPTER VII
QUINE AND PRIOR

One of the first philosophers to explicitly defend a

non-relational theory of belief was W. V.

0.

Quine J

chapter

I

to it.

One objection is that Quine gives only

In this

will discuss Quine's theory and raise two objections
a

syntactical

theory of belief sentences, and no semantical account of them.
But without

a

semantics he is not entitled to draw any conclusions

about the ontological commitments of his theory.
not justified in claiming to have provided

commitment to propositions.

a

Thus, he is

way to avoid

The second objection is that by

dispensing with the objects of belief Quine fails to deal

adequately with
belief.

a

significant aspect of our discourse about

In connection with the second objection

I

will discuss

the views of A. N. Prior, who defends a theory similar to

Quine s.“

I

A.

Quine's theory.

In Word and Obj ect

,

at the conclusion of

a

theories of
critical discussion of sentential and inscriptional
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belief, Quine writes:

...there is no need to recognize 'believes' and
similar verbs as relative terms at all; no need
to countenance their predicative use as in 'w
believes x' (as against 'w believes that p'); no
need, therefore, to see 'that p' as a term.
Hence, a final alternative that I find as appealing
as any is simply to dispense with the objects of
the propositional attitudes
This means viewing
'Tom believes [Cicero denounced Catiline]' no
longer as of the form Fab' with a - Tom and b =
[Cicero denounced Catiline], but rather as of the
form 'Fa' with a = Tom and complex F
The verb
'believes' here ceases to be a term and becomes
part of an operator 'believes that' or 'believes
[...]', which, applied to a sentence, produces a
composite absolute general term whereof the
sentence is counted an immediate constituent
:

'

'

.

.

Quine's view has found several supporters.

In

addition to Prior,

whose views we will discuss shortly, Arthur Danto defends

a

theory similar to Quine's.^'
It is somewhat difficult to give a completely satisfactory

account of Quine's theory without first discussing his methodology.

Although

a

thorough discussion of that would lead to matters that

cannot profitably be discussed here,

I

think that the following

brief account of Quine's project is not misleading.
In

Chapter 4 of Word an d Object Quine points out several

problems that arise in sentences of natural languages.^

problem is that

a

sentence may contain

therefore be semantically ambiguous.^

ari

One

ambiguous term, and

For example, the sentence

'Our mothers bore us' may be about our births and it may be about

.
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our interest in our mother's
conversation.

On any occasion

the meaning of the sentence
depends upon the meaning of 'bore'

on that occasion.

Other problem sentences in natural
language are syntactically

ambiguous .

7

For example,

'Every boy dates some girl’ may mean

that there is some girl such that every
boy dates that girl and
it may mean that every boy is not
dateless.

Quine observes that ambiguous sentences
like these, and

other problem sentences, can often be
paraphrased into sentences
lacking these troublesome features.

For example, the syntactic

amuiguity mentioned above can be avoided by using
predicate logic
quantifiers instead of English quantifiers.
saying

Thus, instead of

'Every boy dates some girl' one may use whichever
suits

one's pyrpose of

y dates x)]
x dates y)]

and

'

(Ex)[x is

a

'(x)[if x is

girl
a

and (y)(if y is

a

boy then

boy then (Ey)(y is

a

girl

and

'

Quine calls the language which contains only these

trouble-free sentences the "canonical language" and the sentences
in it are said to be in canonical

form.^

Quine claims that

translating our language into the ca?ionical language serves two
purposes.

First, the canonical

language is an aid "to

understanding the referential work of language and clarifying
our conceptual scheme."^

I

think that this means that we get

a

clearer idea what entities are referred to and thus what entities
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exist, by focusing our attention on the canonical language rather
than ordinary language.

Second, the canonical
logical

language allows for a simpler

theory than ordinary language .^

0

That is, the definition

of a sentence, and the rules of inference for the canonical

language may be formulated more easily than the definition of

a

sentence and the rules of inference for natural language.

Quine never states clearly what the criteria are for

a

successful paraphrase from ordinary language into the canonical
language.

He says that the canonical

sentence need not be

synonymous with its ordinary language counterpart because synonymy
"is not a notion we can really make adequate sense

Instead, he says that a canonical sentence

paraphrase of an ordinary sentence

S on a

S'

of."^

is a proper

particular occasion
1

provided "the particular business that the speaker was on
occasion trying to get on with, with the help of

S

among other

things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using
1

instead of

S.'

thai.

S

^

Since this

is

not

a

precise criterion for successful

satisfactory.
paraphrasing, Quine's discussion is not entirely

proposed paraphrase is
We do not always know whether or not a

acceptable.

and we
Perhaps this point can be set aside here,

sentences.
can turn to Quine's account of belief

quantification
Quine's view is that reference to and

over propositions can be avoided in the canonical language.
is

It

important to note that he does not defend this view by

paraphrasing belief sentences into other sentences that lack
reference to propositions.

Instead, belief sentences go into

the canonical language in almost the same form they have in

ordinary English.

The only difference is that 'that* is

eliminated and replaced by square brackets around the sentence
following 'believes'.

Thus,

'Jones believes that Darwin erred'

'Jones believes [Darwin erred]'.

becomes

At one point Quine considers the view that '[Darwin erred]'
is a propositional

name,"*^ but he rejects if in favor of an

alternative proposal.^
[...]'

His alternative is to view 'believes

as a predicate forming operator on sentences.

Thus, it

operates on the sentence 'Darwin erred' to form the predicate
'believes [Darwin erred]'.

Quine says his view is that belief sentences are "of
the fonn 'Fa,., with complex 'F'."^

I

take this to mean that

we should view predicates like 'believes [Darwin erred ]

complex.

1

as

Let us call such predicates "belief predicates".

It

to belief
is not clear what Quine's attribution of complexity

predicates amounts to.
some
One possibility is that Quine is just attributing

syntactic property to the predicates.

Complex predicates might

after enumerating
be contrasted with simple ones in this way:
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all

the simple predicates of

to form additional

a

predicates.

language, one might specify ways

Predicates formed on the basis of

these rules would be complex predicates.
serve to form

a

For example,

'and'

can

complex predicate out of two other predicates.

The expression 'believes [...]' can also be considered

a

predicate

forming operator but it forms complex predicates out of sentences,
not out of other predicates.

When Quine says that belief

predicates are complex, he may wish to attribute syntactic

complexity to them.
It is also possible that Ouine's attribution of complexity

to belief predicates is an attribution of some semantical property.

Semantically simple expressions would be those whose interpretation
is assigned directly by the interpretation function.

A semantically

complex expression would be one whose interpretation is determined
by the interpretation of its parts.

So when Quine says that belief

predicates are complex, he might mean that they are semantically
complex.

Whether Quine intended to say that belief predicates are
syntactical ly complex and semantically simple or that they are
both syntactically and semantically complex,

I

think some account

of their semantics is required before he is entitled to draw any

ontological conclusions from his theory.

support this contention.

One is

determining the ontology of

a

a

Two considerations

general consideration about

given theory, and the other

concerns non-relational theories of belief specifically.
The general consideration is that one can only tell what
the ontological commitments of
i.e., by giving

a

theory are by interpreting it,

a

semantical account of it.

Suppose, for exap;ple,

that someone were, to defend an extremely simple theory, which

consisted of the single theorem

'

(Ex)(Fx)'.

We would not know

what entities this theory is committed to until we understand
at least the meaning of

1

F

1

.

If

1

his theory is committed to a cow.

F

1

means 'is

a

cow', then

Similarly, we only know

what entities Quine's theory of belief sentences is committed
to when it is interpreted.
It may seem obvious that Quine's theory can be interpreted

without commitment to propositions, but
is far

from obvious.

I

will argue that that

Indeed, the only moderately plausible

interpreted non-relational theory of belief has been proposed
by Jaakko Hintikka

^

and it seems to be committed to entities

every bit as objectionable as propositions, namely, possible
!

worlds.

j

Some philosophers even identify propositions with sets

values.
of possible worlds, or functions from worlds to truth

theories of
Thus, there is a specific fact about non-relational

theory must be
belief that supports my contention that Quine's
it can be
interpreted before any ontological conclusions about

drawn.

It is that interpreted non-relational

theories seem

indeed, as
have significant ontological commitments;

I

shall

lo
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argue in Chapter 8, their commitments may he as great as relational
theori es.
In

order to support my claim that it is not obvious that

Quine's theory can be interpreted without bringing in any

undesirable entities,

I

want to turn now to two simple ways in

which his theory might be interpreted.
is acceptable,

Neither interpretation

and this suggests that some more complex

interpretation is needed, perhaps one requiring propositions, or
possible worlds.

B.

Two in terpret ation s of Qu ine's theory.

On the first

interpretation of Quine's theory, belief predicates are

semantically simple, despite being syntactically complex.

That

is, the interpretation function interprets them directly, and

their interpretation does not depend upon the interpretation
of their parts.

This view is similar in some respects to the naive

propositional view, (NPV), discussed in Chapter

I.

•

he similarity

semantically
is that where (NPV) posited an infinite number of

simple propositional names

-

one for each sentence

-

this theory

belief predicates
posits an infinite number of semantically simple
-

one for each sentence in the language.
are
The objections to this version of Quine's theory

179

similar to those directed upon
(NPV).

General theoretical

considerations suggest that an acceptable
theory will not have
an infinite number of semantically
simple expressions.

Moreover,

it seems clear that the
meanings of the parts of belief
sentences

do contribute to the meaning
of the whole, contrary to the

implications of this theory 17
.

It seems, then,

complex.

that belief predicates must be
semantically

Since they are formed by operating on
sentences with

the operator 'believes

interpretation of

a

it is natural

to suppose that the

belief predicate will depend upon the

interpretation of this operator and the interpretation
of the

sentence in it.

One way to develop

a

theory along these lines is

to have the interpretation function specify
sets S and

S'

of

believers such that the extension of any belief
predicate
r

believes

is S if $ is true and is S'

if

<j>

is false.

This is

the second possible interpretation of Quine's theory.

The problem with this proposal is that it has the

consequence that the members of

S'

would be unfortunate enough to

believe every falsehood, and the members of
truth.

S

would believe every

Since most people seem to believe some, but not all,

truths, and some, but not all, falsehoods, this theory is clearly

unacceptable.
It is not easy to repair this defect without some radical

changes in the theory.

Since on the theory being considered,
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sentences have no other semantic properties than truth
and
falsity, it is difficult to see how the interpretation of belief

predicates can differ when the sentences in them have the same
truth value.

One move that suggests itself is to assign a

proposition, as well as

a

truth value, to each sentence, and then

let the interpretation of each belief predicate depend upon the

proposition expressed by the sentence in it.

Obviously, this

move is not open to an anti -propositionalist like Quine.
The preceding discussion was intended to show that there
is no obvious or clearcut semantical

theory to supplement Quine's

syntactical theory about belief sentences.

The absence of a

semantical theory renders the syntactical theory relatively
unenl ightening.

We can only tell what entities Quine's theory

requires when we interpret

it.

Since ws have no interpretation,

we have no idea whether or not it requires propositions.
It is

surely true that there is more than one way to

generate all belief sentences out of some syntactically basic
parts.

One way is to allow 'that' to form names out of sentences,

and 'believes' to form sentences out of two names.
is the one Quine advocates.

Which one of these methods is

preferable depends largely upon which leads to
semantic theory.

^

Another method

a

more attractive

If Quine's view does lead to a satisfactory

theory, and that theory is ontolcgically more economical than (PV),
then the Quinean view will

be an attractive alternative to (PV).
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But without

a

semantical theory, Quine's view has no ontological

implications, and thus does not show that commitment
to propositions
is

avoidable.

II

In

this section

I

will examine an objection to non-

relational theories that can be raised even in the absence of
semantical theory.

a

The objection, if sound, shows that no

matter how the semantics is developed, any non-relational theory
will fail

to deal properly with a significant part of our

discourse about belief.

A.

The no quantifi cat ion objectio n.

this way.

In

The objection may be put

addition to belief sentences in which what is

believed is expressed in the sentence, there are belief sentences
in which what is believed is unspecified.

Examples of such

sentences are 'Jones believes something', 'Jones believes something
Smith denies', and 'Jones believes everything Smith says'.

These

sentences, which appear to contain quantifications over objects of
belief, are meaningful and possibly true.

valid inferences involving them.

Moreover, there are

Any adequate theory of belief

.
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should account for these quantified belief sentences, but in
order
to do so,

bc;l

ieves

must oe regarded as

and belief sentences must be relational.

theory is false.

a two

place predicate,

So the non-relational

Let us call this the "no quantification

objection"
We can make the objection a bit more precise by looking

again at Quine's canonical language.

find

1.

a

In that language we will

riot

sentence like:

Jones believes something.

The reason that (1) is absent from the canonical language is that
Quine eliminates English quantifiers like 'something' and replaces

them by predicate logic quantifiers.
It may seem, then, that (1) can be replaced by:

2.

(Ex) (Jones believes x).

But (2) is not in the canonical language either, since 'believes'
is not a predicate and cannot properly be followed by a name or
a

variable.
In

in

order to introduce the kind of quantification we want

(2), we must reinstate

'believes' as a two place predicate.

But doing that requires abandoning the non-relational theory.

Thus, the non-relational theory cannot properly deal with

sentences like (1).

"
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liiyee repli e $ to the no quantificatinn nhjprtinn

i

w -jn

consider three replies to the no quantification
objection.
first reply is Quine's.

The

He admits that quantified belief

sentences cannot be formulated on his theory, but he
suggests
that his theory is satisfactory without them.
I

have devised myself.

can be admitted into

predicates such as
due to A.

N.

a

It is that quantified belief sentences

non-relational theory by recognizing

'believes something'.

Prior.

The second reply

The third reply is

He suggests that quantified belief

sentences can be admitted in

a

interpeting quantifiers in

way different from the customary

a

non-relational theory by

way.
(I) Quine is well

objection.

aware of the no-quantification

In both Word and

Object and Phi lo sophy of Logic he

points out that his canonical language bans quantification over

objects of belief.

moved by the problem.
is that

However, he does not seem to be terribly
In Wor d and Object his comment on it

quantification over objects of belief is "expendable"

because "such quantifications tend anyway to be pretty trivial
in what they affirm, and useful

information.

only in heralding more tangible

20

In saying that quantification over the objects of belief
is expendable, Quine seems

to be

saying that his theory is

satisfactory even if quantified belief sentences cannot be

.
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formulated in it and inferences involving such sentences not

represented in it.

He is, as Israel Scheffler puts it, willing

to "give up" these statements and inferences.

21

discussing Danto's version of Quine's non-relational

In

theory, Heidelberger argues that one's willingness to give up

these statements and inferences does not reduce the force of the
objection.

He writes, "Defenders of non-relational theories may

advocate that we 'give up' such inferences and 'be indifferent'
toward the corresponding conditionals, but if the inferences are
valid and the conditionals true, the attitudes we take to them
are insignificant.

22

Furthermore, Quine seems to be wrong when he says that
The truth

quantified belief sentences are "pretty trivial".

value of sentences like 'Everything the Pope believes (or says)
is true'

seems fairly important.

And the inferences such as one

from this sentence and 'The Pope believes that abortion is
wrong' to 'It is true that abortion is wrong' are valid and

significant.
Finally, Scheffler has argued, plausibly

I

think, that

attitudes
quantification over the objects of the propositional
is

reasons
indispensable in any adequate account of the role of

in human behavior.

23

good
It seems, then, that there are some

objects of
arguments for retaining quantification over the
bel ief
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(II) A possible second reply to the no
quantification

objection is that sentences like (1) need not be
exluded from
the canonical language.

For it may be suggested that what
(1)

says is:

3.

(3)

Jones is a believer.

simply attributes

a

property to Jones, and can easily be

admitted into the canonical language.

(1) can also be admitted,

with 'believes something' being counted as

a

primitive predicate,

or else (1) may simply be excluded and paraphrased by its

equivalent, (3).
This reply does not provide

a

solution to all the problems

caused by the absence of quantification over the objects of
belief.

In

addition to

to say things like

'I

a

way to express (1), we also need ways

believe everything John Dean says' and

doubt everything Nixon says'.
it seems that we will

In

'I

order to say these things,

need additional predicates, i.e.,

'believes everything John Dean says' and 'doubts everything Nixon
says'.

Since there are an infinite number of sentences like

these that can be formed, we will have to suppose that the
canonical language has an infinite supply of these predicates.
But that seems to be an implausible supposition.

Moreover, there are logical relations between various

belief sentences that will be lost if all these predicates are
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regarded as primitive.

For example,

decente is good' and

do not believe that detente is
good

imply

!

I

'I

'Nixon believes that

do not believe something Nixon does
believe'.

With all

the belief predicates left primitive,
the only way to validate
this inference is to introduce a special
rule licensing the

in.erence.

Since there are an infinite number of similar
valid

inferences, we would need an infinite supply of
these rules.
Bui this would seem to be as objectionable as
having an

infinite number of primitive expressions in the
language.

It is

difficult to see how anyone could learn all the rules
for these
inferences.

Yet people are able to recognize the validity of

these inferences.

So it does not seem as though there are an

infinite number of rules but rather one general rule covering
all

the inferences of this kind.

Thus, the second reply to the

no quantification objection is inadequate.
(Ill) A third reply to the objection can be found in Prior's

Obj ect s of Thought

.

Prior advocates a version of the non-relational

theory, but thinks it can be saved from the no quantification

objection.

Before discussing Prior's reply, it may help to

examine some other aspects of his theory.
Prior's major thesis is that propositions are logical

constructions.

By this he means that "sentences that are

ostensibly about propositions. .are not really about propositions,
.

9/1

but.

about something else."

T
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Prior finds ostensible reference to propositions in three
kinds of sentences.

The first is in ascriptions of truth

arid

falsity to propositions, as in 'The proposition that the sun is
hot is true'.

He argues that this sentence just means 'The sun

is hot', and the latter is about the sun, not about a proposition,

so the former is also about the sun and not a proposition.

25

Ordinary belief sentences, such as 'Jones believes that
Darwin erred', make up the second class of sentences in which
Prior finds ostensible reference to propositions.

Prior's

views on these sentences are similar to Quine's.

Like Quine,

he fails to accompany his syntactical observations with any

semantical theory, and therefore he is not justified in

concluding that commitment to propositions by belief sentences
27
is avoidable."

The third context in which Prior thinks there is an

apparent reference to propositions is the kind of context
under discussion in this section, namely, quantifications over

objects of belief.

Prior's example of a sentence of this kind

is:

4.

I

don't believe some of the things that

Coheri believes.

for
Prior credits Ramsey with discovering the method

eliminating this apparent reference to propositons.

28

It is

ordinary English, and
move to a "more stylized language" than

to

:
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rewrite (4) as:

5.

For some p, Cohen believes that p and

I

do not believe that p.

Prior argues that the quantifier in (5) does not range

over propositions, and because of this contends that (4) can be

paraphrased into

a

sentence containing no reference to or

quantification over propositions.

It is important to note, however,

that this paraphrase differs from the earlier one (from 'The

proposition that the sun is hot is ture' to 'The sun is hot')
in that in the earlier case both sentences were part of ordinary

English, whereas in this case we go from English, (4), to

non-English (5).
Perhaps, if Prior can give us

a

reasonable account of the

meaning of (5), and show that it means what (4) does,

arid

that

the quantifier in (5) need not range over propositions, then

we will be in

a

position to accept his claim that the ostensible

reference to propositions in (4) has been eliminated.
needed, then, is

a

What

is

clear account of the meaning of (5), and

some assurance that it means what (4) means.

Chapter 3 of Objects of Tho ught contains Prior's

explanation and defense of his account of quantification.
begins with what he calls "name quantifiers

.

These are

quantifiers binding variables filling the place of
writes

He

a

name.

He
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Consider, for instance, the sentence 'For some x,
x is red-haired'.
The colloquial equivalent of
this is 'Something i; red-haired'.
I do not think
that any formal definition of 'something' is either
necessary or possible, but certain observations can
usefully be made about the truth-conditions of
statements of this sort.
'Something is red-haired'
is clearly true if any specification of it is true,
meaning by a 'specification' of it any statement
in which the indefinite 'something' is replaced by
a specific name of an object or person, such as
'Peter', or by a demonstrative 'this' accompanied
by an appropriate pointing gesture.

Prior seems to be giving a substitutional interpretation
of the quantifier, as two reviews of his book suggest.
a careful

30

But

reading of the above passage, and the one following

it, shows that he is not.

31

On

a

substitutional interpretation,

one would say:

(A)

'For some x, x is red-haired' is true iff some
'x is red-haired' is true.

specification of

Prior is careful to reject (A):

do not say that 'Something is red-haired' or
'For some x, x is red-haired' is true only if
there is some true sentence which specifies it,
since its truth may be due to the red-hairedness
of some object for which our language has no
name or which no one is in a position to point
to while saying This is red-haired'
I

'

So Prior is prepared to accept only half the biconditional
in

(A).

He agrees that the truth of some specification of an

existentially quantified sentence

is

sufficient for its truth.

:
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but does not think it is necessary.

Prior does go on to give necessary and sufficient

conditions for the truth of the quantified sentence, but seems
to think that these conditions are not very enlightening.

He

writes

If we want to bring an 'only if
into it the
best we can do, ultimately, is to say that 'For
some x, x is red-haired is true if and only if
1

'

there is some red-haired object or person, but
this is only to say that it is true if and only
if, for some x, x is red -ha i red.

„

Thus, Prior is willing to assert:

(B)

'For some x, x is red-haired' is true if and only if
for some x, x is red-haired.

While (B) is surely true, it in no way supports the claim
that ’For some x, x is red-haired' is
'Something is red-haired'.

In general

a

,

more stylized way to say
we have no reason to

believe that Prior's stylized sentences are paraphrases of
English quantified sentences.

This fact will be of great

importance when we turn to quantifiers binding variables which
stand in place of a sentence, as in (5).
Prior says that a sentence such as (5)

...is clearly true if any specification of it is,
a 'specification' of it being a sentence in wnich
the prefix 'for some p' is dropped, and the
remaining variable p replaced by an expression
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of the sort for which it stands, i.e.,
sentence. ‘+

a

0

Again, Prior has offered only

sufficient condition for

a

Without

the truth of the quantified sentence.

a

necessary

condition, however, we simply do not know whether (5) really
Therefore, we do not know

is a more stylized version of (41.

whether Prior has shown us a way to eliminate the ostensible
reference to

a

Thus, he has not shown that

proposition in (4).

quantification over objects of belief can be retained in

a

non-relational theory, and he has not successfully replied to
the no quantification objection.

35

In one of the previously quoted passages Prior remarks

that

does "not think any definition of 'something' is either

lie

In light of this, it

necessary or possible".
i

nappropria te to criticize him, as

'something'

,

may seem

have done, for not defining

I

i.e., for not giving necessary and sufficient

conditions for the truth of sentences containing 'something'.
I

think, however, that Prior's remark may be challenged.

For surely

a

definition of 'something' is required if we are to

containing
determine the ontological implications of sentences
it.

Moreover,

a

definition is possible, namely, the standard

objectual interpretation

.

The only problem with that definition

is that it brings with it ontological

objectionable.

Therefore, since

a

commitments Prior finds

definition of 'something

is
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both necessary and possible,

criticize Prior

s

I

think it is appropriate to

theory on the grounds that it does not provide

one.

Ill

In this

chapter

I

have discussed the non-relational

theories of bel ief defended by Quine and Prior.

I

have argued

that they do not show that (PV) has more ontological commitments
than

a

theory of belief requires, because the theories, as

propounded by Quine and Prior, are only syntactical theories
about belief sentences, and we do not know their commitments
until a semantics is provided.

Thus, we do not know that

non-relational theories can have fewer commitments than (PV).
Moreover, the theories fail to properly account for quantified
belief sentences, and thus are subject to the no quantification

objection.

In the next chapter

non-relational theory.

I

will turn to a more successful

,,,,

,
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His second objection
is that the argument can be turned around to show that 'The
think the only answer
I
sun is hot' is about a proposition.
to this is a complete theory showing we need never refer to
propositions.
In the light of such a theory. Prior's
conclusion can be defended against Linsky's on the grounds
of ontological economy.

26.
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27.
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30.
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32. Prior, Objects of Thought , p. 36.
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34.
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35. An interesting question to consider is the adequacy of a
substitutional interpretation of the quantifier iri (5).
I
can think of only one kind of objection to it: there may be
propositions unexpressible in English, and these may be the

only ones Cohen and I disagree about.
In that case, (4)
would be true but (5) would be false. Prior's argument
against substitutional interpretation of name quantifiers
may be recast to show that there are propositions unexpressible
in English.
Suppose there is some red-haired object that is
nameless in English. There is a proposition, expressible in
languages having a name for this object, to the effect that
it is red-haired.
This proposition is not expressible in
Engl ish.

36. Prior, op. c it.

,

p.

36.

CHAPTER VIII
HINTIKKA

The two principal defects found in Quine's non-relational

theory of belief were that it did not offer any semantical account
of belief sentences and that it did not properly treat quantified

belief sentences.

Jaakko Hintikka has also defended

theory of belief^, but his theory does include

a

a

non-relational

semantical account

of belief sentences, and, althouyh Hintikka never discusses

quantified belief sentences,

I

will argue that his theory may be

expanded to include such sentences.
to a discussion of Hintikka's theory.

This chapter will be devoted
In section I,

I

will

present Hintikka's theory in its original form and in section
expand it

to

include quantified belief sentences.

II

Sections III

and IV will contain criticism of the theory.

'

I

I

In this section

I

will describe the language (H) developed

by Hintikka in "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes".

The vocabulary of (H) includes the usual assortment of
lower
constants, predicates, variables, and connectives of the
195

.
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predicate calculus (LPC).
‘S', which will

In addition,

it contains the symbol

be the counterpart in (H) of the English

believes that'

'

The rules for forming well -formed formulas (wffs) in (H)
are exactly like the

forming wffs with

(W1

1

rules in (LPC), with an added rule for

B'.

This rule

2

is:

If a is a constant or variable and
is a wff.

)

Wffs formed in accord with

(W1

)

<}>

is a wff,

then

will be referred to as "the

belief sentences" or "the belief formulas" of (H).

(H) could be

expanded to include other expressions of the same category as
1

B

'

,

representing 'knows that', 'doubts that', etc., but it will

be sufficient to deal with just

B
'

here.

'

The semantics for (H) is a possible v/orlds semantics, and
it may be developed as follows.

possible worlds and
in

(H).

D be a

Some objects in

but not in the others.
E,

D

Vie

Let W be a set of all the

set of all the objects talked about

will exist in some of the worlds in W

may suppose that there is

that assigns to each member of W some subset of

in W, then E(w)

is the set of all

D.

a

function,
If

w

is

those objects existing in w.

to
An interpretation for (H) is a function that assigns

set of
each constant some object and to each predicate some

n-tuples of objects.

But assignments are made relative to worlds,

1

x

.

,

.
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so an interpretation is a two argument function from expressions

and worlds onto objects or sets of n ‘tuples of objects.
An interpretation for (H) will also make assignments to

variables, but these assignments will not vary from world to
world.

Some way to deal with worlds in which the assigned

object to

variable fails

a

need not concern us here.

to

exist is needed, but this point

3

We may now turn to the truth definition for (H).
will

Truth

be defined relative to a world and under an interpretation

Thus, we will say
or simply,

1

<f>

'

cp

is true under interpretation

is true- 1

I

in world w'

in w

The truth rule for atomic sentences is as follows:
n

(Tl)

On are constantsn or variables and P is an
is true- 1 in w
n-place predicate, then fp (ai-..a
n
,w))eI(P
,w)
iff <I(ai,w),... ,I(a
If ai

Molecular sentences will be treated in similar fashion.
In order to state the truth rules for quantified

sentences, the concept of
An interpretation

interpretation
only if

I

and

I

I'

nominal variant must be introduced.

a

for (H) is a nominal variant of

I'

for

with respect to a variable

(hi)

1

'

if and

make exactly the same assignments at every world

to every constant, predicate, and variable, except possibly

The expression
will

1

"I

is a nominal

be abbreviated

1

N(

variant of
)

1

,1

,

'x‘

'

I

x

.

with respect to 'x'"

}

1
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With the help of this concept we may state the truth rules
for quantified wffs:

(T2)

If $ is a wff of the form r (Ex)(tJj)'' then
is true-I in w
,
iff (El ){[N(
'x' ) and ^ is true-I' in w] and I'(x,w)e
, 1
<j>

1

1

E(w)>
(T3)

is a wff of the form r (x)
,
iff (I ){[N(I ,1 'x' ) ^ is true-I'

If

<p

'

'

then

is true-I in w
in w] and I'(x,w)e
<j>

E(w)

that remains to complete the description of (H) is to

All

Hintikka begins his

specify the truth rule for belief formulas.

discussion of them with the observation that of all the possible
worlds, some are compatible with all the beliefs of
individual and some are

a

given

Let us call all those worlds

riot.

compatible with an individual's beliefs his 'belief worlds'.
Since an individual may exist in several worlds, and have

different beliefs in the different worlds, his belief worlds
will vary from world to world.

Hintikka thinks that understanding

B
'

‘

amounts to knowing

the function that assigns to each individual and his world, his

belief worlds relative to that world.

Suppose Ig is that

Ig(a,w) will thus be the set of all

function.

belief worlds

a_ s

relative to w.
We may now state the truth rule for belief formulas.

Informally the idea is that
provided

<J>

is true-I

in all

in every member of Ig(ci^,w)

.

a

wff

r

Ba(<}>)''

is true-I

a/s belief worlds, i.e.,

Formally, this rule

in w
4>

is true-I

may be stated

)
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>

if 9 is a wff of the form r Ba(fi)
then 4 is true-I
iff ip is true-I in every member of I (Ia,w),w).

(T4)

'

>

in w

f

I

think that there are some serious problems with (T 4 ),

but will postpone discussion of them until section III.
II,

I

will develop the language (H

1

)

In section

in which quantified belief

sentences may be expressed.

II

Hintikka never mentions sentences containing quantifications
over objects of belief in his discussion of propositional
He neither explains how they may be formulated in

attitudes.

his system, nor the reason for their absence.

that they may be formulated in
(H), which

I

a

I

think, however,

slightly modified version of

will describe in this section and call

'(H

1

)'.

No sentence in (H) expresses what is expressed in English
by:

1.

Jones believes something.

In

(H') the following formula will

what

2.

( 1 )

expresses:

(Ep) (Bj (p)

be a wff and will express

)

.
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The letter

will be used as an object language variable.

p

Will be called a

'sentential variable' and should not be confused

with the standard variables, e.g.,
(K).

3-

(

In

(H‘

) ,

It

(2) will

V,

already admitted into

be a wff, but a formula such as

Ex ) ( 3 j ( x )

will

be.

not.

It is not difficult to make (2) a wff in (H*

).

The rule

for belief formulas, (Wl), need merely be revised in order to

allow the formation of what we might call

'open belief formulas'.

That is, we replace (Wl) by:

(Wl

1

)

If a is a constant or variable and
variable, then r Ba(4>)' is a wff.

<f>

is a v/ff or sentential

1

Given (W1‘),

a

formula such as 'Ba(p)' is a wff.

Next, we add a rule for forming sentential ly quantified

wffs, similar to the rule for ordinarily quantified wffs:

(W2)

If ^ is a
r

and

wff and

is a sentential

P

variable, then

r

(EP)((f>)'

1

(P)(<M' are wffs.

(W2) allows the formation of wffs with vacuous quantifiers.

For example, since 'Fa' and 'Bb(Fa)' are both wffs, so are '(p)
(Fa)'

and

'

(

Ep ) ( Bb ( Fa )

)
'

.

This is an exact analogy with the

rules for ordinary quantifiers, which allow formation of wffs
such as

'

(Ex) (Fa)

'

)

.

.

)

If desired, we may specify a subclass of ail
(H') as the sentences of (M

1

).

the wffs of

These will be wffs having

neither vacuous quantifiers nor unbound variables.^
Given (2), we will have as wffs (and sentences) in (H

1

)

formulas such as (2) and

4.

(p) (Ba(p)

and

5.

(Ep) (Ba(p)^-Bb(p)

(5) may be used to express

'There is something

a^

believes and

b does not believe'

Now that quantified belief sentences may be formulated in
(H'), we must provide an interpretation for them.

The best way

to do this is to treat sentential variables like ordinary

variables and have interpretation functions make assignments
to them.

The assignment to any sentential variable will be

a

set of possible worlds, and the assignment made by an

interpretation to

a

particular variable will not vary from

world to world
Sentential variables must also be given
at each world.

a

truth value

The reason for this is that it enables

sententially quantified sentences to be treated analogously to
ordinary quantified sentences.

Just as

r

(Ex)(cl>)^

is said to be

.
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true- 1 provided
r

is

<{>

true-I' for some

will be true-I provided

1

(EP)(cf))'

<J>

I*

such that N(I',I,'x'),

is true for some I'

such that

N(I',I,P).
In order to make use of this rule, every open formula, e.g.,

'Ba(p)', must have a truth value.

In order to assign a truth

value to this belief formula, some truth value must be assigned
to

p
'
'

Then we may say that 'Ba(p)' is true-I provided

.

true in all of a'

'p

;

is

belief worlds.

s

The following rule for the truth of sentential variables
will suffice, although numerous other rules would work as well:

(T5) If P is a sentential variable, then P is true-I in w iff
wel (P,w)

be used to specify the truth conditions for

(T4) may still

unquantified belief formulas, open and closed, but

'ip'

must now

be taken to range over wffs and sentential variables.

Finally, we may add clauses to the truth definition for

sentential ly quantified formulas:

(T6)

If

<j>

is ( (EP) (ip)^ then
and ip is true-I' in w.

(T7)

If

<f>

4

>

i

is
s

r

(P)(ip)"

true-I

1

1

then

<J>

<p

is true-I

is true-I

!

in

w iff (EI )N(I

in w iff

I
(

'

)N(1

1

'

,1 ,P)

,1 ,P)

in w.

It may be helpful

the intended results.

to show, informally, that (T5)-(T7) have

The best way to do this is to suppose

interpretation
that there is a function, T, that assigns to each

,

.

203

and sentence or sentential variable, the set of worlds in which

that sentence or sentential variable is true under that

interpretation.

T(

I »4> )

those worlds in which

<j>

or

,

We may call these worlds O's

is true- 1.

T may be defined recursively,

'truth worlds'.

'truth set' or its

thus be the set of all

will

Tj(<j>),

in a manner similar to that in which truth is defined for (H‘).

The way in which (T5)-(T7) work may be seen more easily
We may state an analogue of

in terms of this new function.

The right hand side of (T4) reads

(T4) in terms of T.

true-I in every member of
be restated as

'

T

^ (xp)

or, equivalently,

'

(I

I

(a,w) ,w)

.

ip

is

In terms of T this may

g

includes every member of
(I(a,w) ,w) is

I

'

'

I

g

(a,w) ,w)
'

subset of T

a

( I

(ip)

.

'

Thus,

j

g

(T4) may be replaced by:

(T4

'

)

If 4 is r Bct(ip)^ then
is a subset of Tj(i|j)

4>

is true-I

in w iff

The intuitive idea of (T4‘) is that

a

(I(a,w),w)

I

g

belief sentence is

true provided the subject's (the believer's) belief worlds

subset of the truth worlds of the content

constitute

a

sentence.

set for
It might be convenient to say that a truth

a

sentence

is the

"proposition"

9

expressed by the sentence,

and that the intuitive idea of (T4

'

)

is that a belief sentence

belief worlds are a subset
is true if and only if the believer's
sentence.
of the proposition expressed by the content

)

'
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The truth conditions for quantified belief sentences may
now be explained with relative ease.

'

(Ep) (Ba(p)

)

is true

'

p

provided there is some propositions that may be assigned to

'

such that a's belief worlds constitute a subset of that

proposition.

The assignment to

p
'

’

that makes this quantified

sentence true may be identical with the truth set of some
sentence, but it need not be.

So the quantified sentence may be

such that

true even though there is no sentence

This seems desirable, since it is possible that

something, but nothing expressable in (H

a^

r

Ba

true.

is

(<!>)'

believes

1

).

A more complex example is:

(Ep) (Ba) (p)/v~Bb(p)

5.

(5)
b

represents the English 'There is something

does not believe'.

(5)

'

is false.

believes and

is true provided there is some

assignment that may be made to
and 'Bb(p)

a^

p
'

such that 'Ba(p)'

'

is true

So, if there is some proposition such

that a's belief worlds constitute
not, then (5) will be true.

10

a

subset of it, but b

s

do

If, for example, a believes that

worlds will
Fc, but o does not, then a's belief

constitute

a

by 'Fc', but b's belief
subset of the proposition expressed

proposition.
worlds will not be a subset of that

however, that what
any sentence in (H

a
1

).

It is possible,

expressed by
believes and b does not is not
(5) may still

be true in those circumstances

)

.
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if there is some assignment that may be made to

'p', even though

not a truth set of any sentence, that makes ’Ba(p)„~Bb(p)

true.

'

It is an

(H‘) thus seems to be a superior theory to (H).

interpretated non-relational theory of belief that allows

quantification over the objects of belief.

There are, however,

some serious problems with (H‘), and in the next section

I

will

discuss them.
Before moving on to the objections to (H'),
out that there is one respect in which (H*

I

should point

involves a departure

from (H) that Hintikka might regard as undesirable.

contend,

I

He would

believe, that the introduction of sentential

quantifiers ranging over sets of possible worlds ontologically
those
commits (H‘) to these entities, whereas (H) did not have
commi tments

assumes
Hintikka argues that one's "ontology is what one
an ontologically
to exist in one’s world," and "to exist in

relevant sense, to be

a

part of the furniture of the world, is

to be a value of a special

kind of bound variable, namely one

possible world
whose values all belong to the same

." 1

quantifiers in (H) always
Since Hintikka's object language
same possible world, and never
have values that all belong to the

possible worlds, Hintikka
include possible worlds or sets of

ontologically committed to possible
claims that his theory is not

worlds or sets of possible worlds.

The quantifiers in (H ), on

.
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the other hand, do have sets of possible worlds as values, and these
sets do seem to exist in possible worlds, so (H

committed

to

1

)

is onto logically

such objects.

Hintikka admits that "we must in some sense be
to whatever

v/e

quantify over ."^

2

c ommitte d

But since possible worlds are

are not
only quantified over in the metalanguage for (H), and

said to exist

iji

any world, his theory is not ontologically

committed to them.

Instead, he says, they are part of the

is
"ideology" of the theory, and, apparently, the theory

ideologically committed to them

.”13

(H')

s

however, is

and thus to
ontologically committed to sets of possible worlds

pos

hi e worl ds

thernsel ves

ontology is
The distinction between ideology and
one, but

I

a

clear

that the
think it would be a mistake to suppose

ontological commitments of

a

theory, in Hintikka'

ones.
the only "important" or "relevant"

s

sense, are

Someone who doubts

object to both (H) and (H‘)
that there are possible worlds would

committed to an objectionable kind
on the grounds that they are
of entity.

than (H) because it
So (H') is no more objectionable

It
ideology to the ontology.
moves possible worlds from the
with introducing any entities
would be a mistake to charge (H' )

not required by (H).
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III

In this section

will discuss three fairly familiar

I

These are also objections to (H), but they

objections to (H‘).

are sometimes overlooked in discussions of Hintikka's theory

belief have been the focus of his

because his views on

d e re

critics' attention.

These objections are: (i) the logical

equivalence objection

-

(H‘)

implies that everyone believes

every logical equivalent of anything he believes; (ii) the

closure objection

-

(H') implies that everyone believes all

the

logical consequences of anything he believes; and (iii) the
logical

impossibility objection

-

(H‘) implies that no one

believes any logical impossibility.

I

will argue that each of

these implications is false.
( i )

One consequence

The logical equivalence objection.

of (H‘) is that a person believes everything logically equivalent
to anything he believes.

easily shown.
$ is true

That this is

consequence of (H’) is

a

r

A belier sentence such as

in all

a/s belief worlds.

If

<t>

1

Ba(4>)'

is true provided

are logically

and

so
equivalent, then they are true in exactly the same worlds,

the other
one is true in all a's belief worlds if and only if
is true in all

a's belief worlds.

equivalent, then

r Ba(r|>)l

-j

s

Hence, if

4?

true if and only if

and ^ are logically
r

3a(i|^

clearly
The feature of (H') just described seems

is true.

)
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objectionable because it forces us to attribute to believers many
beliefs they need not have.

Suppose, for example, that

has

a_

never heard of snow and does not have the concept of snow.
that a person cannot have

a

concepts that make it up.

assume

I

belief unless he has grasped all the
Thus,

a^

would have no beliefs

involving the concept of snow, e.g., that snow is white, or that
However, on Hintikka's theory, if a believes

snow is not white.

If he believes,

anything, then he does have beliefs about snow.

say, that grass is green, it follows that be believes that grass
is green and either snow is white or snow is not white.

Ihis is

because 'Grass is green' and 'Grass is green and either snow is

white or snow is not white' are logically equivalent.
(ii) The closure objection.

belief worlds, then everything

worlds as well.
r

So,

is true also.

Ba

if

r

Ba(cf>)^

<j>

If

<f>

is true in all

of a/s

implies is true in all those
is true and

<J>

implies

ip

then

But people frequently fail to believe all

the logical consequences of what they believe, so this implication

of

H
(

'

seems to be false.

objection
A particularly grievous instance of the closure

concerns necessary truths.

Since necessary truths are true in

all worlds, they are implied by everything.

true, for any $, it follows that for any

necessary truth,

<>

implies

ij>,

and

r

ip

Ba(i.b)^

So,

if

r

Ba(cf>)^

is

such that

ip

is true.

This implies

is a

and logical truth.
that every believer believes every mathematical
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H

ihuSj

(

'

implies that every believer believes that snow is

)

white or it is not the case that snow
he has the concept of snow.

do not have this belief.

is white,

whether or not

It seems, however, that some people

Similarly, it seems that there are

many mathematical truths some of us fail to believe.
(iii) The logical

impossibility objection.

Since

a

logically impossible formula is true in no worlds, it is not
true in all
if

<j>

(or any of) the belief worlds of anyone.

is necessarily false, it is provable in (H

false.

^

1

)

Therefore,

that

r

Ba(c*>)''

is

This, too, seems inconsistent with the facts about

belief, since people often believe necessary falsehoods, e.g.,

false mathematical statements.
I

think that each of these objections constitutes

serious problem for Hintikka's theory.

Moreover,

I

a

see no way

to overcome them without significantly changing the theory.

However,

I

should point out that Hintikka is aware that his theory

is subject to objections of this sort.

In response he says that

his theory does not actually apply to the real world, but only
to a world in which people are logically perfect, in the sense

that they are able to draw all the consequences of their belief
and believe all such consequences.

This reply to objections of the sort raised in this

section can only be dealt with briefly here.

Hintikka seems to

belief,
admit that his theory is not an adequate theory of real
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but is adequate only as

a

theory of some idealized kind of belief.

Since ic is real belief and its associated ontology chat are of

interest here,

I

think that we can safely conclude that Hintikka

has not shown that our objections fail.

Perhaps, in fairness to

Hintikka, it should be admitted that although his system is not

adequate as

a

theory of real belief, it is possible that it is

an adequate theory of an idealized belief.

IV

I

will conclude this chapter with a few general remarks on

the alleged ontological advantages of non-relational theories.

Prior and Quine suppose that non-relational theories make no

signficiant commitments to suspect entities.

I

argued in Chapter

VII that no judgment on the commitments of the non-relational

theories of Quine or Prior could be made until semantical accounts
of them were given.

Hintikka has given

a

semantics for

a

non-relational theory of belief but his theory does not escape

commitment to all objectionable kinds of entities.

In

particular, Hintikka's theory is committed to possible worlds,
and that commitment is likely to be judged extravagant by

philosophers like Quine and Prior.

So interpreted non-relational

theories may have commitments Prior and Quine regard as

5

.
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objectionable, and it has not been shown that any adequate
non-relational theory can be developed that lacks such
cornmi

tments

Furthermore,

a

possible worlds semantics for belief

sentences can be developed

1

that has no more commitments than

(H‘) and that avoids some of the objections just raised against

(H').

On this theory, call

it

'(B)', belief sentences are once

again treated as relational, with the objects of belief being
functions from possible worlds to truth values.
In order to develop B, we must suppose that each sentence
is assigned a truth value relative to each world.

that maps each world onto the truth value of

a

The function

given sentence at

that world is the "preposition" expressed by that sentence.
is the function that maps

Thus, the proposition expressed by

each world onto the truth value of
In

(B) a that-clause will

<j>

in that world.

be treated as a name of the

proposition expressed by the sentence it contains.
is a name of the proposition expressed by

t|).

Thus,

'Believes'

^that-cf^

is a

two-place predicate true of people and propositions.
The theory just outlined seems to make no significant

ontological commitments not made by (H

1

).

The only entities

required in addition to the usual assortment of individuals and

properties (sets of individuals) are possible worlds and functions
from possible worlds onto truth values.

Thus, the commitments
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of (B) are the same as those of (H'), with the possible addition
the

01

t»

uth values, which must be as objects of some sort.

There are at least two respects in which (B) is superior
to (H
(H

1

)

'

First, the logical

.

impossibility objection raised against

does not hold for this theory.

)

Consider, for example, the

sentence 'Jones believes that seven times seven is forty eight'.
An adequate theory should allow this sentence to be true, and,

unlike (H

1

),

(B) does.

Since 'Seven times seven is forty eight'

is false in all worlds,

'that seven times seven is forty eight'

names the function that maps every world onto falsity.

The

interpretation of 'believes' may well include the pair consisting
of Jones and this function, so this belief sentence may well be

Thus, (B) is immune to the logical impossibility objection.

true.

The closure objection is also avoided by (B).
fact that $ implies
in all
r

that

ij;

it does not follow that

the same worlds.

^

<j>

From the

and ^ are true

Therefore, the functions named by

and ^thatif/ may differ, and
1

r

S

believes that

cp

believes thatij/ may differ in truth value, even though

and

1

In escaping the closure objection

ip.

infer from the fact that

6

.

S

implies

(B) does open itself to

a

person has one belief that he has

For example, one might hold that

believes that

S

There are some cases in which we may wish to

another objection.

another.

<{>

r

P

and Q
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impl ies

S

7.

believes that

However, since

and Q' and

'P

worlds (assuming

P.

Q
'

'

is

P
'

*

are not true in all the same

contingent and not implied by 'P'), the

thdt-clauses in (6) and (7) name different functions, and thus
there is no guarantee that (7) will be true whenever (6) is.
This objection may be stated in

Whereas (H
ai

1

1

)

a

more general form.

had the undesirable consequence that, one believes

the implications of anything one believes, (B) does not have

as a consequence that one believes any of the implications of

anything one believes (with the exception of logical equivalents
see below for more on this).

-

This too seems undesirable, as

the truth of the matter appears to lie somewhere in between:

there are some implications that are so simple that if

a

person

believes the premise it follows that he believes the conclusion.

Sentences (6) and (7) give us an example

iri

which this obtains.

Although neither (H‘) nor (B) is entirely adequate to this
point, it seems to me that (B) is superior to (H').

For one

thing, one might argue, with some plausibility, that implications

even so simple as simplification can be overlooked and that the

implication from (6) to (7) is invalid.
if it is
arid

On the other hand,

granted that (6) does imply (7), one could add axioms

rules to (B) to validate the inference.

The exact form of

such rules needs to be worked out, but there seems to be no

reason why they cannot be developed.
A more serious problem with (B) is that it is subject to
the logical equivalence objection.

If

cf>

and

are logically

ip

r

equivalent, then they are true in all the same worlds, and
and ^thatije name the same functions.
and

that
I

r

S

believes that

^

As a result,

that

(jO

believes

are equivalent.

conclude that non-relational theories of belief, at

least those considered here, have little to recommend themselves.
The best non-relational theory, (H

1

),

did have a commitment to

possible worlds, and thus does not avoid all suspect entities.
Since (B) is

a

relational theory that makes no additional

commitments and avoids some of the problems encountered by
it would seem that (B) is a superior theory.

(H

1

),

As we have seen,
..

..

however, (B) itself is open to at least one serious objection.

16

.

.

'
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FOOTNOTES

1.

-

CHAPTER VIII

Oaakko Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes",
reprinted in Refere nce and Modality , edited by Leonard Linsky,
Oxford University P'ress, London, 1971, pp. 145-167. See also,
Oaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief Cornell University
Press, 1962.
,

2.

It is important to realize that (Wl) allows open formulas,
e.g., 'Bx(Fa)', to be wffs.
I
assume that the other
formation rules are similar, and that formulas such as Fx
are also wffs.
'

3.

One possibility is to let interpretations be partial functions.
If I('x',w) is u and u is not E(w- ), then I('x',w.) would be
undefi ned

4.

See Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", pp. 150151

5.

See ibid

6.

Since Ig is a function from individuals and worlds onto sets
of worlds, and not a function from names and worlds onto sets
of worlds, it would be a mistake to replace the right hand
side of (T4) by 'if; is true-I in every member of I(a,w)'.

7.

A large part of his discussion is devoted to quantifying into
belief contexts, but that is not our concern here.

.

,

p.

152.

'vacuous quantifiers' and 'unbound variable'
can be defined precisely, but I will not attempt to define
them here.

8. The expressions

9.

intend every set of worlds to be a proposition, in this
sense, and not just those sets that are truth sets of some
I do not wish to suggest
sentence under some interpretation.
that this use of 'proposition' is the same as the one
discussed in Chapter I.
I

there is something
10. Alternatively, we may say that (5) is true if
in all of
true
not
is
that
true in all of a's belief worlds
b's.
11. Hintikka,

"Semantics for Propositional Attitudes",

p.

153.
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12.

Ibid

.

,

p.

3

Ibid

.

,

pp. 153-154.

1

.

14.

154.

I
assume that Ijj does not assign the null set to any person
Ba(4>)'' would be true for every <J>,
If it did, then
and world.
would be true in all (i.e., none) of ads belief
since every
worlds.
(

cj>

15.

See Richard Montague, "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic" in
Semantic s of Natural Languages , edited by D. Davidson and G.
Hanman, Dordrecht-Hol land, D. Reidel Publishing Co, 1972, pp.
142-168.

16. Montague argues in "Pragmatics and Intensional
this is not a bad feature of his system.

Logic" that

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters

have examined the views of

I

several philosophers who claim that an adequate account of belief

sentences does not require all the entities, such as propositions,

required

b.y

(PV).

Carnap and Scheffler attempt to establish

this conclusion by rewriting or paraphrasing belief sentences as

sentences of languages that can be interpreted without including

prepositions in the domain.

Davidson attempts to establish this

conclusion by providing an interpretation for the English belief
sentences themselves, while Prior and Quine defend it by

suggesting that belief sentences have

a

syntactical structure

different from that assumed by defenders of propositional
theories.

Hintikka provides an interpretation for belief

sentences that presupposes such
In this chapter

J

a

syntax.

will summarize the conclusions reached

in my examination of these theories.

I

will also discuss what

have concerning
implications the truth of these theories would

desirability of a
the existence of propositions or the
propositional theory.
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I

Carnap and Scheffler have proposed rewriting belief

sentences as sentences of languages that can be interpreted

without propositions.

Originally, Carnap proposed that

a

belief

sentence such as

1

.

Galileo believed that the earth moves

be rewritten or paraphrased as:

2.

Galileo was disposed to respond affirmatively to some
sentence of some language synonymous with 'The earth
moves' in English.

Other belief sentences could be rewritten in

a

similar manner.

The major problem with this proposal is fairly evident:
3.
one's tendencies to respond affirmatively need not coincide with

one's beliefs.

For example, Galileo might have tended to lie or

he might have been afraid to admit his controversial belief.

In

either of these cases (2) would be false despite the trutn of (1).
So this proposal

is unacceptable.

critics, Carnap
In the light of objections raised by his

suggested tnat
came to reject this proposal and in its place

sentence like (1) be replaced by

Galileo had relation
Engl ish.

B to

a

a

sentence like.

'The earth moves' as a sentence of
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The idea here is that belief sentences be replaced in Carnap's
formal system by sentences that express a relation between a person,
a

sentence, and a language.

All

references to propositions are

thus avoided, and it appears that we have an account of belief

sentences more economical than (PV).

It is important to realize

that in this proposal, unlike the first one, the nature of the

relation expressed by the replacement sentences is not specified.
Objections raised by Church, discussed here in Chapter III,
show that this proposal succeeds only if two controversial

assumptions are made.

First, it must be assumed that an adequate

that
paraphrasal of a sentence need only be logically equivalent to
Second, it must be assumed

sentence, and not synonymous with it.

do.
that sentences in English necessarily mean what they

That is,

it must be assumed that a sentence like

4.

earth moves
'The earth moves' means in English that the

is a necessary truth.

is mistaken, although

I

I

believe that each of these assumptions
am not certain that these points

proposal.
constitute decisive objections to Carnap's

were discussed in
Additional problems for Carnap's theory

Chapter IV.

doubt that
One problem is that there is some

properly by the theory.
iterated belief sentences can be treated

existence of ambiguous
Furthermore, it seems clear that the

sentences poses

a

serious problem for the theory.

Consider the
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ambiguous English sentence:

5.

Jones believes that the bank is wet,

and its paraphrase in Carnap's system:

6.

Jones has relation B to 'The bank is wet' in English.

Since (5) is ambiguous,

or false.

we should not say that it is simply true

Instead, we should say that it is true or false given

one of its meanings, and true or false given another of its

meanings.

As a result, we can say that some utterances

oi

(5)

occasions
are true and some are false (or that (5) is true on some
of utterance and false on others).

Sentence (6), however, is not

ambiguous and consequently cannot properly paraphrase (5).
7.
(5)

For if

under the other,
is true under one of its meanings and false

value, then (6)
and (6), being unambiguous, has only one truth

meanings.
must improperly paraphrase (5) under one of its
is contained in
The most promising solution to this problem

the proposal made by Davidson.

Scheffler has proposed
sentences.

I

a

will turn to it shortly.

different paraphrase of belief

According to his theory,

a

belief sentence like (1)

would be rewritten as:
(that-the-earth-moves)
There is some x such that x is a
inscription and Galileo bel ieved-true x.
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An inscription is a (that-the-earth-moves) inscription if and only
if it is an inscription in English that looks just like the

inscription

'Trie

earth moves'.

predicate 'bel ieves-true'

.

Scheffler says little about the

What he does say is that

a

person need

not understand, affirm, or even be aware of an inscription he
bel

i

eves-true.

argued that (7) is not

I

a

proper paraphrase of (1), since

(7), unlike (1), implies the existence of an inscription.

One interesting and important issue that arises in

connection with these proposals concerns the ontological
implications that can be drawn from them.

Scheffler apparently

thinks that the truth of his proposal shows that there are no

propositions, or at least that we can avoid commitment to them.
He argues that since (a), (1) can be rewritten as (7), and (b),

quantifier does not
(7) makes no mention of propositions and its

range over propositions, or at least that (d), we can avoid

commitment to them.

Since we can avoid commitment to propositions,

and propositions are suspect entities, Scheffler would conclude

that we should adopt

a

theory that avoids them.

argument could be made by

a

A similar

defender of Carnap's theory, although

Carnap himself does not offer such an argument.
I

invalid.

is
believe that the inference from (a) and (b) to (c)

upon an
My argument against this inference is based

argument offered by Heidelberger.

Since the predicate 'believes-
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true'

is not one

with which we are familiar, and it is not fully

analyzed, we do not know whether or not

a

person can believe-true

an inscription without standing in some other relation to some
In particular, we do not know whether or not a

other object.

person can believe-true an inscription without there being

a

proposition expressed by the inscription and believed by the
person.

Until we know that this is not the case, we cannot infer

from the (alleged) truth of Scheffler's proposal that there are
no propositions.

Similar considerations apply to the above argument made by

defender of

a

predicate

Carnapian theory.

On Carnap's theory, the

is used in the sentences that paraphrase belief

B
'

sentences.
a

a

'

All

that we know about this predicate is that it is

languages,
three-place predicate true of people, sentences, and

and that if

B
'

'

language
is true of a person p, a sentence S, and a

L, and S in L is synonymous with S'

S', and L'.

in L',

then

B
'

'

is true of p,

not
One thing we do not know is whether or

can have relation B to

a

sentence and

a

a

person

language without there

sentence in the language and
being a proposition expressed by the

believed by the person.

case,
Until we know that this is not the

truth of Carnap's proposal
we cannot infer from the (alleged)

that there are no propositions.
(d), from the success
One might draw the weaker conclusion,

proposals.
of one of these paraphrasing

That is, one might argue

.
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that the paraphrases show

that,

what is expressed by belief

sentences can be expressed by sentences of languages whose

interpretations do not include propositions in their domain.
Thus,

a

defender of Carnap's proposal might say that all that is

needed to interpret belief sentences are people, sentences, and
languages.

Scheffler claims that all that is need to interpret
Since these proposals are

his system are people and inscriptions.

more economical than (FV), they are preferable to (PV).
This argument is more complex than the previous one.

Of

are not
course, since we have seen that the paraphrases

successful, we can reject the argument.

However, it is of some

the paraphrases would
interest to determine whether the success of

should not, suppose that
have established that we need not, and

there are propositions.
I

these proposed
believe that the success of either of

shown that belier can
paraphrases of belief sentences would have

can be interpreted without
be expressed in a language that

resorting to propositions.

However, the price paid for this

of the primitive predicates
ontological saving comes in the nature

of the language.
B
»

is

*

to the predicate
On Carnap's theory we appeal

One way to account for the way

*B’

behaves in the system

synonymous when they express tne
to say that sentences are

sentence
person has relation B to a
same proposition and that a

proposition
if he believes the
in a language if and only

,
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expressed by the sentence in the language.

Of course, if the point

of the proposal is to avoid propositions, such an explanation of
'B'

is inappropriate.

It seems desirable, then, that some alternative account of
B
'

'

However, it is difficult to imagine

be given.

other than the one just mentioned could be given.

v/hat

account

Thus, Carnap's

proposal makes use of an unanalyzed obscure predicate

B
'

*

that

can only be properly understood if appeal is made to propositions.
It is not clear that a theory with such an obscure predicate is

preferable to one that recognizes propositions in the first
That is, it is not clear that an interpretation of our

place.

language that renders predicates obscure is preferable to an
interpretation that requires suspect entities.
Similar remarks can be made about Scheffler's proposal.
Like

1

B‘, Scheffier's

predicate.

'bel ieves-true'

is an unanalyzed obscure

One possible analysis of it would appeal

propositions!

a

to

person bel ieves-true an inscription if and only

inscription.
if he believes the proposition expressed by the
this account of 'bel ieves-true

1

But

is unacceptable to Scheffler,

who proposes to do without propositions.

Again, it is not clear

predicate, is preferable
that Scheffler's theory, with its obscure
in the first place.
to a theory that recognizes propositions
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II

Davidson has proposed another alternative to (PV).

He

develops his theory in terms of sentences in indirect discourse,
and suggests that the truth conditions for

8.

a

sentence such as

Galileo said that the earth moves

are given by the following molecular sentence:

9.

Galileo produced some utterance that is
the earth moves.

Here ’that' is

a

a

samesaying with that

demonstrative referring to the utterance of the

sentence following it.

Accordingly, 'samesaying' is

a

two-place

predicate true of utterances, that holds, according to Davidson,
when the utterances agree in "purport".
When we extend Davidson's theory to belief sentences,
10.
of problems arise.
couple

a

It is difficult to see how 'believes

can be analyzed in terms of samesaying.

Since (1) can be true

produce
without Galileo having produced or even been disposed to

any samesayi rig with any utterance of 'Ihe earth moves

,

(1)

for (8).
cannot be given an analysis similar to that proposed

The best we can do,

I

believe, is rewrite (1) as:

Galileo believed that: the earth moves.

As in (9),

'that'

is to be interpreted as a demonstrative.

referring in any utterance of (10) to the utterance of 'The earth
moves' contained in that utterance of (10).

Accordingly,

'believes' is a two-place predicate true of people and utterances.

One virtue of this proposal is that it solves the
Consider again the

ambiguity problem described earlierambiguous sentence (6).

On Davidson's theory,

(6)

is rewritten as:

11. Jones believes that: the bank is wet.

In any particular utterance of (11)

'that

refers to the utterance

of (II).
of 'The bank is wet' contained in that utterance

Since

meaning, Jones
such utterances of 'The bank is wet' may vary in
of them.
may believe some of them but need not believe all

So

in truth value from one
(11), on Davidson's theory, can vary

represent (6).
utterance to another, and therefore can properly
is that it has
What is peculiar about Davidson's proposal

utterances they have never
as a consequence that people believe
understand.
heard and utterances they could not
(10)

For example, if

then Galileo believed an
is true as uttered by me now,

utterance made by me now in English.

Thus, Galileo would believe

years after his death in a language
an utterance made hundreds of
he need not have understood.

saying that 'believes',
This oddity could be explained by
in the following
in (10) may be analyzed
as it should be understood
of
utterance, in Davidson's sense
way: a person believes an
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'believes', if an only if he believes, in

a

proposition expressed in that utterance.

Since one of the

more usual sense, the

objectives of Davidson's theory is to avoid propositions, this

account of his use of 'believes' is inappropriate.

Without it,

however, we are left with an obscure unanalyzed predicate, and
again, it is not clear that such

a

theory is preferable to one

that recognizes propositions in the first place.

Davidson's theory also encounters problems in dealing with

sentences in which the objects of one's belief are mentioned

without being expressed.

12.

For example, for a sentence such as

Galileo believed something Newton disbelieved

to be true on this theory, there must be some utterance such that

Galileo believed it and Newton disbelieved it.

However, since

the point of contention between Galileo and Newton might remain

unspoken, this seems to be an improper reading of (12).

Ill

The final group of theories discussed here are theories
that suggested that we do away with objects of belief altogether.
It was thought that so doing would avoid commitment to objectionable

entities.

However, the non-relational theories proposed by Quine

.

and Prior did not include any semantical treatment of belief

sentences, and as

a

result we have no idea what the ontological

commitments of these theories are.

An interpreted non-relational

theory, such as Hintikka's, does have commitments to some entities

that may be objectionable: possible worlds.

theory has

everyone

a

Furthermore, Hintikka'

number of problematic features, most notably, that

believes all the logical consequences of anything he

bel ieves
I

conclude, then, that none of the theories discussed here

is entirely satisfactory.

Since we have no acceptable alternative

to (PV), we have no acceptable account of belief sentences that is

committed to fewer entities than (PV).

Thus, it has not been

established that (PV) is committed to more entities than are
required for an adequate account of belief sentences.

.
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